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Abstract
The notion of informed consent to medical treatment is a fundamental precept in law. It
recognizes autonomy and the right to personal inviolability, irrespective of nationality,
socio-economic situation and ideological orientation. A full realization of autonomy in
the Nigerian legal system is severely constricted by sociological and cultural factors. Of
particular concern is the impact of oppression which may arise from socialization,
arbitrary disclosure practice by physicians, or as a result of legislative enactment. To
remedy the elemental defects in the Nigerian Code of Medical Ethics, without
addressing the impediments posed by the social environment from which a patient
operates, will nuance informed consent in Nigerian health care but may not fully realize
patient autonomy. A serious commitment to respecting patient autonomy may be
realized through a collective effort of the State, the medical profession, the community,
and patients in order to remove the impediments to full exercise of autonomy.
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Chapter One
Introduction
1.1

General Overview

The notion of informed consent to medical treatment is a fundamental precept in law. It
recognizes autonomy and the right to personal inviolability, irrespective of nationality,
socio-economic situation and ideological orientation. This right inures in a person by
virtue of his or her individuality and appears firmly established in the legal and ethical
consciousness of most developed countries. However, its necessity in a legal system
which is constricted by political, economic, sociological and cultural factors appears to
be largely symbolic. The concept of rights in a medical setting in Nigeria, especially one
as notorious as the right to personal autonomy and self-determination, which the
doctrine of informed consent connotes, is prima facie, unfeasible. This thesis critically
evaluates the engagement of Nigerian law and practice with the concept of informed
consent and autonomy, its challenges, and explores ways in which it may be enhanced.
Traditionally, decision-making powers in medical treatment are assigned to the
physician.1 Trained in the working of the human body and equipped with an ability to
detect a medical problem and to determine how best it can be fixed, a physician is
generally in a position to help a patient regain good health. The physician’s commitment
to care, or, at least, to do no harm, gives him or her discretion to direct a patient’s
course of treatment with primary focus on restoring the latter to health and physical
wellness.2
In recent years, the medical profession has been confronted with increasing assertions
of patients’ right to make decisions concerning their care and treatment, and to control

1

See Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and
the Limits of Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 11.
2
Edmund D Pelligrino & David C Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988) at 7.
1

what happens to their bodies.3 That is, patients demand the right to be active
participants in decisions about their medical treatment, reflective of their status as
autonomous persons. As John Stuart Mill notes, an individual of adult years and sound
mind’s right over himself or herself, his or her own body and mind, is absolute.4
So entrenched is autonomy in healthcare discussion that it is assumed to be a basis for
physicians’ obligation to the patient regarding disclosure, seeking consent,
confidentiality and privacy.5 Specifically, autonomy is identified as the value underlying
the concept of informed consent. It is to allow a patient to meaningfully determine the
course of his or her treatment, in line with his or her values and preferences, that
knowledge and understanding of treatment alternatives and their possible risks is
required.
Counterposed to autonomy is the reality of paternalism, which implies pursuing the
welfare of a person without recourse to the person’s opinion of what his or her best
interests are. Because paternalism negates a patient’s right to autonomy, and because
autonomy is accepted as the most important element in the physician/patient dyad,
paternalism is generally seen as a bad thing. Yet, despite the importance of autonomy,
individuals are rarely, if ever, wholly rational self-rulers.6 An individual’s self-rule is
constrained, such as by environmental factors which impose conditions to which an
individual has to adapt, and by cultural and social background and upbringing.
Consequently, the farther a person is from being a rational self-ruler, the more
paternalism seems to be morally justified.7 Stated simply, the amount of acceptable
paternalistic intervention is inversely proportional to the degree of autonomy a person
is capable of exercising.
3

Donnelly, supra note 1 at 13.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859 (Ontario: Batoche Books Limited, 2001) at 13,
available online: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf
5
See Tom L Beauchamp & James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 4th ed (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
6
Erich H Loewy, Textbook of Healthcare Ethics (New York: Plenum Press, 1996) at 59.
7
Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 5 at 281.
4

2

In Nigeria, conflicting latent wishes find simultaneous expression in the doctrine of
informed consent. The Nigerian law governing the practices of the medical and dental
professions attempts, at one and the same time, to give decisional authority to patients
and to maintain the authority of the physician. It acknowledges both the self-restoring
power of autonomous choice and the beneficent paternalism of the medical profession.
Ostensibly, emphasis on decision making in medical treatment in Nigeria has shifted
from the physician to the patient. However, there is, as yet, no acknowledgement by
courts in Nigeria, the Nigerian medical and dental profession, or scholarly writers, that
Nigerian law has failed to place effective authority in a patient’s hands, and that
commitment to individual decision making in medical treatment in the country is more
acknowledged than practiced.
Perhaps, confused about what the law expects them to do, Nigerian physicians have
continued to exercise their traditional discretion to decide what treatment to give, what
information to disclose and to which category of patients. Nigerian physicians protect
themselves from any legal liability that may arise from not obtaining proper consent by
the use of a generic consent form. By this form, the patient authorizes the physician not
only to carry out the particular procedure indicated, but every other procedure that is
medically necessary. This makes it seem that a Nigerian patient exercises autonomy, but
only to the extent that he or she has chosen to seek medical treatment.
Apart from the fact that Nigerian law largely fails to ensure that patients are involved in
their medical decisions, other factors also generally defeat the goal of having informed
and autonomous patients. These factors derive from the socio-cultural realities of
Nigeria. They include patriarchy and role-play which confine individuals to certain
stereotypical conduct, and, which affect first-person decision making, especially decision
making by women. This is particularly evident regarding their reproductive health.
The effect of patriarchy, socialization and role-play on the autonomous capacity of
women in Nigeria is made obvious when individuals are viewed in the context of their
relationships. This view, simply identified as a relational view, theory or conception,
3

enables a proper appreciation of the influences on a patient’s autonomy, particularly, a
woman’s ability to determine matters relating to her reproductive health. Such matters
include whether or not to have sex, use a preferred kind of contraceptives, or carry a
baby to term. A relational view exposes societal valuation of women for their
reproductive role, and how this influences women’s decisions about sex, contraception
and abortion in the country.
The influences may be direct, such as criminalizing abortion in Nigeria except to save the
woman’s life, or, requiring the consent and permission of her husband before accessing
reproductive services. They may also be indirect, by limiting significant options that are
available to them. A relational view encourages the understanding that the best
response to these influences is not making the woman able to adapt to them or
overcome them on a private and personal level. Rather, it involves changing the wider
society which is the source of the influences.
The thesis argues, therefore, that a reasonable degree of commitment to obtaining
informed consent and respecting patient autonomy in the Nigerian healthcare delivery
system has untold benefits, and that these may be realized, at the policy level, by
revoking legislative impediments to full autonomy, and at the social level, through
empowering the citizens –actual and potential patients- educationally and economically.
1.2

Identifying the Problem

The law and practice of informed consent in Nigeria is not satisfactory. Although the
right to informed consent is both constitutionally and judicially protected, it does not
inform the experiences of patients. The Code of Medical Ethics in Nigeria8 straddles both
paternalism and autonomy. It provides no definite guide on how, if possible, its
application in medical treatment can synchronize the interest of the patient as he or she

8

Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria, Code of Medical Ethics in Nigeria (Surulere:
Petruvanni, 2004) [the “Code” or the “Code of Medical Ethics.”] This Code regulates the
ethical conduct of the medical and dental profession in Nigeria.
4

sees it, with the paternalistic disposition of the medical profession toward the patient.
This incongruity is maintained by other ancillary provisions in the Code.
Given to operate in a socio-cultural context that appears detrimental to patient
autonomy, the observance of informed consent within the Nigerian medical setting
appears to be arbitrary, although, as a theory, it appears to be well understood. In
practice, consent is not generally obtained before every medical procedure, and
informed consent is not always sought. Whether or not necessary information is
disclosed to the patient depends on the patient’s literacy level. Because of Nigeria’s
patriarchal social order, authorization of a competent woman’s medical treatment may
be obtained from her husband.
1.3

Thesis Objective

In light of the foregoing, this thesis critiques the law and practice of informed consent in
Nigeria. It examines the shortcomings of its prescriptive content, and the challenges to
operationalizing informed consent in Nigeria. In the end it suggests that the concept
may be read and interpreted in more nuanced ways to account for the socio-economic
and cultural realities of a Nigerian patient. The thesis seeks to answer three basic
questions: how does the practice of informed consent promote a Nigerian patient’s
autonomy? What does autonomy mean to a Nigerian patient, and how effectively is it
being exercised? How can a Nigerian patient’s autonomy be maximized?
This inquiry necessitates an exposition of the peculiarities in the socio-cultural life of
Nigerians. Specifically, the exposition depicts Nigeria as performing below optimum in
regard to rights entitlements. The analysis demonstrates that, in principle, the notion of
patient autonomy is acknowledged in Nigerian healthcare; however, it hardly forms part
of the experience of patients. Nevertheless, the thesis shows that the right to autonomy
is important. As such, it delineates ways in which its realization may be contextualized
within the realities of Nigerian medical practice, specifically, in terms of its
manifestation in the dynamics of the doctor/patient relationship.

5

To do this, the thesis draws on the limited literature on informed consent in Nigeria.
Most of this deals with empirical studies of how informed consent is perceived and
practiced in Nigeria,9 and with the sociological and cultural situations in Nigeria which
make the practice of informed consent different from what is generally understood to
be the practice in other jurisdictions.10 Some of the literature also deals with the need
to extend the informed consent doctrine to apply to alternative medical therapies.11
Thus, while factual accuracy is a general concern, this thesis is constrained by
inadequacy of local material.
1.4

Theoretical Framework

Informed consent primarily seeks to protect the autonomy of patients. There are several
conceptions of autonomy.12 In Gerald Dworkin’s classic exposition, autonomy is “liberty”
or “freedom to act”, as well as “dignity” and “freedom of the will”. It is also

9

See for example, OC Osime et al, “Current Practices and Medico-Legal Aspects of PreOperative Consent” (2004) 81:7 East African Medical Journal 331; NJ Jebbin & JM
Adotey, “Informed Consent: How Informed Are Patients? (2004) 13 Nigerian Journal of
Medicine 148; OI Aisuodionoe-Shadrach, OS Ogunlade & OE Amoran, “An evaluation of
the Informed Consent Process for Elective Surgery at a University Hospital” (2006) 15
Nigerian Journal of Medicine 281; KA Agu, “Informed Consent Policy and Surgeons in
Southeast Nigeria” (2003) 9 Nigerian Journal of Surgery 39; AO Adisa et al, “Informed
Consent in Surgery: An Audit of Practice in Ile-Ife, Nigeria” (2008) 11(3) Nigerian Journal
of Clinical Practice 206; Temidayo O Ogundiran & Clement A Adebamowo, “Surgeons’
Opinions and Practice of Informed Consent in Nigeria” (2010) 36:12 J Med Ethics 741.
10
See for example Emmanuel R Ezeome & Patricia A Marshall, “Informed Consent
Practices in Nigeria” (2008); David O Irabor & Peter Omonzejele, “Local Attitudes, Moral
Obligation, Customary Obedience and Other Cultural Practices: Their Influence on the
Process of Gaining Informed Consent for Surgery in a Tertiary Institution in a Developing
Country” (2009) 9:1 Dev World Bioeth, 34; YZ Lawal et al, “The Doctrine of Informed
Consent in Surgical Practice” (2011) 10:1 Annals of African Medicine 1.
11
See for example Ireh Otighbor Iyioha, “Informed Choice in Alternative Medicine:
Expanding the Doctrine Beyond Conventional Alternative Therapies” (2007) 5:2 ICFAI
Journal of Health Care Law [Iyioha, “Informed Choice in Alternative Medicine”].
12
Alasdair Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational
Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 9.
6

“independence”, and the faculty of “critical reflection”.13 Alasdair Maclean adds that
autonomy is “self-mastery”; “choosing freely”; “choosing one’s own moral position and
accepting responsibility for one’s choice”; “self-control”; and “self-determination”.14
These various notions of autonomy reflect its core concept which is implicit in its
etymology: self-government.
The conception of the self that exists in Nigeria is a relational one. There, individuals are
socially interconnected, mutually interdependent, socially and culturally encumbered,
and affectionate. It is proper that the notion of autonomy that is used in exploring the
concept of informed consent in Nigerian healthcare be one that reflects the social and
cultural constitution of individuals. This enables proper appreciation of the factors
within the society which either enhance or oppress the individual and his or her
autonomous capacity.15 A relational view of autonomy provides an appropriate
theoretical framework. It depicts the socio-culturally and politically situated positions
from which individuals exercise, or seek to exercise control over their health. In essence,
it focuses on what the effects are of being in relation.
As mentioned above, among the benefits of relational autonomy include the fact that it
enables analysis of impediments to and facilitators of autonomous agency.16 They
include patriarchy, gender inequality and religion, on the one hand, and familial support,
empathy, and the sense of being connected with others, on the other hand. Particularly,
relational autonomy enables analysis of the ways in which oppressive socialization and
social relationships can impede autonomous agency.17 According to Mackenzie and
Stoljar, the impediments are visible at three interrelated levels: first, at the time of
13

Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988) at 6 [Theory and Practice of Autonomy].
14
Maclean, supra note 12 at 10.
15
See Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer Llewellyn, “Relational Theory & Health Law and Policy”
(2008) Special ed Health L J 193.
16
Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, “Introduction: Autonomy Refigured” in Catriona
Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on
Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 3 at 22.
17
Ibid.
7

formation of the individual’s desires, values and beliefs; second, at the time of
development of autonomous capacity, self-reflection, self-direction, and selfknowledge; and, third, at the time of acting on autonomous desires or making
autonomous choices.18 Since the ultimate thesis of this paper is that true
operationalization of informed consent is viable if patients are empowered, and the
impediments to their exercise of autonomy are removed, an anti-oppressive relational
theory is ideal as a framework. In essence, where oppression is perceived, this thesis
argues for liberation.
A major challenge of this framework, perhaps the only one, is that it may lead to
disruption of relationships, particularly intimate relationships like family, marriage and
church. However, a disruption may be salutary, desired even, if by it, the autonomous
capacity of certain individuals to make their own healthcare decisions is enhanced.19
This is very important because the capacity to be autonomous is, according to Marilyn
Friedman, “instrumentally valuable as a means for resisting oppression and intrinsically
valuable as part of the fullest humanly possible development of moral personality.”20
1.5

Thesis Roadmap

The issues arising from the law and practice of informed consent in Nigeria are
discussed over four substantive chapters. Broadly speaking, the two chapters following
this introduction engage with the general concept of informed consent: its nature,
importance, history and constitutive elements. Chapters Four and Five are, respectively,
concerned with the Nigerian law on the concept and its shortcomings, and the
challenges to implementing informed consent in the country. The content of these
chapters is summarized as follows.

18

Ibid.
See generally, Marilyn Friedman, “Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women” in
Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, eds, Relational Autonomy: Feminist perspectives
on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (New York: Oxford university Press, 2000) 35
at 41-48.
20
Ibid at 47.
19

8

Chapter 2 examines the concept of informed consent. It describes its nature and
importance in the protection of bodily integrity and its invocation of the ethical values
of beneficence and autonomy. It explores the modern history of the concept, beginning
from the Nuremberg events of 1947. It traces the extension of its elements to the
clinical setting, and highlights the judicial decisions instrumental in its extension. It
concludes that although physicians have a professional obligation to promote the
welfare of patients, it is important that patients are empowered to be able to decide on
the medical treatment that they receive. Doing this will guard against possible misuses
of professional power, protect patients from being taken advantage of by physicians,
and respect their right to medical self-determination.

Chapter 3 analyzes the constitutive elements of informed consent, namely, competence,
voluntariness and disclosure. As to their determination, the analysis, in regard to
competence, suggests a functional assessment which is not based on age or mental
status, but on the patient’s ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of
any decision that is made. As to voluntariness, it argues that this depends on the
intentionality or deliberateness of the patient’s decision, and on the absence of fraud,
duress, undue influence, misrepresentation and oppression. In regard to disclosure, it
suggests that its adequacy and materiality should be determined by the need of the
patient, including his or her understanding of the information given. It also suggests that
understanding may be ensured or enhanced through a hermeneutic approach which
encourages an engagement with patients in ways that facilitate their understanding of
the information disclosed.

Chapter 4 begins the exploration of informed consent in Nigeria. First, it analyzes the
law, that is, the regulatory framework of medical and dental practice in Nigeria which
includes the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, judicial decisions, and
the Code of Medical Ethics. It also examines the actual practice of informed consent. It
argues that the right of self-determination is adequately reflected in the constitutional
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rights of personal dignity, personal liberty, right to privacy, and freedom of conscience
and religion, especially as interpreted by the court. It finds that the Code of Medical
Ethics may not adequately cater to the particular needs of Nigerian patients in terms of
alternatives to treatment. The Code of Medical Ethics also does not adequately reflect
the social context in which Nigerian patients must operate: the framework does not
help to identify who may act as next of kin where a substitute decision is required and
what considerations should guide him or her. It finds that the elements of informed
consent are not well delineated, and that there is a conflict about where decisional
authority resides. The analysis establishes that the inadequacies of the Code of Medical
Ethics promote the arbitrariness observable in the practice of informed consent in
Nigerian healthcare. To deal with this unsatisfactory situation, the discussion suggests
that the decision making process should be collaborative, although the patient’s
preference should prevail; competence should be functionally assessed and materiality
of disclosure should be tied to the patient’s needs; alternatives to treatment should
include indigenous alternatives, particularly where there is evidence of their efficacy;
that next-of-kin should include close friends, even if they are not related to the patient,
and family members may persuade the patient, but the decision should be his or hers.

Chapter 5 examines socio-cultural factors which affect the practice of informed consent
in Nigeria. Unlike Chapter 4, this chapter concentrates on factors external to the Code of
Medical Ethics and their influences on the way informed consent is practiced. The
factors, which are mainly cultural, are not all peculiar to Nigeria. However, they appear
to be more nuanced in the country and include patriarchy, religion, and stereotypical
roles. Their combined impact, especially in regard to female patients, is that first person
consent may not be obtained in practice, and autonomy may be desirable to have, but
difficult to attain except through empowerment.
The conclusion (Chapter 6) argues that in light of the inadequacies of current informed
consent practice and the challenges to its proper functioning posed by the socio-cultural
and economic realities of Nigeria, a realistic means to foster progress is to change the
10

wider social environment in which decisions are made. This may be done through
empowering citizens - actual and potential patients - economically and educationally,
and reversing the effect of socialization through targeted education, regardless of
gender. This empowerment must be culturally based to be effective. Accordingly, it
must engage the traditional decision makers and develop allies among those who are
likely to benefit from a patriarchal society. In all of these, the care and support that is
visible in community-oriented Nigeria should be recognized and upheld.
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Chapter Two
History and Importance of Informed Consent in Health Care
2.0

Introduction

The notion of formal informed consent in healthcare is a relatively recent development.
Traditionally, when patients accessed medical treatment, they expected to be relieved
of their illness by physicians who are sworn to protect their health and wellbeing. They
also accepted the unequal relationship they were entering into. Without patients
submitting to treatment, physicians, typically, cannot administer treatment. This implies
the existence of a form of consent. However, the nature of the consent was usually not
formal, in the sense of being express, and certainly not as informed as is currently
demanded. As medicine advanced and society developed, a need for formal and
informed consent21 of patients before treatment was felt. The importance of obtaining
consent at all, and informed consent in particular, is the focus of this chapter.
This Chapter traces the modern history of informed consent to the Nuremberg trial
where the elements that make up informed consent were articulated, albeit, in a
research setting. This historical account brings into focus the factual basis for informed
consent. It reinforces the importance of informed consent by highlighting the possibility
of abuse by physicians, of their privileged position. It traces how the consent elements
were expanded, reinterpreted and extended, in the form they currently are, to the
clinical setting, and the role played by the courts. It concludes that autonomy through
informed consent is very important in modern bioethics and deserves protection.

21

Throughout this thesis, “informed consent” will be used inclusively and encompasses
informed decision making and informed choice. The term is retained because of its
popularity and for ease of recognition.
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2.1

Authorization for Treatment: Consent Simpliciter

Generally, the right of competent persons to refuse or consent to medical treatment is a
basic premise in modern medical ethics and law. To impose treatment, however
beneficial, on a competent patient without his or her permission or authorization is both
unethical and, often times, unlawful except where such permission cannot be
obtained22 or is not required.23 This requirement for self-determination is founded on
respect for a person’s right to autonomy and the inviolability of bodily integrity.24 Aside
from these ethical reasons, failure to obtain the consent of a patient before treatment
opens a physician to a legal claim in damages for trespass against the patient,
specifically, a claim in battery. Cardozo J aptly captured the legal essence of consent to
treatment in his classic statement thus:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation

22

Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010). The earliest reported case which dealt with consent to
treatment is generally acknowledged to be the English case of Slater v Baker &
Stapleton, [1767] 95 Eng Rep 860 (KB). But non-consensual medical treatment has long
before then been remediable under a writ of trespass. See President’s Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research,
Making Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in
the Patient-Practitioner Relationship Volume One: Report (Washington DC: US
Government Printing Office, 1982) at 16 (footnote 3) [President’s Commission Report].
23
An example is where public health legislation authorizes treatment without the
patient’s consent. See for example, Alberta Public Health Act, SA 1984, c P-27, s 31 [am
1988, c 41, s 9).
24
See Ciarlariello v Schacter, [1993] 2 SCR 119 at 135 [Ciarlariello]. See also Owena
Simpson, “Consent and Assessment of Capacity to Decide or Refuse Treatment” (2011)
20:8 British Journal of Nursing 510; Margaret Somerville, “Changes in Mental Health
Legislation as Indicators of Changing Values and Policies” in Martin Roth & Robert
Bluglass, eds, Psychiatry, Human Rights and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009) 167.
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without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in
damages.25

In Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital, the plaintiff consented to an ether
examination to determine the character of a lump that was found in her stomach.
According to her, she did not consent to the operation that was subsequently carried
out to remove the lump which turned out to be a fibroid tumour. Following the
operation, and, according to the testimony of her witnesses, because of it, she
developed gangrene in her left arm and some of her fingers had to be amputated. She
sued the hospital, which was run as charity, for her injury. The court noted that, if the
plaintiff’s testimony that she did not consent to the operation is accurate, it is battery
and liability will be affixed on the physicians who carried out the operation. However,
the plaintiff was unable to recover damages because her claim was against the hospital
instead of the physicians. For, as the court held, hospitals that are maintained as
charitable institutions are not liable for the acts of the doctors they employ. The policy
reason for this, as the court found, is that to impose liability may constrain charitable
institutions, as a measure of self-protection, to limit their activities. Therefore, although
the plaintiff lost, it was primarily because her claim was against the hospital. Arguably, if
she had sued the operating physician, and had been able to establish that she did not
consent to the operation, she would have succeeded in proving battery.

The nature of consent required for a defense against battery is not particularly exacting.
It could be given expressly in writing or words, implied from conduct or inferred from
circumstances.26 It suffices if the consent was given based on the name and a general

25

Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital, 211 NY 125, 105 NE 92 (1914)
[Schloendorff].
26

Simpson, supra note 24.
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description of the procedure by a competent patient.27 This means that it is not overly
concerned with the quality of the patient’s understanding, nor does it require strenuous
disclosure from the physician.28 However, consent would be vitiated by fraud, coercion
or deception.29

The requirement of consent demonstrates and protects the importance of the right of
bodily integrity and self-determination. Therefore, where consent is lacking, or
exceeded, a patient may recover damages, notwithstanding that the treatment or
surgery was competently performed, and notwithstanding that the patient actually
benefitted by it. This was, arguably, the situation in the Canadian case of Malette v
Shulman.30

In Malette v Shulman, the plaintiff was taken unconscious to the hospital following an
accident in which the car she was in, as a passenger, and which was driven by her
husband, had a head-on collision with a truck. The accident resulted in the immediate
death of the plaintiff’s husband, and left the plaintiff severely injured and bleeding. A
card declaring her status as a Jehovah’s Witness and refusing blood treatment was
found on her. The fact of the card and its content was communicated to the defendant
physician attending her. Despite the card, the defendant physician administered blood
to the plaintiff. Following the transfusion, the plaintiff’s condition improved and she was
subsequently discharged from the hospital. The Defendant was held to have violated
the patient’s right to bodily integrity.

This case laid a very strong emphasis on a patient’s right to self-determination. It
equated individual freedom of choice and self-determination with fundamental

27

See Chatterton v Gershon, [1981] 1 QB 432, [1981] 1 All ER 257 [Chatterton]. See also
Reibl v Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880 [Reibl].
28
President’s Commission Report, supra note 22 at 19.
29
See generally Jackson, supra note 22.
30
Malette v Shulman, [1990] OJ No 450, (1990), 67 DLR (4th) 321 (Ont CA) [Malette].
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constituents of life, and demonstrated that to deny individuals the freedom to choose
their healthcare lessens their value of life rather than enhances it.31 As a result, although
the plaintiff recovered after the blood transfusion administered by the defendant,
perhaps because of the blood transfusion, the defendant was still found liable in
battery.

2.1.1 Exceptions to the Requirement of Consent
Generally, the consent of a patient must be sought in every case before any medical
intervention may be administered. However, there are occasions when it may be
impossible or unnecessary to obtain the consent of the patient. These include
emergency situations, for example, where the patient is unconscious.32 Or, where, in the
interest of public health, such medical intervention is required to be carried out.33 In the
case of emergencies, a doctor is justified in proceeding without the patient’s consent on
the basis of necessity.34 However, the treatment administered must be to preserve the
life or health of the patient.35 The emergency exception does not extend to treatment
that is administered because it is convenient to do so, either because the patient is
unconscious, or is under anaesthetic.36 Patients who are unable to provide consent to
31

Ibid at 35.
For example, Parmley v Parmley, [1945] 4 DLR 81 (SCC).
33
Erin Nelson, “The Fundamentals of Consent” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield &
Colleen Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy 2nd ed (Canada, Butterworths, 2002)
111 at 117-20.
34
Simpson, supra note 22. It is suggested that justification for treating without consent
in emergency situation is based on implied consent, that is, the assumption that the
patient would have consented to such emergency treatment. For a fuller discussion, see
PDG Skegg, “A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed without Consent” (1974)
90 LQ Rev 512. In Malette, supra note 30 at para 20, the court indicated its preference
for necessity over implied consent, but held that no matter the justification, the effect
of emergency is to set aside the legal requirement of consent on the basis that, being a
reasonable person, the patient would want emergency aid to be given to him or her if
he or she is incapable of giving instruction.
35
Marshall v Curry (1933), 3 DLR 260 (NSSC).
36
Murray v McMurchy (1949), 2 DLR 442 (BCSC). c/f Re F, [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL) where the
House of Lords held that if a patient is incapable of consenting, the physician may
32

16

treatment may have their next-of-kin or other persons make decisions on their behalf.
However, where the next of kin is not immediately available, and postponing the
treatment will result in greater harm, the emergency principle may apply.37
2.2

Knowledge and Consent: The Doctrine of Informed Consent

For a person to meaningfully consent to a medical procedure, it is necessary that he or
she knows the implications of his or decision. Consequently, the physician, as part of his
or her duty of care, is obligated to provide the patient with material information
required for an enlightened decision about his or her medical treatment. This is the
doctrine of informed consent.
Informed consent is the primary means of protecting a patient’s right to control his or
her medical treatment.38 Under this doctrine, a physician may not administer any
treatment on a patient unless he or she consents. A valid consent which will protect a
physician from liability, is one given, following adequate provision of information, and
understanding of it, which enables a patient to evaluate the risks and benefits of a
proposed treatment, and available treatment options, in order to make a choice
whether or not to submit to the treatment.39 The doctrine anticipates that the patient
has the capacity to understand the information that is supplied, that he or she actually
understands it to a reasonable extent, and that he or she is able to make a reasoned
decision based on the facts.
administer any treatment he or she considers to be in the patient’s best interest, so long
as the treatment is reasonable in the circumstances. This case has been criticized as
endorsing paternalism. See, for example, Phil Fennel, “Inscribing Paternalism in the Law:
Consent to Treatment and Mental Disorder” (1990) 17 JL & Soc’y 29.
37
See Health Care Consent Act, SO 1996, s 25(2) [being Schedule A to the Advocacy,
Consent and Substitute Decisions Statute Law Amendment Act, SO 1996, c 2; proclaimed
in force March 29, 1996]. The authorization of the most senior doctor in the medical
establishment may be required. See Code of Medical Ethics in Nigeria, supra note 8 s 19,
discussed in Chapter Four.
38
Malette, supra note 30 at para 18. This is not limited to accepting or refusing
treatment, but includes the decision about what treatment to accept from available
options.
39
Videto v Kennedy (1981), 125 DLR (3d) 127, (1981) 33 OR (2d) 497.
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Erich Loewy opines that consent implies a fiduciary relationship that assumes that what
will be done is for the patient’s good and that the patient consents because he or she
understands what is to be done, the means, and the intended goal.40
In Reibl v Hughes,41 the court described this as the right of the patient to know the risks
attendant upon any option of treatment to effectively decide which one to take. This
imposes an obligation on the physician to provide the patient with the information he or
she needs for an informed consent.42 This obligation forms part of the physician’s duty
of care to the patient. Jay Katz noted that “[p]roceeding from the law of battery, the
courts reasoned that significant protection of a patient’s right to decide their medical
fate required not merely perfunctory assent but a truly “informed consent,” based on an
adequate understanding of the medical and surgical options available to them.”43
Where a physician fails to disclose, or to adequately disclose, information which is
necessary for a patient to be able to decide the course of treatment to adopt, the
physician is said to be in breach of his or her duty of care, and, where harm results
which can be linked to the lack of or insufficient disclosure, the physician may be liable
in negligence.44
2.2.1 Informed Refusal
Although suggested by the nomenclature, informed consent is not limited to instances
where a patient accepts treatment. It also extends to the right to refuse medical
treatment in exercise of a patient’s right over his or her own body.45 A competent
40

Loewy, supra note 6 at 115.
Reibl, supra note 27.
42
Ibid. See also Hopp v Lepp, [1980] 2 SCR 192.
43
Jay Katz, “Informed Consent A Fairy Tale?: Law’s Vision” (1977) 39:2 U Pitt L Rev 137 at
148.
44
See Reibl, supra note 27; Canterbury v Spence, 464 F2d 772 (DC Cir 1972) [Canterbury];
Chatterton, supra note 27; Rogers v Whittaker, [1992] HCA 58, (1992) 175 CLR 479.
South Africa allows a cause of action in battery where failure of informed consent is
alleged. See Castell v De Greef, 1994 (4) SA 408 (c). This case was challenged in Broude v
McIntosh, 1998 (3) SA 69 (SCA) but the decision in Castell was not overturned.
45
See Malette, supra note 30 at para 19.
41
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patient has a right to choose one treatment instead of another, and to refuse any
medical treatment, regardless of the consequences of such refusal, and regardless of
how beneficial the proposed treatment may be. This is because the right to be free from
non-consensual medical treatment is an implicit component of the right to determine
what happens to one’s body, which underlies the doctrine of informed consent.46 Except
in very limited instances, such as emergency situation or public health requirement, the
right of a person over his or her body is absolute.47 The right of patients to refuse
treatment is so fundamental that, aside from judicial recognition, it also enjoys
constitutional protection, especially constitutional provisions dealing with the right to
liberty and security of the person.48
Withholding or withdrawing treatment upon the decision of a patient, even if it is a lifesaving treatment, does not result in a liability on the part of the physician.49 On the
other hand, imposing treatment in the face of patient refusal may result in liability for
battery. However, the physician has a legal duty to ensure that the refusal is not as a
result of a failure of the communication process, and that the patient understands the
consequences of refusing treatment.50 Where a patient refuses necessary treatment, it

46

See Fleming v Reid (1991), 82 DLR (4th) 298.
47
See Ciarlariello, supra note 24 at 618-619; Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney
General) (1993), 107 DLR (4th) 342 at 398-99; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, [1993] AC 789
at 864 (HL).
48
See the American case of Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 US
261 (1990) where the right to refuse treatment was recognized under the liberty
interest protected by the 14th Amendment to the American Constitution.
49
See Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992), 86 DLR (4th) 385 (Que SC); Manoir de la
Pointe Bleue, (1978) Inc v Corbeil, [1992] RJQ 712 (SC) discussed in Joan Gilmour,
“Withholding and Withdrawing Life Support from Adults at Common Law” (1993) 31
Osgoode Hall LJ 473 at 494-95.
50
Whether informed consent extends to informed refusal was left inconclusive in
Malette, supra note 30. The trial court [1987] OJ No 1180 at 114-15, had held that the
right to refuse treatment is not premised on an understanding of risks of refusal. But,
The Ontario Court of Appeal noted that a corollary of the right to consent to treatment
is the right to refuse treatment. It did not state whether there is a duty on the physician
to ensure that the patient understands the risk of refusing treatment. However, it is
well established that a physician has a duty to ensure that the patient understands the
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is prudent to have it documented, including the steps taken to ensure that the patient
understands the consequences of refusing treatment. This will serve an evidential
function in the event that a dispute arises.51
2.3

The Nuremberg Experience: Historical Overview of the Spirit and Intent of
Informed Consent

Contemporary discussion of informed consent in biomedicine started with the 1947
Nuremberg focus on research ethics.52 However, its principles and elements also apply
in clinical ethics. How this came about is the focus of the rest of this chapter. The
historical overview covers the factual basis of the Nuremberg Code, its consent
requirement, its modification by subsequent ethical documents, and, finally, its
extension to clinical ethics through the court.53 The historical account buttresses the
importance of informed consent as already discussed, and emphasizes the danger of not
insisting on informed consent.
2.3.1 The Nuremberg Experience
As noted, modern judicial development of informed consent in medical treatment was
presaged by the articulation of consent requirements in the context of research
involving human subjects. The articulation was to address the stark and horrifying
account of the atrocities perpetuated by Nazi physicians under the guise of medical
risks of refusing treatment. See Truman v Thomas, 165 Cal Rptr 308 (Cal SC 1980); Hollis
v Dow Corning Corp (1995), 129 DLR (4th) 609 at 620 (SCC); Re T (Adult: Refusal of
Medical Treatment), [1992] 4 All ER 649 at 663 [Re T]; Reibl, supra note 27 at 13.
51
See Davidson v British Columbia, [1996] 1 WWR 137 (BC SC) where it was held that
failure to document the patient’s refusal and the explanations of the risks of refusing
treatment is not negligent but only affects the ease of proof.
52
Neil C Manson & Onora O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 4.
53
See generally, President’s Commission Report, supra note 22 at 20 [footnote 19]. It
should be noted that prior to the first modern case on informed consent in 1957, there
were cases that referred to the duty of doctors to warn patients of risks or dangers of
treatment. Such cases include Hunter v Burroughs, 123 Va 113, 96 SE 360 (1918); Pratt v
Davis, 224 Ill 300, 79 NE 562 (1906), aff’g (1905) 118 Ill App 161 (cited in President’s
Commission Report, supra note 22 at 19 [footnote 14]).
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research during World War II.54 The central factor in the account is that the atrocities
were performed on non-consenting prisoners. The defense, unsuccessfully, tried to
persuade the tribunal that the absence of positive evidence that the prisoners refused
to participate suggests they consented.55
The experiments included military-related studies to test the limits of human endurance
to high altitudes and freezing temperatures. There were medically related experiments
which involved inoculating prisoners with infectious disease pathogens, and testing new
antibiotics on non-consenting prisoners. There were also various mutilating bone,
muscle, and nerve experiments, as well as sterilization experiments all performed on
non-consenting prisoners.56
The final judgment of the tribunal that tried the offending Nazi doctors contained ten
principles which became the Nuremberg Code. These principles specifically address the
scope and limit of acceptable non-therapeutic experimentation on adult prisoners.
Because this group of persons, though competent, is in confinement, the Nuremberg
Code was particularly concerned about elements of coercion and duress. As a result,
informed consent became the mechanism for ensuring that whatever consent that was
obtained from these persons was voluntary, free from coercion, and given with full
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President’s Commission Report, ibid at 20.
Trials of War Criminals Before the Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law 10, vol
II (Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office,
1950) Military Tribunal, Case 1, United States v Karl Brandt et al, October 1946-April
1949 at 53-56.
56
For a fuller account of the Nazi medical atrocities, see Trials of War Criminals Before
the Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law 10, vol 1 (Washington, DC:
Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1950) Military Tribunal,
Case 1, United States v Karl Brandt et al, October 1946-April 1949, at 27-74; Telford
Taylor, “Opening Statement of the Prosecution December 9, 1946” in George J Annas &
Michael A Grodin, eds, The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Right in
Human Experimentation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 67; Michael Burleigh,
Death and Deliverance: ‘Euthanasia’ in German, c 1900-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994); Ethics and Extermination: Reflections on Nazi Genocide
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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knowledge of the implications of the research project.57 The first principle of the
Nuremberg Code, devoted primarily to informed consent, provides as follows:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means
that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention
of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior
form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him
to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires
that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental
subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose
of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his
health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the
experiment.
A valid consent is, therefore, one which has all the qualities prescribed above:
competent person; full disclosure; and, voluntariness. The requirement of voluntariness
reflects the social contract tradition which recognizes, in a research context, that no
injury is done where the subject is willing.58 The proscription of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, over-reaching or other form of constraint is to assure that the consent obtained
is voluntary. This protects the right of the individual, as an autonomous person, to
decide, following an evaluation of the burdens of the endeavor, whether or not to
participate in any research project, and the extent of participation.59
The Nuremberg Code does not indicate whether persons who are unable to give
informed consent can, nevertheless, participate in a research project by having
someone else give consent on their behalf. This is significant because the testimony on
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Michael A Grodin, “Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code” in George J Annas &
Michael A Grodin, eds, The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Right in
Human Experimentation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 121 at 138.
58
Manson & O’Neill, supra note 52 at 3.
59
See Leonard H Glantz, “The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S Statutes and
Regulations” in George J Annas & Michael A Grodin, eds, The Nazi Doctors and the
Nuremberg Code: Human Right in Human Experimentation (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992) 183 at 184.
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ethically acceptable research, given by the expert witnesses for the prosecution at the
trial influenced, to a significant extent, the articulation of the principles of the
Nuremberg Code.60 According to this testimony, where a subject is mentally ill, and the
experiment concerns the nature and treatment of nervous and mental illness, consent
may be given by the next of kin or legal guardian. And where possible, the consent of
the subject should also be obtained.61
In their final judgment, the tribunal expanded on the testimony of the expert witnesses.
However, it did not discuss the requirement of substitute consent in the case of
mentally ill subjects. This may be interpreted to mean that the tribunal does not
envisage incompetent subjects being used for research purposes, as they are incapable
of understanding the risks and providing informed consent. Alternatively, the omission
may be because the situation where incompetent persons were experimented upon was
not before the tribunal. Hence, it did not see any need to address it.
2.3.2 The Nuremberg Code and Subsequent Ethical Documents
Following the articulation of the principles of the Nuremberg Code, a series of
international documents were created, each traced to the Nuremberg Code, and each
proscribing experiments on human subjects without the subject’s informed consent.62
The Nuremberg Code also influenced the activities of the World Medical Association
[WMA], which was founded in 1947, in the formulation of its ethical guidelines.
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The factual basis of the Nuremberg Code influenced the development of codes and
guidelines, both in the general field of medical ethics, and in research involving human
subjects.63 It impelled the WMA Assembly in Geneva, to rededicate physicians to the
ethics of medicine in what became known as the Declaration of Geneva, a modern
restatement of the Hippocratic Oath.64
2.3.3 Substitute Consent and Adequate Disclosure
The most significant aspect of the Nuremberg Code for this thesis, is its informed
consent provision in Principle 1, as set out above. This provision has also received the
most criticism. For example, it is argued that its absolute prescription for the voluntary
and informed consent of the subject forecloses research on the mentally incompetent
and children, people who are unable or legally incapable of providing consent.65 Also
criticized is its requirement of full disclosure. It is argued, first, that it is impossible for a
researcher to provide comprehensive information on every possible risk, for in most
cases, such risks are not known until the experiment is actually conducted. Second,
many of the procedures and drugs used in the research are too technical for the
research subjects to understand either the effects of the treatment or the risks
involved.66 Thus, it was suggested that the experimenter should only strive towards
adequate understanding by the subject. The principle was therefore restated to be one
of a duty to disclose adequate information, not a duty to achieve full understanding in
every subject.67
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2.3.4 Guidance of Physicians by Physicians: From the Nuremberg Code to the
Helsinki Declaration
The short-comings of the Nuremberg Code highlighted the need for more extensive
guidelines, one designed by physicians for physicians, to regulate the conduct of
therapeutic and non-therapeutic experiments, unlike the Nuremberg Code which only
regulates non-therapeutic experiments. In 1961, the Committee on Medical Ethics of
the WMA submitted its proposal for a code of ethics for human experimentation to the
WMA at its 15th General Assembly. After several revisions, the proposal was adopted by
the 18th World Medical Assembly in Helsinki in 1964.68 The 1964 Declaration of Helsinki
reiterated the requirements of the Nuremberg Code. However, it went two steps
further than the Nuremberg Code: First, it provides for situations where the research
subject is legally or physically unable to provide consent, in which case the consent of a
legal guardian will be sufficient. Second, it requires consent to be in writing.

2.3.5 From Research Ethics to Clinical Ethics through the Courts

Prior to the articulation of the Nuremberg Code, common law acknowledged the
fundamental right of an individual to control what is done to his or her body. It also
established the duty of the physician to seek the consent of their patient prior to
initiating treatment. Several of the cases decided around this time, including
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Schloendorff v Society of N.Y Hospital69 involved situations in which there was no
consent at all, or the consent given by the patient was exceeded, or a different
procedure other than the one to which consent was given was carried out.70

It was not until 1957 that the term “informed consent” was used to describe the duty of
physicians to their patients. In the Californian case of Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr
University Board of Trustees,71 an apparently competently performed aortography
caused permanent paralysis of the plaintiff’s lower extremities. Part of the plaintiff’s
testimony was that he was not informed that anything in the nature of an aortography
was to be performed. This was contradicted by the defense. However, the defense
admitted that the details of the procedure and its possible dangers were not explained
to the plaintiff.

In ordering a retrial, the court noted that the jury was given a broad instruction that the
physician has a duty to disclose all the facts which affect the patient’s right and interests
and also the surgical risks, if any. The court held that a physician violates his or her duty
to his or her patient and subjects himself or herself to liability if he or she withholds any
facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to
the proposed medical treatment. The court further held that a physician may not
minimize the known dangers of a medical procedure to induce consent, though the
physician must place the welfare of his or her patient above all else.72

The court also held that requiring physicians to disclose all facts to the patient and also,
to promote the welfare of the patient, puts the physician in a position in which he or she
has to choose between two options: first, to explain to the patient every risk attendant
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upon any surgical procedure, no matter how remote and, consequently, to unduly alarm
an already apprehensive patient, or increase the risks by reason of the physiological
apprehension; second, to recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, and
that mental and emotional health is equally important, so that in discussing the risks,
the physician may exercise discretion on what to disclose. The court held that a
physician has “a certain amount of discretion [which] must be employed consistent with
the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent.”73

The question is how to reconcile “discretion” to withhold information with “full
disclosure.” Insight was provided in the latter case of Natanson v Kline.74 In this case, the
patient consented to the treatment that was carried out. Subsequently, in a malpractice
suit, she alleged that her consent was not informed because the physician failed to
disclose the risks of treatment. The court reviewed several cases75 and opinions to
conclude that a physician is not obligated to provide full disclosure of facts, diagnoses,
alternatives or risks of treatment. The court noted that full disclosure may so alarm a
patient that it would, in fact, constitute bad medical practice.76 Except where there is
reason to withhold information on therapeutic grounds, the court held that a physician
should make substantial disclosure to the patient or risk liability in tort.77

By this decision, the court recognized that physicians may exercise discretion on what to
disclose, and even to withhold information entirely if disclosure would affect the health
of the patient. However, provided a patient is of sound mind, American culture, which
demands thorough-going self-determination, requires that the patient should make the
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decision, and the physician is not permitted to substitute his or her judgment for that of
the patient by any form of artifice or deception.78 Just as in Salgo, the court held that
the duty of the physician is limited to those disclosures which a reasonable medical
practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances. Most significantly,
the court held that:

so long as the disclosure is sufficient to assure an informed consent, the
physician's choice of plausible courses should not be called into question if it
appears, all circumstances considered, that the physician was motivated only by
the patient's best therapeutic interests and he proceeded as competent medical
men would have done in a similar situation.79
In other words, whether disclosure is sufficient, is to be determined by how informed it
makes the patient. This will include how much of it the patient understands. Stretching
this further, it would mean, as further discussed in Chapter Three, that what standard of
disclosure to adopt is unnecessary, for any standard adopted must ensure that the
patient’s consent is informed. If this meaning is validly read into the court’s decision,
then it would follow that the true reason for requiring informed consent will be
understood as not to merely recite risks, but to educate patients so that they can decide
whether or not to consent to the treatment.

Evident from all of the foregoing is that informed consent serves a particular purpose: to
protect patients’ right of self-determination. This right is asserted against the traditional
professional obligation of physicians to pursue and protect the welfare of their patients.
A brief discussion of autonomy and beneficence, values implicated by informed consent,
are presented next.
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2.4

Ethical Values Implicated by Informed Consent

Underlying the requirement of informed consent are certain moral values deemed
important and deserving of protection. Under the Nuremberg Code, the free agency of
the research subject was held important. Thus, informed consent was required as an
assurance that research participants do not act out of fraud, duress, deceit,
misrepresentation, or any other constraining factor. In clinical medicine, and even in
research, informed consent is justified on the basis of the right of self-determination,
generally referred to as patient autonomy. This right is asserted against the paternalism
tradition in medical research and practice. The goal is that physicians should no longer
treat patients paternalistically, except in very limited instances where patients lack
capacity, such as in emergencies. As well, control of treatment decisions should rest on
the patient, not the physician.80 Evident in the foregoing are two central ethical values:
promotion of patient well-being, and respect for self-determination.

2.4.1 Promoting Patient Well-Being: the Principle of Beneficence

A primary reason why patients seek medical treatment is to improve their health and
advance their wellbeing. As such, a physician is obliged to take positive steps to
promote patient health and wellbeing. In ordinary parlance, beneficence is synonymous
with altruism, blessing, enhancement, love, betterment, improvement, kindness and
charity. It includes all actions which are intended to benefit another person. Central to
bioethics are the obligations to confer benefits, remove or reduce possible harm and to
weigh and balance possible good against potential harm.
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Often times, these

obligations are not implemented by a single means. For example, a fractured limb may
be repaired in several ways other than by surgery; and different drugs and injections
other than the ones given may be used to treat the same health problem. Expectedly,
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any positive steps taken would improve the health of the patient. However, whether the
particular steps taken are the best means of improving the patient’s health is a different
matter. A decision about the course of treatment to undertake necessarily involves
value judgment and preferences. A physician exercising this judgment is usually guided
by the need to promote the patient’s welfare.

In the modern restatement of the Hippocrates Oath,82 physicians recognize that the art
of medicine requires warmth, sympathy and understanding which sometimes outweigh
the knife and drugs. Physicians also recognize that a patient is more than a chart or a
cancerous growth, and that they must see their responsibilities as being towards a sick
person whose illness may affect his or her family and economic stability, and to prevent
disease whenever they can. These are all geared towards benefiting the patient and,
where they form the moral basis of treatment decisions, it is reasonable to conclude
that the patient’s best interest will be protected.

Often times, the decision made accords with the preference of the patient, or where the
patient does not have an original preference, the patient is, nonetheless, satisfied with
the outcome. But there are instances where the physician’s professional opinion may
conflict with the desires of the patient. This is where the challenge lies. Should the
physician be allowed to do what, in his or her opinion, is in the best interests of the
patient, given his or her training and skill in matters of the temporal body? Or should
the patient’s preference prevail, given that the temporal body belongs to him or her and
it is him or her, not the physician, who will live with the outcome of the treatment?

One suggestion is that where the decision involves medical science, the physician, with
his or her training and expertise, is in a better position to decide what the best approach
would be. On the other hand, a non-medical decision is properly left for the patient, as it
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does not require any special skill.83 An example would be a decision whether to undergo
surgery for a slipped disc, or take medications and have bed rest. Such a decision is not
totally dependent on medical knowledge, but depends also on the preferences of the
patient. Deferring to this preference does not detract from the physician’s obligation to
promote the health and wellbeing of the patient. However, it is not clear in what sense a
decision can be said to involve medical science for it to be made by the physician. It
ought to be that where there are several viable options, the physician should present
them to the patient who would decide on the option he or she prefers.

Recognizing that patients may prefer one treatment and not the other, or may prefer no
treatment at all, and that they are competent to make this choice, requires that, in the
promotion of a patient’s health, physicians should necessarily accommodate these
preferences under a broad definition of health which includes emotional, psychological
and social health. Since there is no definite best approach to a medical problem and
patients decide on a treatment option for subjective reasons, the physician’s obligation
to promote patient health and wellbeing should, to an extent, be dependent on the
patient’s preferences. However, the options provided are those which, to a higher or
lesser degree, will protect patient health and wellbeing.

Another reason to defer to the patient’s preference is because it is his or her preference
and he or she has the right to it. This is referred to as the right to personal autonomy.
This right is the other, arguably the main, ethical value implicated in the concept of
informed consent.

2.4.2 Respecting Self-Determination: The Principle of Autonomy
The term “autonomy,” in its original formulation, had more to do with the politics of
self-government dating back to the European Enlightenment, rather than to healthcare
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or the individual.84 Since the Enlightenment, the principle of autonomy came to be
associated both with states and individuals, and it proceeded to form the legal and
philosophical core of much of the discussion on bioethics.85 The importance of individual
autonomy is central to bioethical discussions about end-of-life decisions, reproductive
technology, and sale of body parts or tissues. But in this thesis, it is explored in the
limited sense in regard to making decisions about treatment.
In the book, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Gerald Dworkin notes that there are
many and varied meanings of the concept of autonomy, but that the only unifying factor
among them is that it is “a feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have.”86
In this thesis, persons are taken to be emotional, embodied and interconnected, but still
retain a distinct identity that differentiates them from others. Self-determination
reflects an individual’s exercise of the capacity to form, revise and pursue plans for his
or her life.87 As already indicated above, patients have preferences about medical
treatment which accords with their subjective values, shaped by their relationships, and
which a physician, in the promotion of the health and wellbeing of the patient, is
required to respect and accommodate.
The need to respect a patient’s preference flows from the instrumental and intrinsic
importance of self-determination.88 Instrumentally, the outcome that will best promote
a patient’s well-being is the one determined by him or her; intrinsically, self84
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determination affects the moral worth of an individual and is thus important in its own
right.
The impact of the individual’s social environment on his or her values, and,
consequently, his or her choices, deserves notice. This is due to the fact that social
environments either foster or thwart the development and exercise of autonomous
potential by an individual.89 An individual may display attributes of himself or herself
which are socially reinforced, thus, his or her originality may, from the outset, be
undermined by convention, and by the consequences of socialization. This potentially
makes autonomy a matter of degree: (i) the extent an individual is able to act according
to his or her desires; (ii) the extent the desires are influenced by his or her relationships;
and, (iii) the extent his or her exercise of autonomy is “episodic” or “programmatic”, in
the sense of a one-off specific decision, or a long term life shaping decision, such as
deciding to be a mother.90 Where the consequences of socialization or social structure
impair full autonomy, that socialization may be described as oppressive.91
On the other hand, where an individual’s professed desires are fashioned by his or her
subordinated status, are those desires deserving of respect as autonomous decisions? If
not, might we not be at risk of infringing on the self-determining rights of the individual?
Yet, if we respect those desires, will we be encouraging such subordination? Diana
Meyers suggests that all desires need not be treated equally. According to her, only
autonomous desires, that is, desires developed through self-discovery, compared to
desires which are formed from uncritically accepted norms, deserve respect.92
The problem with Meyers’ suggestion is that it may further erode the autonomous
capacity of the individual. In essence, her suggestion tells the individual that “because
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you are acting or deciding based on your inferior position, your decision cannot be
respected.” For Susan Wolf, an autonomous person is one who has the capacity to
identify and distinguish right from wrong.93 She argues that, because oppressive
socialization interferes with this capacity, persons subject to it are not autonomous.
According to her, such socialization may lead to internalization of norms which, once
internalized, cloud an individual’s ability to objectively evaluate, criticize or judge those
norms. However, just as with Meyers, the question remains whether decisions made by
persons who have internalized certain oppressive norms are to be respected,
nonetheless. It is doubtful that a clear answer exists, one which does not raise more
questions.
As mentioned earlier, often times, where a treatment decision is left to the physician,
the decision made accords with the patient’s values or satisfies his or her preferences,
however formed. In such instances, it is arguable that respect for self-determination and
beneficence exist in harmony. The beneficence-driven physician does not injure the
autonomy-seeking patient because, by the treatment decision made, the absence of
self-determination did not interfere with the promotion of the well-being of the patient.
It is argued that unless the patient requested the option taken, he or she would not
have been shown proper respect nor protected from arbitrary, though well meaning,
control by others.94
A counter argument is that since the decision made by the physician accords with what
the patient would have chosen for himself or herself, he or she cannot, in the real sense
of the word, be said to have been disrespected. Following this argument, it would be
different where the physician purports to know what is in the best interest of the
patient, which does not correspond with what the patient thinks is in his or her best
interest. In such a situation, proceeding with the physician’s idea of what is in the
patient’s best interest will be disrespectful of the patient’s autonomy. But even this
93
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argument potentially denies a patient’s autonomous capabilities on the grounds that
the physician has made an accurate assessment. Thus, it is essential that the patient be
allowed to decide what is in his or her interest, even where the physician is able to
accurately assess what the best interest is.
Self-determination operates as a sword.95 In this sense, the concept of agency describes
the ability or the right of a person to cause events as a subject, rather than be the object
of other people’s causative actions. Here, individuals are seen as possessing values
which mark them out as distinct and unique from other persons. Consequently, decision
making, especially in healthcare, where the patient bears the consequences of whatever
treatment option is pursued, should properly reflect the purposes and values of the
patient rather than be externally determined. Such a decision must not only be
expressed by way of a choice among options, but it must also be educated in terms of
the implications of any choice, including the choice of refusing treatment. According to
the President’s Commission:
If people have been able to form their own values and goals, are free from
manipulation, and are aware of information relevant to the decision at hand, the
final aspect of self-determination is simply the awareness that the choice is their
own to make. Although the reasons for a choice cannot always be defined,
decisions are still autonomous if they reflect someone’s own purposes rather
than external causes unrelated to the person’s “self.” Consequently, the
Commission’s concept of health care decision making includes informing patients
of alternative courses of treatment and of the reasoning behind all
recommendations. Self-determination involves more than choice; it also requires
knowledge.96
The importance of knowledge to self-determination is evident in treatment refusals
where studies have shown that a contributing factor to treatment refusal is insufficiency
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or lack of understanding of information which in turn compromises self-determination.97
Facilitating and letting a person decide for himself or herself, and to advance his or her
own values free from external influences98 is, arguably, the greatest respect that can be
paid to his or her individuality and, consequently, his or her autonomy.
Understandably, there are healthcare measures that cannot be chosen. Examples
include public health measures such as food safety standards or air quality levels which
an individual does not have powers to choose to comply with or not.99 In some
instances, choice may be overridden where it is in the interest of public health. An
example is where a person is suffering from a communicable disease such as AIDS,
hepatitis, meningitis, tuberculosis, and syphilis.100 In such a case, the person must,
pursuant to any existing public health legislation, submit to treatment.101 Choice may
also be impossible in some cases, notably in emergencies, cases of severe mental
impairment or extreme illness.102The foregoing demonstrates that the right to self-
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determination is not absolute, and external influences may not always be denied.
2.5

Conclusion

The doctrine of informed consent plays a central role in modern biomedicine. It protects
patient’s right to physical inviolability. It also respects patients’ right to selfdetermination. Common law ensures that the interest of patients in their physical
inviolability is preserved, by imposing liability in damages on a physician who violates
this right. Patients are entitled to give or withhold consent to treatment, and to receive
relevant information about the treatment from physicians, in order to make an
informed decision about whether to proceed with the proposed treatment, or any
treatment at all. It may not be justifiable to deny a patient the right to be selfdetermining simply because of the oppressive effects of socialization. But care needs to
be taken in order not to foster an environment where such oppressive socialization
thrives. Thus, although physicians have a professional obligation to promote the welfare
of the patient, and are well positioned to do this, it is important that patients are
empowered to be able to veto the medical treatment that they are offered. This will
guard against a misuse of professional power, protect patients from being taken
advantage of by physicians and respect their right to be self-determining.

As the foregoing show, whether in a research setting or clinical setting, the doctrine of
informed consent is premised on the presence of several interlocking requirements
which must be met. Chapter Three examines these elements in detail, both conceptually
and through their articulation in the jurisprudence of a selected number of common law
jurisdictions.

37

Chapter Three
Informed Consent: Constitutive Elements
3.0

Introduction

From the Nuremberg Code, the Helsinki Declaration, judicial interpretations and
scholarly discussions of informed consent, the perception is that informed consent is an
autonomous decision made by a voluntarily acting patient who has the capacity and
knows the implications of that decision. Implicit within the concept are the twin
elements of “information” given to a patient with capacity to understand it, and
“consent” proceeding voluntarily from the patient pursuant to understanding that
information. The information component refers to both disclosure of information and
understanding of the information. The consent component encompasses the voluntary
decision which may be an authorization or a refusal of a medical treatment. Whether a
particular consent satisfies the requirements of informed consent is analyzable in terms
of competence, disclosure, understanding and voluntariness. A proper definition of
informed consent to medical treatment must account for the presence and
interconnectedness of these elements. Therefore, informed consent is a voluntary
decision made by a competent patient following disclosure of information and an
understanding of the information disclosed.

Implicit within the above definition, are the elements of informed consent. This chapter
discusses these elements in detail. The chapter begins with competence as an element
of informed consent. It examines the various notions of competence as understanding,
consistency, rationality and appreciation. It finds that competence encompasses the
various notions and suggests that it should be functionally assessed. This assessment
may be done using either standards or, preferably, a sliding scale. A sliding scale
assesses competence based on the significance of the decision to be made. However, it
38

is not without limitations. The competence of minors to consent to treatment is isolated
and explored across countries like the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
South Africa and Australia. In all these countries, it was found, first, minors are not, by
reason of age alone, incompetent. Second, depending on their level of maturity, minors
may consent to treatment. Third, minors may not refuse necessary treatment, except
where such refusal is consistent with their best interest.

Voluntariness as an element of informed consent is discussed primarily in terms of
undue

influence.

However,

other

constraints

on

voluntariness

like

fraud,

misrepresentation and duress are briefly highlighted. Also discussed is the effect of
oppression on a patient’s exercise of autonomy.

The next section discusses disclosure as an element of informed consent. It presents
arguments which justify disclosure as therapeutic. It examines the two standards by
which materiality of information for disclosure is measured. It notes that a component
of disclosure is the duty to ensure that the patient understands. Following from this, it
questions the point at which consent of a patient is informed: whether at the
informational level or at the understanding level. It suggests that consent should be
informed when the patient understands the information he or she has been given.
Accordingly, it suggests “informed” as an ideal standard of disclosure. However, it notes
that ensuring understanding may be challenging and suggests ways understanding may
be both enhanced and ascertained.

Lastly, causation as an evidential element of informed consent negligence action is
explored. The challenge posed to plaintiffs by the test for causation is highlighted. It is
suggested that such challenges may be met by making choice a legally protectable
interest and making breach of duty to disclose actionable on its own without a need to
prove injury.
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3.1

Competence or Capacity as an Element of Informed Consent103

A preliminary matter
It is a general legal presumption that every adult individual is competent to give
authorization for treatment, except where legislation or the courts have decided
otherwise.104 Debates about competence in medical treatment focus on whether a
person is, psychologically or legally, able to understand the information relevant to
making a decision about the treatment, and able to appreciate the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.105

Competence

distinguishes patients whose decisions would be accepted, from those whose decisions
need not be solicited or, where given, need not be accepted; it sets apart those who can
and should decide their own treatment, from those whose treatment decisions should
be overridden or made by a surrogate.106 In other words, competence determines
whether autonomy or paternalism107 would prevail. A finding of incompetence justifies
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paternalism. Where incompetence is caused by pain, anxiety or other reversible factor,
the primary objective of the physician should be to restore or enhance competence
prior to decision making.
3.1.1 Defining Competence
It is difficult to define with certainty the abilities one must possess to be adjudged
competent and what distinguishes a competent patient from an incompetent one. Is a
competent patient one whose decisions accord with a notion of reasonability, or one
whose decision does not conflict with the opinion of the physician? As noted by
Beauchamp and Childress, it is difficult to draw a line between competence and
incompetence which is not arbitrary.108

According to John Stuart Mill, a competent person is of full age and has an ordinary
amount of understanding.109 For Ronald Dworkin, the autonomous individual is one who
has “the ability to act out of genuine preference or character or conviction or a sense of
self.”110 John Rawls equates capacity with the ability to act freely and rationally.111 A
comprehensive definition of competence would encompass all of the foregoing views.
Accordingly, a patient lacks competence if he or she is not able to appreciate his or her
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medical condition, understand relevant information about its treatment, or unable to
use this information as part of the decision-making process.
3.1.1.1 Competence as Ability to Understand and Appreciate the Nature
and Consequences of Treatment
Competence assesses the ability of patients to understand and appreciate the nature
and consequences of treatment rather than actual understanding and appreciation.112
For a person to be capable of understanding the information relevant to his or her
treatment decision, he or she must be capable of intellectually processing the
information as it applies to his or her treatment, including its potential benefits and
risks.113Actual understanding and appreciation demonstrates the presence of ability to
understand and appreciate.114 This does not mean that the opposite is true. While lack
of understanding may be an indication of incompetence, it is not determinative.115 Lack
of understanding may result from poor communication rather than from any defect in
the patient’s capacity. In other words, a patient may be competent and yet not
understand the information given.116 However, once a patient acknowledges that he or
she has a set of symptoms for which certain treatment is proposed, and understands
the implication of the treatment and the consequences of no treatment, the patient is
competent. This is irrespective of whether he or she agrees with the name given to the
symptoms, the cause of the symptoms or the recommended treatment.117
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In Starson v Swayze,118 the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that a patient
need not describe his or her medical condition as an illness, or describe it in any
negative terms.

Provided he or she acknowledges that he or she has a medical

condition and is possibly affected by it, according to the majority judgment, he or she is
competent. On the other hand, where the health condition makes the patient unable to
recognize that he or she is affected by its manifestations, he or she is incompetent.119
The implication of the majority decision in Starson v Swayze is that, provided the patient
has a cognitive understanding of, for example, the nature and the treatment for bipolar
disorder, acknowledges that he or she has the symptoms that are associated with it, he
or she would be capable. The physician does not have to satisfy himself or herself that
the patient applied the information to himself or herself. Consequently, such a patient
may deny that he or she has bipolar disorder but accept that he or she experiences
extreme, intense and long lasting swings in mood, energy, thinking and behavior, from a
maniacal high, to a depressive low, which interferes with his or her ability to function. If
he or she understands the nature and implication of the treatment proposed for bipolar
disorder, he or she is competent.
3.1.1.2 Competence as Consistency and Authenticity
Ronald Dworkin defines competence as the ability to be consistent or authentic with
one’s sense of self.120 In the context of patients with dementia, Dworkin argues that
If [a patient’s] choices and demands, no matter how firmly expressed,
systematically or randomly contradict one another, reflecting no coherent sense
of self and no discernible even short-term aims, then he has presumably lost that
capacity that it is the point of autonomy to protect.121
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Dworkin makes a distinction between an individual’s critical and experiential interests.
In other words, he distinguishes between the interests that define the individual’s life
and ensures that his or her choices “keep faith with the way [he or she] … wanted to
live,”122 and current interests such as pleasure or pain. Although in general terms,
consistency and authenticity are evidence that the person acting has capacity, Dworkin’s
argument does not imply that an individual must consistently adopt a particular value,
even where the circumstances are different.123 Rather, Dworkin, arguably, contemplates
a systematic contradiction of choices or views without a discernible pattern or cause.
Where this occurs, Dworkin views the patient as having lost the capacity that autonomy
is meant to protect. Dworkin’s emphasis on the individual’s critical interests or life
values124 seem to suggest that where a patient makes a choice that appears consistent
with his or her stable preferences, that choice will be respected. What happens where
there is indication that, though consistent with his or life values, the patient failed to
understand or retain the information received in order to make a reasoned decision.
Whether consistent or not, in Canadian law, a patient is competent if he or she
understands and appreciates the nature and implications of the decisions he or she is
making.125
3.1.1.3 Competence as Rationality
Contrary to John Rawl’s argument that a competent patient is one who can act freely
and rationally,126 that a patient’s decision conflicts with a notion of rationality is not,
without more, evidence of incapacity. In the first instance, requiring persons to make
122
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rational or good decisions is inconsistent with John Mill’s concept of liberty and with
judicial authorities which allow individuals the right to be foolish.127 Second, focusing on
the apparent irrationality of a patient’s decision to determine capacity, where the
irrationality is seen as evidence of an unsound mind rather than as an assertion of will,
undermines a patient’s right of self-determination.128 But this is only one way of looking
at capacity and rationality.
Mary Donnelly suggests another way of looking at capacity and rationality which focuses
on the process leading to the decision rather than on the decision itself.129 On this view,
capacity requires an ability to reason and reflect on one’s choice and to rationally
manipulate the information received in order to reach a decision.130 However, focusing
on the process of the decision making is not without its flaws. First, a person may reach
an irrational conclusion through a rational thought process.131 According to Donnelly, an
example of such situation would be where a person at risk refuses to be screened for a
sexually transmitted infection, because he or she believes that if he or she does not
know that he or she has it, he or she will not experience its symptoms.132 Second, a
thought process may, arguably, be evaluated based on the decision that is made.
Therefore, an irrational decision may be taken to mean an irrational thought process
and evidence of incapacity.
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3.1.1.4 Functional View of Competence: A Suggestion
Present in the various notions of competence as understanding and appreciation,
consistency or authenticity, and rationality, is the idea that competence presupposes
ability to accomplish a task, in this case, to make a decision about treatment.133 The
nature of the decision to be made also affects whether a person who is competent to
make one decision retains the competence to make a different decision. This implies
that competence to decide is specific, both to the individual and to the decision.134 In
other words, assessing a person’s ability to make a decision is specific to the decision to
be made; it is not generalized to other decisions. It is possible that a person who is
adjudged to be incompetent to perform acts, such as managing his or her estate, getting
married, or voting in an election, may, otherwise, be competent to make medical
decisions,135 or be able to make one medical decision and not another. In effect,
functionality disallows a presumption of continuance which arises where a person found
to be incompetent at one time, is presumed to remain incompetent at all times.136
A person’s competence may fluctuate as a result of illness or a generally competent
patient may act incompetently in a particular situation. For example, a patient may
accept a suggested treatment option even though it conflicts with what she really
wants, either because she is awed by the physician or the hospital environment, or
because she has a personality that is not assertive. A functional view of competence
requires that the patient be assessed with respect to the particular decision that is to be
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made. One way of carrying out this assessment is by the use of standards. Another way
is by the use of a sliding scale. Each of these is explored in more detail below.
3.1.2 Assessing Competence
3.1.2.1 Determining Competence Using Standards
Debates about assessing competence based on cognitive ability turn on the standard to
be used in measuring competence. Beside age as a standard, the schema of standards of
competence runs through one requiring the least ability, to one requiring the most
ability. The standards include
1. Inability to express or communicate a preference or choice
2. Inability to understand one’s situation and its consequences
3. Inability to understand relevant information
4. Inability to give a reason
5. Inability to give a rational reason (although some reasons are given)
6. Inability to give a risk/benefit related reason (although some rational reason is
given)
7. Inability to reach a reasonable decision
The above standards may be grouped into minimal, outcome and process standards.137
3.1.2.1.1 Minimal Standard of Competence
This standard merely requires the simple ability of the patient to express a preference. It
respects every choice of the patient and does not inquire into the reasoning behind the
choice or disregards the defects or mistake in the reasoning process. It does not inquire
whether the choice accords with the patient’s own conception of his or her good, or

137

See generally Allen E Buchanan & Dan W Brock, “Standards of Competence”
reprinted in Thomas A Mappes & David DeGrazzia, Biomedical Ethics 4th ed (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1996) 100 [“Standards of Competence”].
47

whether the choice will be harmful to the patient. This standard does not seek to
protect patient well-being. According to Buchanan and Grock, it is insensitive to the way
in which self-determination varies both with the nature of the decision to be made and
with differences in people’s capacity to choose according to their conception of their
own good. The minimal standard has been described as weak,138 and as not being a
criterion of competent choice at all.139
3.1.2.1.2 Outcome Standard of Competence
At the other end of the spectrum from the minimal standard is the standard that
focuses on the content or outcome of the decision. This standard questions whether a
patient has a reason for his or her decision; how rational the reason is; whether the
reason is risk/benefit related; and, whether the decision reached is reasonable. It
ultimately requires some rationality or reasonability in the decision made, in order for
the person making it to be deemed competent. On this view, a failure of the decision to
match what other reasonable or rational persons would choose implies that it is not a
competent decision.140 This standard maximally protects the well-being of the patient,
but, it does not respect the self determination of the particular patient.
Central to self-determination is the interest of a patient in defining, refining and
pursuing his or her own conception of the good life.141 Where the patient cannot or
does not determine for himself or herself, he or she becomes subject to a paternal
substitution of another’s conception of what is in his or her best interest. Buchanan and
Brock observe that the claim of an ideal standard which maximally protects a patient’s
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best interest is only as strong as the basis on which the best interest of the patient is
determined.142
It is difficult to attempt to ascertain what may be in a patient’s best interest. Even so,
any determination of best interest which does not ultimately rest on the patient’s own
underlying values is “both problematic in theory and subject to intolerable abuse in
practice.”143 Given that the decision envisaged is one about the appropriate treatment
for a patient, a standard that measures competence by comparing the content of the
patient’s decision to some vague notion of reasonability may fail to appropriately
protect the patient’s best interest.
3.1.2.1.3 Process Standard of Competence
At the center of the spectrum, between the standard that defers strongly to selfdetermination and significantly less to patient welfare, and the standard that seeks to
protect patient welfare over respect for self-determination, is a standard which
balances both welfare and self-determination. This standard does not particularly focus
on the decision that is made, or on the content of that decision. Rather, it focuses on
the process that leads to the decision.144 The process standard is guided by questions
such as: how well must the patient understand and reason to be competent? How much
can a patient’s understanding be limited, or his or her reasoning defective, and still be
compatible with competence? How certain must physicians be, that a patient has
understood and reasoned, especially in marginal cases where the degree of uncertainty
about competence is significant?145 In answering these questions, Buchanan and Brock
suggested a sliding scale technique which is analyzed shortly.
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The process standard is attractive. First, it respects and protects both patient selfdetermination and welfare without preferring one over the other. It does not abandon a
patient to his or her decision, however harmful the decision may be. Thus, in principle, it
respects a patient’s choice in a way that does not cause him or her harm.146 Its focus on
the process leading to a decision makes it adaptable to the peculiarity of each patient.
However, in practice, the process standard does not clarify how answers to the
questions guiding the standard are to be determined.147 The standard may also
encourage paternalism in cases where the patient is deemed to lack sufficient
understanding or reasoning. Accordingly, it appears that a sliding scale may present a
better assessment tool.
3.1.2.2 Determining Competence Using the Sliding-Scale
The motive for determining competence is to protect patients from making decisions
that may not be in their best interests.148 Based on this, it is believed that competence
should be closely linked to patients’ levels of experience, maturity, responsibility, and
welfare.149 The sliding-scale strategy may be used to achieve this. The method of this
strategy is that the higher the risks for a patient occasioned by medical intervention, the
higher the competence required to accept, or refuse, it. Conversely, the lower or less
substantial the risk that might occur, the lower the level of competence required to
authorize it. For example, a medical intervention or non-intervention that has a risk of
death would require a higher level of competence. On the other hand, if the risk
involved is a rash or temporary dizziness, it would seem that a less exacting standard of
competence will be required. Thus, with the sliding scale, the level of competence
required increases with the degree of risks that is present in the medical intervention. It
follows that an otherwise healthy patient might need only minimal competence to
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accept a low-risk life-saving procedure, but would require a higher level of competence
to refuse the same procedure.150
The attraction of the sliding scale seems obvious: it enables a balance to be maintained
between respecting patients’ autonomy and protecting their welfare. It does this by
requiring a more stringent and thorough assessment of competence where the
implication and consequences of a decision are grave.151 This is borne out of the need to
ensure that the patient fully understands and appreciates the consequences of his or
her decision. The opposite would be the case where the harm to the patient is minimal.
But that is the positive side of the sliding-scale. The sliding scale strategy runs the risk of
conflating the assessment of competence with the patient’s competence.152 In other
words, it suggests that a person’s ability to decide his or her treatment depends on the
consequences of his or her decision. This conflation is evident in the argument that
because a patient is competent to consent to treatment, it does not mean that he or she
is competent to refuse it.153
The implication that caution must be exercised in allowing patients to assume a greater
risk by requiring a higher standard of competence is disturbing.

It implies that

competence is variable, according to the consequences of the decision that is to be
made. A patient is competent if he or she is able to understand the nature and
implication of the decision he or she is making.154 Assessing competence is, therefore,
an examination of whether this ability is present. Where the consequences of the
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decision are grave, it warrants a closer scrutiny of this ability.155 In other words, the
requirement for competence does not change. Rather, the ability of a patient to satisfy
this requirement may be challenged where the consequences of the decision are severe.
Whether competence is assessed using standards or the sliding scale, including whether
it is assessed at all, arguably depends, on the most part, on whether or not there is a
conflict between the wishes of the patient and the physician’s professional judgment. A
UK study found that a significant proportion of patients who are admitted to hospital do
not have decision-making capacity, yet the identification of this incapacity is not
triggered unless the patient questions the doctor’s decisions.156 Consequently, it has
been suggested that competence assessment must be made more routine.157 This
suggestion, if accepted, may undermine the prima facie presumption of the competence
of adults. Rather than a routine assessment, it would be more functional if the physician
is alert to any signs of incompetence, however veiled. For example, where a patient
refuses a low risk treatment with a high therapeutic value which a reasonable person
would accept, it should trigger a competence assessment. This indirectly requires the
patient to be reasonable. The reality, however, is that an unreasonable decision only
alerts the physician to the possibility of incompetence, for which he or she is to satisfy
himself or herself that it is not the case. This point is further expanded by John Devereux
and Malcolm Parker as follows:158
If we value maximal freedom and efficiency, through the prima facie
presumption of competency, we also must be alert to those conditions which
should trigger an assessment of competency…. A refusal of treatment which has
serious possible consequences should always be explored, in order to distinguish
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between possible incompetence and a stable decision. Organic brain syndromes
associated with trauma, drugs, alcohol, infection, dementia, and so on, should
also be regarded as potentially extinguishing competency, as should mental
states characterized by fear, anxiety, and depression, whether or not these are
associated with mental illness. Nevertheless, it is crucial to accept that the mere
presence of mental illness, or any of the other medical conditions mentioned do
not, ipso facto, imply incompetence.
The above argument is wide enough to make competence assessment routine, except
where the patient’s illness is not serious enough to induce fear, anxiety or depression,
or is not caused by trauma, drugs, alcohol or infection. The cases falling within the latter
group would, it seems, constitute the exception rather than the rule, especially since
illnesses are often caused by infection, or by trauma. Also, the consequences of illness
include fear, anxiety and, sometimes, depression. In effect, the prima facie presumption
of capacity is whittled down by Devereux and Parker’s argument. However, this effect
may be tolerated given that the legal consequences of an error in competence
assessment are potentially severe. For example, if a physician carries out medical
treatment relying on consent which proceeded from a person without competence, he
or she may be liable for battery even if the procedure was competently performed.159
Similarly, where a physician fails to carry out a medical procedure because he or she
relied on a refusal of treatment from a person who was not competent, the physician
could be liable in negligence for failing to treat the patient.160
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Thus, it is suggested that once there is suspicion of a pathological influence on the
cognitive functioning of a patient, not necessarily because the decision has changed,
competence assessment should be done. And, provided the patient demonstrates a
capacity to understand and appreciate his or her condition, the nature and purpose of
the proposed treatment and, to appreciate the consequences of treatment or no
treatment, irrespective of the gravity of the consequences, he or she should be certified
competent.161
The above suggestion avoids the sliding scale strategy and its implication that a patient
may be competent to accept a treatment but incompetent to refuse it, though his or her
understanding, values or beliefs have not changed. With the above suggestion, it is not
so much about a change in the patient’s understanding as it is about the need for the
physician to be more certain about what the patient understands. However, it is
acknowledged that the suggestion requires a relatively high expectation of knowledge
on the part of the patient which may not be met because of impaired cognitive ability
caused by the health condition, or as a result of anxiety or other illness-induced
emotions.
3.1.2.3 Age as a Marker for Competence: A Case Apart
Apart from cognitive and psychological capacity, another operational criterion for
determining competence is age. How countries like Canada, the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia and South Africa treat minors in respect to healthcare
decision making is the focus of this part. The result of the comparison shows more
commonality than differences in the treatment of minors.
3.1.2.3.1 Competence of Minors in Canada
The legal age of majority in Canada has progressively become irrelevant in determining
when a minor is competent to make decisions about his or her medical treatment.
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Common law on consent to treatment has evolved so that competence is measured
based on the maturity of the minor rather than his or her chronological age.162 In other
words, the determinant of competence in a minor is the extent to which his or her
physical, mental, and emotional development allows for an understanding and
appreciation of the nature and consequences of the proposed treatment, and the
implications

of

refusing

treatment.163

The reliance on maturity to assess a minor’s capacity to decide on his or her medical
treatment has been codified by legislation in a number of provinces and the territories.
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Only the Province of Quebec has a fixed age of 14 years, below which the consent of

the parent or guardian of the minor, or of the court is required.165 Refusal of treatment
by a person who is 14 years or over may be overridden by a court or, in cases of
emergency, by parents.166
In AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), a 14 year old Jehovah's Witness
minor who had an "advance medical directive" refusing blood products in any
circumstances, suffered from gastrointestinal bleeding as a result of Crohn's disease and
was assessed as being in imminent danger by her treating physician. A psychiatric
assessment at the hospital found that she was alert, cooperative, bright, well spoken,
and occasionally teary, and had no psychiatric illness. The assessment concluded that,
although a minor, she understood why a transfusion is recommended as well as the
consequences of refusing it. In other words, she was found to be a "mature minor."
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However, the Director of Child and Family Services apprehended her as a "child in need
of protection" under Manitoba’s Child and Family Services Act,167 and obtained a
treatment order enabling blood to be transfused in her. Following the transfusion, she
recovered and, subsequently appealed the treatment order.
The majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada held that under the common
law mature minor doctrine, children are entitled to a degree of decision making that
reflects their evolving maturity.168 The court acknowledged the continual struggle
between respecting the autonomy of mature minors and carrying out the protective
function of the state. The court held that the maturity of each minor must be taken into
account for each particular medical treatment.169 This results in a sliding scale of
scrutiny; with the minor’s view becoming more determinative with increasing maturity,
and the level of scrutiny increasing with the complexity of the medical decision or the
severity of its impact.

A summary of the implication of the majority judgment is that: (i) according to
Manitoba’s legislative framework, competent patients who are over the age of 16 may
refuse medical treatment, regardless of the consequences of that decision; (ii) according
to the framework, patients who are below the age of 16, but who are found to be
"mature minors" may refuse non-essential medical treatment if it is in their best
interests; (iii) a minor’s best interests may, as he or she gets more mature, collapse into
his or her desire and right to exercise autonomy, whatever may be the consequences of
the exercise of that autonomy;170 (v)

where refusal of treatment carries serious

consequences such as death or permanent disability, a more rigorous assessment of the
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minor’s maturity will be required;171 (vi) where the medical treatment is necessary to
preserve life, it is likely that the court, exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction, will
authorize treatment despite the contrary wishes of the mature minor; and (vii) in all
cases, determining the minor’s best interest must take into account the minor’s
expressed wish, with the weight given to such wish increasing with the minor’s maturity.
Since the psychiatric assessment in AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services)
showed that the minor was mature enough to understand the nature of treatment and
the implication of no treatment, it is challenging to appreciate the reason why
treatment was still imposed on her, and why her decision was not determinative.
According to Binnie J in his dissenting judgment:
[t]he state's interest in ensuring judicial control over the medical treatment of
"immature" minors ceases to exist where a "mature" minor under 16
demonstrates the lack of need for any such overriding state control. In such
cases, the legitimate object and basis of state intervention in the life of the
young person has, by reason of the judge's finding of maturity, disappeared.
Whether judges, doctors and hospital authorities agree or disagree with [the
child’s] objection, the decision belongs to her, as the Charter is not just about
the freedom to make the wise and correct choice; it also gives her the individual
autonomy and the religious freedom to refuse forced medical treatment, even
where her life or death hangs in the balance, regardless of what the judge thinks
is in her best interest. The state would be justified in taking the decision away
from [the child] if there was any doubt about her capacity, as in a situation of
urgency, or whether she was acting under the influence of her parents (who are
Jehovah's Witnesses). However, these matters were looked into by three
psychiatrists at the Winnipeg hospital where the blood transfusion was to be
administered, and the psychiatrists concluded, and the applications judge
accepted, that [the child] - though 14 months short of reaching 16 years of age was nevertheless at the [material] time an individual "with the capacity to give
or refuse consent to her own medical care.172
Binnie J further contended that the position at common law is that proof of capacity
entitles the "mature minor" to exercise personal autonomy in making medical
treatment decisions free of parental or judicial control. He acknowledged the difficulty
of persuading a judge that a young person who refuses potentially life-saving medical
171
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treatment is nonetheless competent, but noted that the Charter requires such an
opportunity to be given.173 Binnie J’s reasoning accords with the discussion on
competence and how it may be assessed. A minor who understands and appreciates the
decision to be made including the consequences of refusing treatment is competent. It
should not matter what the consequences are of refusing treatment.
The implication of the decision in AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services)
is, arguably, similar to the position in other common law jurisdictions. As will be seen
shortly, while competence in minors is functionally assessed, courts in other
jurisdictions have generally been reluctant to accept the exercise of the right to refuse
treatment. The right accorded to minors who have sufficient maturity first arose in the
United Kingdom. The position of minors in the United Kingdom is discussed next.
3.1.2.3.2 Competence of Minors in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, minors aged 16 years or over have a statutory right to consent
to medical treatment without parental consent.174 However, the rights of those under
16 years of age are governed by the seminal case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech
Area Health Authority.175 The central issue in this case was whether a doctor can ever, in
any circumstances, lawfully give contraceptive advice or treatment to a girl under the
age of 16 without parental consent. The Department of Health and Social Security on
family planning services for young people had issued a guideline which, in effect,
allowed a physician in certain exceptional cases to prescribe contraception for a girl
under 16 years without her parents’ consent. Mrs. Gillick, a mother of five daughters,
challenged the guideline as being unlawful. The House of Lords rejected her claim and
held that minors had the capacity to consent to medical treatment provided that they
had sufficient maturity and understanding to decide on the matter in question. By this
173
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decision, the court recognized the autonomy and privacy rights of 'Gillick competent'
children. In particular, the decision endorsed a functional determination of competence
that is based on the child’s level of maturity.

However, just as in Canada, the courts have been reluctant to find a minor competent
where he or she exercises this right to refuse treatment, such as blood transfusion,
which the court thinks is in his or her best interest.176 In other cases of refusal of
treatment, the courts have interpreted the Gillick decision as giving a minor the capacity
to consent to treatment, but it does not remove parental rights to override the minor’s
decision.177 In Re R,178 the patient, a ward of the local authority, was suffering from
recurring psychotic states. While in a calm state, she was able to convince a social
worker that she no longer wished to take her medication. And in Re W,179the patient
was in the care of the local authority, was suffering from anorexia, and did not want the
treatment indicated for her. In both of these cases, the English Court of Appeal held that
no child has the power to refuse healthcare such as to override consent that has been
given by someone with parental responsibility, or by a court. The implication is that,
following Gillick, a minor might be able to consent to treatment if he or she is of
sufficient maturity; the minor may not refuse necessary treatment.180

Recently, in R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health,181 a case whose facts are similar to
Gillick, the rights and autonomy of minors to make decisions about their own lives was
emphasized. Although this case did not decide whether a minor can refuse treatment
irrespective of the views of her parents and the court, it stressed the importance of the
176
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minor’s right to participate in decision-making about her health, and implies that as she
matures, she may be able to exclude others from the decision process. It would seem
that the right to participate in healthcare decision-making does not equate with the
right to make the decision. Yet, if the basis of a minor’s involvement in medical decisions
is autonomy rather than welfare, then it is expected that the decisions of competent
minors should be respected even where the consequences of those decisions are
grave.182 Although, it may be difficult for a minor to demonstrate competence to
understand decisions involving life and death, what is argued here is that the
assessment must be a functional one. It must not depend on the age of the minor.
3.1.2.3.3 Competence of Minors in Australia
The High Court of Australia adopted the decision in Gillick in Secretary, Department of
Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case).183 Consequently, in
Australia, competence of the minor to consent to treatment is not determined by age
but by his or her capacity to fully understand the implication of the treatment
contemplated. However, as in the United Kingdom, courts in Australia have interpreted
the right of a competent minor to refuse necessary treatment to be subject to the
parens patriae jurisdiction of the court.184 For example, in Minister for Health v. AS.,185
the Supreme Court of Western Australia said that the court would almost always
override a child's decision to refuse life-saving or life-prolonging treatment, in
accordance with the child's best interests. Although the views of the child are relevant
to the "best interests" analysis, and the court would exercise great caution in
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overturning them, the child’s views alone are not determinative, regardless of the
child’s maturity.186
3.1.2.3.4 Competence of Minors in South Africa
The position in South Africa is similar. According to the South African Children’s Act,
2005,187 a minor188 may consent to his or her own medical treatment or to that of his or
her child if the minor is over 12 years of age, is of sufficient maturity and has the mental
capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the
treatment.189 However, the competent minor requires the assistance of his or her
parent or guardian to be able to consent to surgery.190 The consent of a parent or
guardian is required where the minor is under 12 years of age, or over but lacks
sufficient maturity or ability to understand the benefits, risks and social implications of
the treatment or surgery.191 However, such parental consent must take into
consideration any expressed wishes of the minor, bearing in mind his or her age,
maturity and stage of development.192
The right of minors to consent to treatment or, with assistance, to surgery does not
include the right to refuse life-saving treatment. Where a minor unreasonably withholds
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consent, or the parent or guardian unreasonably refuses to give consent or to assist a
minor to give consent, the Minister may give consent.193 In all instances where another
person who is required to give consent withholds such consent, the High Court or
children’s court may consent to the treatment or surgery.194 So far, except for some
variation on specifics, the law in South Africa accords with those in the other countries
discussed. First, competence is functional and not by age, although South Africa sets a
definite age limit below which the law need not assess competence. But, where the
treatment or surgery is for the purpose of terminating a pregnancy, a minor of any age
may consent to such treatment or surgery; she does not require parental assistance to
do so.195 Second, a mature minor cannot refuse necessary medical treatment. As well,
parents or a guardian cannot simply withhold consent to necessary treatment or surgery
for religious reasons. According to the Act:
No parent, guardian or care-giver of a child may refuse to assist a child…or
withhold consent…by reason only of religious beliefs or other beliefs, unless that
parent or guardian can show that there is a medically accepted alternative
choice to the medical treatment or surgical operation concerned.196
This provision codifies the common law practice of overriding, in most cases, the refusal
by parents or guardians to consent to life saving treatment, like giving of blood or blood
products, on the grounds of religious belief. But here, South African legislation requires
the parent or guardian to provide an alternative medical treatment to justify refusal of
the treatment offered.
3.1.2.3.5 Competence of Minors in the United States
In the United States, the competence of minors to make healthcare decisions is well
established in both federal and state policy.197 A research study that was conducted to
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determine the policies at the federal and state level found that with the exception of
abortion, many states explicitly authorize minors to access reproductive healthcare and
other sensitive services, such as treatment for alcohol and drug abuse and outpatient
mental health care, without requiring parental consent or notification.198
The policy reason for the explicit authorization is to protect the privacy rights of the
minor, as well as the recognition that requiring parental consent or notification may
dissuade minors, such as those who are sexually active, pregnant, infected with a
sexually transmitted disease, abuse drugs or alcohol or suffer from emotional or
psychological problem, from seeking needed care.199
Several attempts have been made to restore the traditional parental control over
minors’ reproductive health care decisions.200 These attempts are based on the notion
that before the age of majority,201a minor lacks the “experience” and “judgment” to
make “fully informed decisions.”202 Hence, as argued, it is acceptable to override the
decision of a minor in order to protect him or her from making wrong decisions due to
his or her inexperience, except in cases of emergency where parental consent cannot be
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obtained, or in the case of emancipated203 or mature minors. These attempts were,
however, unsuccessful.
Under common law, as in other jurisdictions, the capacity of competent minors to
consent to treatment, including having an abortion, is recognized,204 but whether such a
right extends to refusing necessary treatment is, as in other jurisdictions, not clear.
3.1.2.4 Competence of Minors: Conclusion
What is clear in all the jurisdictions is that a minor is not, by reason solely of being below
the age of majority, incompetent to make treatment decisions. Although legislation, in
some cases, provide for age of consent, in all the jurisdictions analyzed above,
competence is not a function of age, but of maturity, and assessment is subjective both
to the particular minor and her level of maturity, and to the decision to be made. It is
also reasonably clear that courts are, generally, reluctant to allow a mature minor to
refuse necessary treatment which is in his or her best interests. In such cases, the minor
may be subjected to a more rigorous assessment of maturity,205 or the court may
exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction to authorize treatment.
Beyond the foregoing gate-keeper competence, is the requirement that consent should
proceed from the patient voluntarily, without fraud, duress or undue influence. This
requirement is the focus of the next section.
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3.2

Voluntariness as an Element of Informed Consent

A valid consent is one which is given voluntarily, without coercion, undue influence or
misrepresentation,206 and in which the will of the person giving it is neither
overwhelmed nor undermined.207 To act voluntarily implies that the person acts
deliberately out of his or her own volition or free will and in the absence of fraud,
duress, undue influence or misrepresentation. Voluntariness also implies the absence of
oppression.208 Although oppression may manifest through duress or coercion, yet, as
McLeod and Sherwin argue, it functions in complex and less obvious ways, and affects
whole social groups rather than individuals. Hence, it tends to be overlooked.

Getting such consent in its strictest sense may be difficult, but not impossible. A
patient’s decision may be influenced by economic considerations,209 familial concern,210
internalized norms, and even by the illness itself. Arguably, these factors influence the
voluntariness of the decision and the extent to which it is representative of the patient’s
personal desires. The factors may be described as internal constraints and, depending
on severity, if they do not affect the competence of the patient to be self-determining,
they may be accepted as a part of the patient and not necessarily as undue influence.

But, there are instances where the persuasion and influence of other persons are so
pronounced that the decision made cannot rightly be attributed to the patient’s
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voluntary exercise of will.211 Or, though not as pronounced, yet it interferes with a
patient’s ability to act autonomously. Arguably, a patient may be persuaded to change
his or her mind about a particular treatment provided the persuasion is not of such a
nature that his or her will is undermined or overwhelmed. The question to ask,
according to Lord Donaldson MR is “[d]oes the patient really mean what he says or is he
merely saying it for a quiet life, to satisfy someone else or because the advice and
persuasion to which he has been subjected is such that he can no longer think and
decide for himself?”212

In the Irish case of JM v The Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital,213 a patient’s
husband applied for a court order to have blood transfused in his unconscious wife
notwithstanding that, while conscious, the patient had refused blood transfusion. Part
of the evidence provided by the patient’s husband in support of his application was that
the patient is African and became a Jehovah’s Witness on her marriage because it is part
of her culture to adopt the religion of her husband upon marriage.214 The court held that
the patient refused blood transfusion “because of her cultural background and her
desire to please her husband and not offend his sensibilities.”215 The court further held
that the patient was “preoccupied with her husband” rather than her health and that if
she was conscious, she would have approved of the decision taken and comforted by
her husband’s attitude.216 Consequently, the court ordered the blood transfusion.

Clearly, the court recognized the effect on the patient’s decision to refuse blood that is
caused by her being a married woman from a culture which appears to place a premium
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on pleasing one’s husband. Arguably, the court viewed such cultural emphasis as an
impediment to the patient’s autonomy. This is further strengthened by the fact that the
patient had, at some point accepted treatment, but changed her mind before the
treatment was administered. Following the emergency situation that followed, it may
be uncertain whether the patient would not have changed her mind again and accepted
treatment. Based on this, it is arguable that the court did not treat the refusal of blood
transfusion as proceeding autonomously from the patient.

However, the decision in this case raises certain concerns about agency and right to selfdetermination. Since the patient had indicated that she did not want blood treatment
and there was no suggestion that she was incompetent, or unduly influenced at the
time she made the decision, it is arguable that her right of self-determination was
injured by the treatment order.

On this view, the desire to please her husband by

accepting his religious belief as her own is an autonomous act which the patient was at
liberty to pursue. This is more so given that the patient’s husband had assured her that
she was free to accept the blood treatment and that he would not hold it against her. It
is immaterial that the patient’s decision was inconsistent, it is still, arguably
autonomous. Provided she understood and appreciated the implication of accepting or
refusing treatment, she is competent to make the decision, and this includes changing
her mind and making a different decision.

It would seem that consent that is given because a patient feels she has no other choice
is not truly voluntary and may be vitiated. In the Canadian case of Norberg v Wynrib,217
a physician who knew about a patient’s dependency on drugs, agreed to give her the
drugs in return for sexual favours. The patient subsequently sued for damages, alleging
among other things, battery. The physician raised the defence of consent. Three of the
presiding judges held that the patient’s consent to the sexual activity with the physician
was not without duress, given the inequality of power between the parties, as well as
217
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the exploitative nature of the relationship. Two of the judges found the physician liable
for breach of fiduciary duty. One of the presiding judges found the physician liable for
breach of his professional duty even though, according to this judge, the patient’s
consent to sexual contact was valid.

Also vitiated is consent obtained when a physician deliberately misrepresents facts to
induce the patient to consent. This contemplates fraudulent misrepresentation, such as
where a physician misrepresents the procedure actually performed, for example,
abscess instead of abortion.218 It does not include innocent misrepresentations where
the intention to mislead the patient is absent.219 Where a physician fails to disclose, for
example, an error in a previous surgery, and subsequently obtains consent to a second
surgery to repair the initial error, the physician is deemed to have misrepresented by
omission. In Gerula v Flores,220 a physician mistakenly performed a surgical operation on
a patient’s fourth vertebra instead of the third to which consent was given. The
physician subsequently obtained consent for a second surgery without informing the
patient that the second surgery was necessary to repair the initial mistake. The Ontario
Court of Appeal held that the misrepresentation was deliberate and vitiated the
patient’s consent to the second operation. The court also held that both the first and
second operation amounted to battery.

The ability of a patient to act autonomously may also be affected by social factors, such
as sexism and patriarchy, which either limit the options available to the patient, or
actively prevents her from deciding what she wants. This runs a risk of generalization
218
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for, it will be incorrect to conclude that every person who belongs to a class of persons
that is subject to oppression is unable to exercise full autonomy. However, it is arguable
that oppression interferes with an individual’s ability to act autonomously. As McLeod
and Sherwin states, “[i]ndividual members of oppressed groups are affected to varying
degrees by the forms of oppression that are endemic to their society; some manage to
overcome the oppressive circumstances of their lives largely unscathed.”221

A female patient who is socialized to be subservient may not trust herself enough to
make decisions affecting her health even where she is invited to do so, or, presented
with options, she may choose one which is likely to be approved by the persons to
whom she is subservient. Consequently, for a patient to be maximally able to exercise
autonomy, it is necessary that sources of oppression be eliminated.

A competent patient requires information to be able to make a decision. This forms part
of a physician’s duty of care. The nature and extent of this duty is explored next under
disclosure as an element of informed consent.
3.3

Disclosure as an Element of Informed Consent

The requirement that physicians must obtain the informed consent of patients before
they intervene medically, places a duty on them to provide patients with material
information to enable each patient to make an informed decision. As noted in Chapter
Two, a physician who fails to provide, or who provides insufficient information for an
informed decision is in breach of his or her duty of care and may be liable in negligence.
Adequate disclosure and informed consent are, arguably, intricately linked: for consent
to be informed, the patient must receive adequate disclosure. The nature and scope of
information required in discharge of this duty, and to make patient consent informed
varies according to the decision to be made and according to the patient making it. The
court in the US case of Canterbury v Spence held:
221
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[T]he patient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal.
That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough
information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician’s
communications to the patient then must be measured by the patient’s need,
and that need is the information material to the decision. Thus the test for
determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the
patient’s decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must be
unmasked.222
The foregoing dictum aptly captures the true import of disclosure necessary for
informed consent: adequacy of disclosure as determined by the patient’s need.223 It has,
however, been contended that while measuring adequacy of disclosure by the need of
the patient may be morally ideal, it would amount to an undue demand on physicians
who may lack the foresight to know what information a patient needs in order to give
an informed consent, especially where there is a possibility the patient himself does not
know this until the risk materializes.224 Hence, standards have been introduced to create
a semblance of uniformity in meeting the requirements in issue. In order words, the
desire for predictability necessitates the introduction of rules by which adequate
disclosure may be measured. Such rules or standards are either patient-based or
physician-based. Each of the standards is further analyzed. However, the importance of
disclosure to informed consent and to the patient’s health will be discussed first.
3.3.1 Justifying the Need for Disclosure
It has already been stated that information is essential to giving an informed consent,
for it provides the fodder required for the decision making process. Disclosure performs
two important functions: it confers therapeutic benefit and empowers the patient.
Studies indicate that patients who are knowledgeable about their health condition and
involved in the decision making process are more likely to comply with their treatment
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regimen. They also have reduced levels of anxiety, recover faster from surgery, and have
enhanced ability to protect themselves, such as by recognizing untoward side effects.225
Consequently, they are more likely to emerge from therapy in better health.226 In its
empowerment function, disclosure provides the patient with the information he or she
needs to be self-determining.
The therapeutic benefits of disclosure have been criticized. It is argued that in those
instances where the efficacy of a medical procedure is not certain so that a lot depends
on the blind faith of the patient, disclosure of the existing uncertainties and risks may
rob him or her of the placebo component of treatment.227 It is generally acknowledged
by physicians that patients are cured not only by an actual treatment, but also by the
knowledge that they have undergone a medical procedure and that relief is
imminent.228 It is also contended that disclosure of risks and side effects may result in
patients refusing necessary treatment out of fear of risks that might not occur and that
it may, in some cases, create undue anxiety and cause a relapse. However, these fears
are neither justified nor supported by available empirical evidence. Rather, existing
empirical evidence shows that disclosure is beneficial.229
A study on the attitudes of cancer patients and their families toward the disclosure of
terminal illness shows that although some patients would rather not be informed that
their illness is terminal, a majority of patients would want to be informed of the nature
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of their illness, including whether it is terminal.230 It was also found that patients who
were informed about their health status had a better emotional and psychological
adjustment to their health status than patients who reported guessing about their
condition or learning about it by chance. This, as confirmed by empirical evidence,
suggests that more often than not, the hypothesized negative reaction or outcomes of
disclosure such as anxiety, stress, and deterioration, do not materialize.231 Even where
disclosure produces anxiety, a US Supreme Court Justice opines that it is the very nature
of informed consent requirements, as well as the reason for their existence, that they
produce some anxiety in the patient and influence the choice he or she makes.232
According to this judge, “it is an entirely salutary reason.”233 Physicians are, however,
generally reluctant to disclose “bad news” to patients and would either avoid disclosure
entirely, or give a vague, generalized or round-about disclosure.234
Studies have also demonstrated that preoperative counseling tends to reduce anxiety
and complications during convalescence.235 It is hypothesized that the stress-reducing
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effects of preparatory information is achieved by stimulating an initial worry prior to the
medical treatment and, consequently, it provides emotional inoculation for the patient
to be better able to cope with the stress.236 Other hypotheses are that disclosure of
information serves to produce accurate expectations, and the information allows a
patient to retain a measure of control over adverse post-treatment outcomes by being
able to predict them.237
Having identified that disclosure is necessary for a proper exercise of the right to selfdetermination, and given that it is better that a patient is informed than not, it is
necessary to find out how extensive such disclosure should be. As mentioned earlier,
the ideal is one which facilitates informing the decision made by a patient. This excludes
an extensive recitation of facts and statistics which may have no meaning to the patient.
In this respect, two standards have been identified across jurisdictions like Canada, the
United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa. They are professional and patientbased standards. In as much as each standard has advantages, it also has disadvantages.
These are discussed next.
3.3.2 Standards of Disclosure
3.3.2.1 The Professional Standard of Disclosure
The professional standard of information disclosure contemplates disclosure of
information according to the custom of the medical profession. Here, the nature and
materiality of information to be disclosed is determined by the physician in line with the
approved conduct of his or her professional colleagues. Under this standard, the duty of
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the physician is to disclose such information as an objective and prudent physician in
the same field would provide.238 It follows that if the standard practice of prudent
members of the profession is not to disclose a certain piece of information, the
physician will be justified in not disclosing that information. Expert testimony would be
required to establish what a reasonable physician would have done. This standard is still
the law in the United Kingdom239 and in some states in the United States.240
The key attraction of the professional standard for the physician is the relative certainty
of the nature and scope of information that is required. A general criticism of the
standard is that it is uncertain that there is an accepted custom of disclosure of
information even among specialists in the same field.241 Secondly, it is argued that even
if such a custom exists, pervasive negligence may be perpetuated with impunity as
professionals would offer the same inadequate disclosure, or retain the discretion to
decide the level of disclosure to provide.242 In the main, the professional standard has
been criticized on the grounds that it constrains patient autonomy and fosters
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paternalism.243 Consequently, the professional standard has been rejected in Canada,244
Australia,245South Africa,246 and some states in the United States.247
3.3.2.2 The Patient Standard of Disclosure
The patient standard of disclosure requires that the information to be disclosed should
be determined by reference to the patient rather than the physician. This standard
places the interests of the patient at the center of the disclosure requirement. The 1972
U.S. cases of Canterbury v Spence248 and Cobbs v Grant249 were instrumental in the shift
from what used to be a physician-based standard to a more patient-centered
approach.250 The patient standard requires adequacy of disclosure to be calibrated by
jury assessments of what a reasonable patient in the plaintiff’s position would expect to
be told prior to making a decision about treatment.251 The court did not altogether deny
the relevance of professional expertise. Rather, the court assigned medical expertise a
substantial role in determining diagnosis and treatment options, but left the preferred
option to the patient.252
Under the patient standard, the test for determining whether a risk needs to be
disclosed is its materiality to the patient’s decision.253 In Reibl v Hughes, it was held that
the relationship between surgeon and patient gives rise to a duty upon the surgeon to
243

Ibid.
See the landmark case of Reibl, supra note 27.
245
See Rogers v Whittaker, supra note 44.
246
See Castell v De Greef, supra note 44.
247
See King & Moulton, supra note 224 Appendix A for a list of countries applying a
patient based standard.
248
464 F2d 772 (DC Cir 1972).
249
Cobbs v Grant, 8 Cal 3d 229, 104 Cal Rptr 505, 502 P 2d 1 (1972).
250
See David M Studdert et al, “Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: Two
Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risks” (2007) 4:1 J Empirical Legal Stud 103.
251
According to Robinson J in Canterbury v Spence, 464 F2d 772 (DC Cir, 1972) at 781,
“[i]t is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician to determine for himself the
direction in which his interests seem to lie.”
252
Canterbury v Spence, supra note 44 at 785-87.
253
Ibid at 786.
244

75

disclose to the patient all material risks attending the surgery which is recommended.
Relying on its earlier decision in Hopp v Lepp, the court stated:
In summary, the decided cases appear to indicate that, in obtaining the consent
of a patient for the performance upon him of a surgical operation, a surgeon,
generally, should answer any specific questions posed by the patient as to the
risks involved and should, without being questioned, disclose to him the nature
of the proposed operation, its gravity, any material risks and any special or
unusual risks attendant upon the performance of the operation. However,
having said that, it should be added that the scope of the duty of disclosure and
whether or not it has been breached are matters which must be decided in
relation to the circumstances of each particular case.254
Further, the Court held that even if a certain risk is a mere possibility which ordinarily
need not be disclosed, yet if its occurrence carries serious consequences, as for
example, paralysis or even death, it should be regarded as a material risk requiring
disclosure.255 What is material is not limited to risks, but includes alternatives to
treatment and the risks in those alternatives. According to Picard & Robertson
It is now well established that the duty of disclosure is not confined to risks, but
extends to other material information which a reasonable patient would want to
have. In particular, the patient must be informed of any available alternatives to
the treatment being proposed, as well as the material risks associated with those
alternatives.256
From the foregoing, it is evident that materiality is determined objectively. Thus, the
physician is only required to disclose those risks which “a reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to
attach significance to…”257 This standard made a great impact on patient autonomy by
concentrating more powers in the patient than is generally available to him or her under
the professional standard, and sought to redress the inequality of power between the
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physician and the patient.258 The objective patient standard also protects the physician
from liability where a seemingly insignificant or extremely unlikely risk is not
disclosed.259 The standard performs this function by limiting the scope of disclosure to
what a reasonable person in the patient’s position would want to know. In other words,
the objective patient-based standard protects physicians from the whims and
idiosyncrasies of individual patients.260 Both Canterbury v Spence and Cobbs v Grant
were relied on by Australia,261New Zealand,262 Canada,263 and South Africa264 in
adopting the objective patient-based standard.

This standard too has its shortcomings. The concept of “reasonable patient” is flawed on
several grounds.265 First, patients hardly agree about what risks are “material” to a
medical treatment decision.266 Where treatment options have closely related risks and
benefits, patients tend to judge the same set of treatments differently, depending on
their risk aversion or other value judgment, especially where the risk involved affects
the quality of life of the patient.267 Second, because even “reasonable” patients’
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preferences vary, the physician’s ability to determine what, in a particular circumstance
is material, would involve guesswork and may, consequently, be unreliable.268

The pertinent questions are: who decides what is reasonable in a particular instance?
How is reasonability determined? What qualifies as reasonable? Perhaps, the notion of
reasonability is meant to operate as a sieve to separate those whose conduct conforms
to the mainstream from those whose conduct does not conform. This is because
inherent in the idea of reasonability is an acknowledgment that there are unreasonable
individuals. Perhaps it is in order that physicians may be protected from liability for
failing to provide the kind of information that would meet the needs of the class of
persons who do not fit within the reasonable group that the duty to disclose is
measured by an objective standard.269

Third, an objective standard suffers from the same flaw as the professional standard
which courts are abandoning. In this respect, just as adherence to the practice of a
reasonable body of medical opinion denies the patient the right to determine the
information he or she needs to be able to make an informed decision, so does adhering
to what a class of reasonable persons would expect to be told. Both do not take into
account the particular patient’s need.

Fourth, and following from the above, the objective patient standard, in a sense, is
paternalistic. It assumes that a particular patient would want to know what a reasonable
person would want to be told, whether or not the patient actually wants that
information. In other words, it assumes knowledge of what a patient would want to
know without inquiring into the need of the actual patient. Individuals differ due to
unconventional belief systems, widely varying values, unusual health problems, and
unique family history. Consequently, reasonable disclosure, in the case of a patient who
268
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requires a different kind of information other than what a hypothetical reasonable
person would want, does not serve to make the patient informed. But, as already
indicated, where the objective standard operates, provided the physician gives the
patient information that a reasonable person would need, he or she is protected from
liability from breach of his or her duty to disclose. Whether the consent that is obtained
is truly informed is a different matter.
3.3.3 When is Consent Informed?
At what point then can consent be said to be informed? Is a patient’s consent informed
when he or she has received information a reasonable patient would require, however
extensive it is? Or does a patient need to understand the information received for him
or her to be informed? The answer to this depends on how informed consent as a
concept is viewed. There are two notions and each is analyzed below.
3.3.3.1 The Physician’s Duty to Disclose: First Notion of “Informed
Consent”
This notion of “informed consent” concentrates on the duty of the physician to disclose
information and only measures how much information is disclosed. This duty to disclose
forms part of the duty of care a physician owes a patient. Whether the duty has been
discharged or not is measured by standards. Where emphasis is on duty to disclose, the
focus is properly on the nature and content of the physician’s disclosure rather than on
the understanding and consent of the patient.270 On this, the physician discharges the
duty when he or she makes a reasonable effort to provide the patient with sufficient
information even though, without any fault of the physician, the patient does not
understand the information.271
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However, it is not certain that consent given without understanding the information
provided is informed. The view of disclosure as including understanding is the second
notion of informed consent and the subject of the next section.
3.3.3.2 Patient Comprehension: A Second Notion of “Informed Consent”
As earlier indicated, a physician may discharge his or her duty to disclose by providing
adequate information which, assuming an objective patient standard, a reasonable
patient would want. However, consent is not necessarily informed because there has
been disclosure of information, irrespective of how extensive the disclosure may be.
Rather, consent is informed when, following disclosure of information, the patient
understands what has been disclosed and its implications. One patient may require
more time, material, explanation, analogies, in order to understand what is disclosed.
Another patient may not require any additional effort to understand. To be sure, the
duty on physicians is not to explain all the details of every procedure and all the things
that can possibly go wrong.272 Rather, the duty of the physician is to do his or her best to
make the patient understand the implications of treatment and, following this
understanding, to decide if he or she wants that treatment or not.
That a patient must understand the information given to her is required in both the
Nuremberg Code273 and in the Declaration of Helsinki (2008).274 The capacity to
understand is, arguably, an important, if not the sole criterion for determining
competency. Understanding is usually an issue where there is language limitation,275 or
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unsophisticated patients with limited education,276 or patients under emotional or
physical distress.277 As earlier argued, whether a patient has capacity depends on his or
her ability to understand the information he or she is given, and utilize the same in
making a health care decision. The physician has a moral duty to ensure that the patient
understands the information that has been given.278 The understanding contemplated
transcends the language used in communication to include understanding of the actual
information disclosed.279 In Ciarlariello v Schacter,280 the Supreme Court of Canada
observed that
Prior to Reibl v Hughes, there was some doubt as to whether the doctor had the
duty to ensure that he was understood. However, Laskin CJC made it quite clear
in that case that it was incumbent on the doctor to make sure that he was
understood, particularly where it appears that the patient had some difficulty
with the language spoken by the doctor.
Indeed, it is appropriate that the burden should be placed on the doctor to show
that the patient comprehended the explanation and instructions given.281
The above dictum by Justice Cory was not very well received, especially among
academic writers.282 Picard and Robertson argue that to require a doctor in every case
to ensure that the patient understands the information given, and to place the burden
of proving actual understanding on the physician “seems far too onerous and
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impracticable a duty, especially in light of studies which indicate that many patients do
not understand (or remember) what doctors tell them.”283 They suggest that the doctor
should only be required to take reasonable steps to ensure that the patient
understands.
The above suggestion by Picard and Robertson is practical and involves a hermeneutic
approach towards enhancing patients’ understanding, and, thus, their autonomy. A
physician would be deemed to have taken reasonable steps to ensure understanding if,
where language is a barrier, he or she procures an interpreter, repeats explanations,
asks the patient questions that require application or evaluation of the information
given rather than a recital of the information, or enlists the assistance of family
members to explain the information to the patient.284 However, given, as already
acknowledged and supported by empirical evidence, that patients may not understand
what doctors tell them, perhaps even after measures have been taken to ensure
understanding, consent given by such patients, in the absence of actual understanding,
may still not be informed.
The question becomes how the physician would satisfy himself that the patient actually
understands. This issue is complex as understanding is subjective. Somerville suggests
an “appearance” test. That is, if the patient appears to understand the information
given, barring any indication to the contrary, the physician is entitled to assume that the
patient actually understands.285 This suggestion seems ideal, especially as it may be
difficult to measure understanding. However, as an added measure, the presence of a
witness is helpful. The witness may also double as an interpreter or a facilitator, and
should, preferably, be a family member. The family member may be enlisted to explain
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the information to the patient. The family member should also be convinced that the
patient understands the information given. While this may not ensure understanding in
every situation, such situations will be the exceptions and are more likely to be in a very
small minority.
Other means by which comprehension may be enhanced include the timing and method
of conveying information.286 Canadian courts hold that unless there are compelling
reasons to the contrary, the patient should be given sufficient time to consider and
reflect on the information given, to consult family and other physicians if they wish, and
so to come to an unhurried decision.287 Video presentations have been found to aid
understanding.288 So are leaflets. However, it is argued that written disclosures are less
effective than face-to-face communication.289 But this does not mean written
disclosures are unhelpful. However, where leaflets or other printed materials are used,
it is necessary, even prudent, to ensure that the information contained in them is
accurate, simple rather than technical, and obvious.290 The patient should also be
encouraged to ask questions, and their questions should be candidly answered by the
physician.291
When patients ask questions, it may be about matters that are important to them, or an
indication of their understanding of the information. But encouraging patients to ask
questions is not as simple as it sounds. Given the power and status imbalance between
286
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a physician and the patient, unless patients are secure or comfortable in their
relationship with the physician, they are unlikely to ask questions, or, in some cases,
understand what they are told. They are also unlikely, perhaps out of selfconsciousness, to disclose their lack of understanding to the physician.292 It is also
possible that, without medical knowledge, patients may not know much about their
condition in order to ask meaningful questions. Or without seeking confirmation from
the physician, patients may assume certain facts and hold on to such assumptions
subconsciously, even where the physician discloses information that negatives those
assumptions.293 It is important that physicians understand these factors and actively
seek to ensure and enhance patient understanding.
The implication of the two notions of informed consent is that depending on where the
focus is, the adoption of the same appellation “informed consent” for both of them is at
best, confusing. It would seem that “informed consent” has a different, though not
necessarily separate, meaning for the physician, as a professional, in his or her dealing
with a patient, and for the physician, as a defendant, in an action alleging negligent nondisclosure. To the physician care giver, the primary focus of informed consent is on
whether there is appropriate authorization by a competent patient to whom “sufficient”
information has been disclosed. An appropriate authorization may be a signed consent
form which may not necessarily embody the patient’s understanding. To the physician
defendant, the focus narrows on whether adequate disclosure was made and whether
the patient understood what was disclosed. Specifically, the question narrows to
whether the particular risk which occurred had been disclosed, even though other risks
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may have been disclosed. However, it remains to be said that cases alleging lack of
informed consent often turn on adequacy of disclosure.294
3.3.4 Duty to Disclose: A Suggestion
It is submitted that the focus must not be on the quantum of information supplied. A
patient’s interest may not be served by a detailed technical exposition of facts that has
little relevance to his or her understanding of his or her medical condition, or material to
the decision he or she has to make. Neither will a patient’s interest be served by an
artificially restricted scope of information. As the President’s Commission noted:
Overwhelming patients with a mass of unintelligible technical data that they are
ill-prepared to comprehend or use, particularly at what may be a stressful time,
can be as destructive of the communication process, and its goal of enhanced
understanding as giving too little information is. Similarly, reciting “all the facts”
in a blunt, insensitive fashion can also be as destructive of the communication
process, as well as the patient-professional relationship itself.295
Rather, empowering the patient to make an informed decision which accords with his or
her values and preferences should be given central consideration. To this end, the goal
of the physician should be “a tactful discussion, sensitive to the needs, intellectual
capabilities, and emotional state of the particular patient at that time, in terms that the
patient can understand, assimilate, and work with as part of the ongoing decision
making process.”296In this respect, neither a professional standard nor a reasonable
patient standard can claim hegemony. Both need integration. What physicians
customarily disclose and what a reasonable patient may want to know, may not satisfy
what a particular patient who is to undergo the medical procedure may want to know in
order to make an intelligent decision.
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The challenges inherent in the scope of disclosure which depends on the particular
patient is acknowledged: patients often do not know what information they would need
to decide on a course of treatment; physicians may lack fore-knowledge of what
information a patient may need, and patients may unfairly rely on hindsight to create
liability for the physician.297 In terms of cost, this standard may require time, intellectual
and emotional effort, and a certain level of selflessness for physicians to meaningfully
discuss issues that are of concern to patients. But these are necessary costs incurred in
the pursuit of the larger goal to have informed patients. Given that the goal of
disclosure is to promote patient autonomy, the objective standard does not fully protect
such autonomy, though from the point of view of physicians, it is comparably more
certain.
Where information that ought to have been, but was not disclosed to the patient, would
have, if disclosed, affected his or her decision to undergo a particular treatment from
which an injury resulted, the patient may be able to recover damages against the
physician. As an element of an informed consent negligence action, causation performs
an evidentiary function by linking the breach of a physician’s duty to disclose to the
injury suffered by the patient. Even though the concept of causation seems to be tied
closely to disclosure as an element of informed consent, it will be treated separately
because of its determinative value to whether an action for lack of informed consent
succeeds.

3.4

Causation as an Evidential Element of Informed Consent Negligence Action

The duty of physicians to provide patients with information is part of their duty of care.
A breach of this duty, where injury occurs, may result in an action against the physician
in negligence. A patient who alleges non-disclosure or inadequate disclosure of
information has the onus to establish a causal link between the physician’s failure to
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provide material information and his or her injury.298 In principle, the test is a subjective
one. That is, the patient has to prove that he or she would have declined the treatment
if proper disclosure had been made. This was the position in Canada before the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Reibl v Hughes.299

In Reibl, the subjective test was rejected as inappropriate because it put a lot of
emphasis on the patient’s hindsight and exposes the physician to his or her
bitterness.300 Instead, the court adopted an objective test, which focuses on whether a
reasonable person in the circumstances of the patient would have declined
treatment.301 A patient would succeed only if he or she satisfies the court, on a balance
of probabilities, that a reasonable person in his or her circumstance would have
declined the treatment if proper disclosure was made.302 This is also the test used in the
US. The UK303 and Australia304 focus on what the particular patient would do had proper
disclosure been made.
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The objective test adopted by the US and Canada treats the evidence of the patient
about what he would have done as inherently biased, untruthful and tainted with
bitterness and hindsight.305 On the other hand, the subjective test adopted by the UK
and Australian courts “at least permits the plaintiff to attempt to persuade the court
that she would have refused treatment if the risks had been disclosed.”306However, in
assessing the testimony of the patient, the UK courts do not outrightly dismiss the
possibility of the testimony being self-serving. This way, they have modulated evaluation
of the patient’s testimony by appealing to objective factors.307

In theory, the subjective test appears to be better suited to the doctrine of informed
consent because it considers the particular plaintiff whose autonomy is at risk.308
Whether this is helpful to plaintiff patients is uncertain. This uncertainty is based on
studies carried out by Gerald Robertson on informed consent cases since the decision in
Reibl v Hughes, which identified causation as a major hurdle for plaintiffs309 and, which
found that even though the test was increasingly subjective, plaintiffs still lose.310
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It is suggested that to overcome the hurdle posed by causation in an action in
negligence, failure to disclose should be made actionable per se without a need to prove
resulting harm;311 choice should be a legally protected interest;312 and, the onus on the
plaintiff to prove causation should be shifted to the physician instead.313 On this latter
suggestion, the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s position is presumed and the onus to
rebut this presumption is placed on the physician.

3.5

Conclusion

This chapter sets the background for the rest of the thesis. It provides the lens through
which informed consent in Nigeria will be analyzed. The major lessons of the chapter are
that competence is not determined by status. Rather it is assessed based on the
patient’s ability to understand and appreciate the information that is necessary for a
treatment decision, and to evaluate that information in terms of himself or herself. It
describes how such an assessment may be made, perhaps, using a sliding scale, but
preferably, functionally. Consent must proceed voluntarily from a competent patient. In
this regard, fraud, duress, undue influence, misrepresentation and oppression may
vitiate the consent that is given. In terms of disclosure, it finds that mere disclosure of
information, however extensive, does not make a patient’s decision informed unless the
patient understands the information that has been disclosed. It suggests how
understanding in a patient may be enhanced and determined. Accordingly, it suggests
that an ideal disclosure standard is one which is determined by what the patient needs
to make a decision. A successful claim for failure to obtain informed consent requires a
causal link between the breach of duty to disclose and the injury suffered. This is a
challenge for plaintiff patients. This challenge may be surmounted if choice is protected
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as an independent interest and breach of duty to disclose is made actionable per se.
Alternatively, the truthfulness of a plaintiff patient’s testimony about what he or she
would have done should be presumed until the physician proves the contrary.
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Chapter 4
Informed Consent in Nigeria: The Law and its Shortcomings
4.0

Introduction

The previous chapter provided a thorough and comparative analysis of the elements of
informed consent. The analysis showed that an ideal informed consent must flow
voluntarily from a patient who is found to be functionally capable, following disclosure
of the information that the patient would need, and which the patient understands. As
demonstrated below, although Nigerian law advocates the mainstream requirement for
informed consent to treatment to protect autonomy, its requirement is equivocal.
Hence its observation by physicians is arbitrary. The provisions of the law on the
elements of informed consent, and the actual practice of informed consent, still defer to
the traditional practice by which physicians act in the manner that they perceive to be in
the best interest of patients. This chapter discusses Nigerian law on informed consent in
light of the nature and standards of its elements as analyzed in Chapter Three.
The chapter begins with the law regulating the medical and dental profession in Nigeria.
This legal exposition begins with the Nigerian constitution.314 It analyses the relevant
provisions in the Constitution which assure the privacy, dignitary and religious rights of
Nigerians. It examines how these constitutional provisions have been interpreted by the
Nigerian court, vis-à-vis, the Code of Medical Ethics in Nigeria [the Code]. Next, it sets
out the relevant provisions of the Code dealing with informed consent. Further, it
explores the actual practice of informed consent and how it relates to the Code. It finds
that, although the right to personal dignity, liberty and privacy are constitutionally
guaranteed, because of the arbitrariness in actual practice of informed consent, these
314
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rights are not adequately respected. It finds that this arbitrariness, in part, derives from
shortcomings in the Code. Consequently, the discussion highlights the shortcomings of
the Code with suggestions on how to deal with the shortcomings.
4.1

Regulation of Medical Practice in Nigeria

The primary body which regulates medical practice in Nigeria is the Medical and Dental
Council of Nigeria [the Council]. The Council is a statutory regulatory body set up by the
Medical and Dental Practitioners Act.315 Its objective is to regulate the practice of
Medicine, Dentistry and Alternative Medicine in the most efficient manner that
safeguards best healthcare delivery for Nigerians. One of its statutory functions is to
prepare and review from time to time a statement as to the code of conduct which the
Council considers desirable for the practice of the professions in Nigeria.316 The Council
is also empowered to establish the Medical and Dental Practitioners Investigating Panel
and the Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal for the enforcement of its
rules of conduct.

Pursuant to the enabling provision, the Council has prepared and reviewed editions of
the rules of professional conduct of medical and dental practitioners in Nigeria. The
latest edition of the rules is titled, “Code of Medical Ethics in Nigeria.”317 This Code,
alongside the Physician’s Oath Declaration (Declaration of Geneva) adopted by the
World Medical Association in 1948 and amended in 1994,318 and the International Code
of Medical Ethics,319 guide the ethical conduct of the medical and dental profession in
Nigeria. The practices of the medical and dental practitioners are, however, subject to
315
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the jurisdiction of the courts and to the overriding provisions of the Nigerian
Constitution. Because of the overarching nature of the Constitution, and next to it, the
courts, primacy is given to discussion about relevant provisions of the Constitution.

4.1.1 The Nigerian Constitution

The Constitution is the supreme law in Nigeria.320 Every other law in Nigeria derives
validity from the Constitution and is invalid to the extent that it conflicts with the
Constitution.321

The Constitution sets out various fundamental rights of Nigerians,

including: the right to life;322 the right to personal dignity;323 the right to personal
liberty;324 the right to privacy;325 and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion.326

By the provisions of the Constitution, every person has a right to life and no one shall,
intentionally, be deprived of his or her life except in execution of the sentence of a court
in Nigeria.327 This does not extend to where a person dies from the use of permissible
force: to protect a life or property; to effect a lawful arrest or prevent a lawfully
detained person from escaping; or to suppress a riot, insurrection or mutiny.328 Every
person is entitled to respect for his or her personal dignity and, as such, must not be
subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, held in slavery or forced into
labour.329 The Constitution guarantees everyone the right to personal liberty. However,
it makes exceptions where this right may be overriden. The exceptions include, in the
320

See the Constitution, s 1(1).
The Constitution, s 1(3).
322
The Constitution, s 33.
323
The Constitution, s 34.
324
The Constitution, s 35.
325
The Constitution, s 37.
326
The Constitution, s 38.
327
The Constitution, s 33(1).
328
The Constitution, s 33(2).
329
The Constitution, s 34(1).
321

93

case of a person who is under 18 years of age, limiting his or her liberty is allowed for
the purpose of his or her welfare or education.330 For persons suffering from a
communicable disease, unsoundness of mind, drug and alcohol addiction, and vagrants,
they may be detained for purposes of their treatment, or to protect others.331 Further,
the Constitution assures everyone the privacy of their homes and communications.332 It
also gives every person the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and to
manifest and propagate the religion in teaching, worship, practice and observance.333

4.1.2 Case Law on Informed Consent

Although it may be argued that the foregoing rights can be interpreted to fit within the
health care context, only the rights to life, privacy and religion have actually been
engaged with by the court in the two known cases dealing with patient’s refusal of
treatment.334 The interpretation given to these rights as they concern medical
treatment and informed consent are, arguably, extendable to bodily integrity, liberty
and self-determination of patients. The first case, Medical and Dental Practitioners
Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo [MDPDT v Okonkwo], reached the Supreme Court of
Nigeria, the apex court in the country. The second case, Esabunor v Faweya is a Court of
Appeal decision. The decisions in these cases are presented in turn.
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4.1.2.1 MDPDT v Okonkwo

In MDPDT v Okonkwo,335 a patient who is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses sect
refused blood transfusion which was medically required for her ailment. She signed a
card refusing blood transfusion, and indicating acceptance of non-blood products. She
also released attending physicians from responsibility for the result of her refusal. The
respondent physician proceeded to treat the patient without transfusing blood.
However, the patient died. The physician was charged before the Medical Practitioners
Disciplinary Tribunal and convicted on two counts of infamous conduct336 for attending
to the patient in a negligent manner contrary to medical ethics and to his oath as a
medical practitioner. On the first count, it was alleged that the physician knew that the
patient was severely anemic, yet he failed to transfuse blood; he claimed to be inhibited
from transfusing blood by the patient’s refusal, yet he did not transfer the patient to a
bigger hospital where such inhibition would not operate to the patient’s disadvantage.
On the second count, it was alleged that the physician allowed his own belief as a
Jehovah’s Witness to influence him into agreeing with the patient and her husband not
to transfuse blood, and ignored the entreaties from the patient’s relations.

Relying on the English case of Sidaway v Board of Governor Bethlehem Royal Hospital337
and the Canadian case of Malette v Shulman,338 the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that
the combined effect of s 34 and s 35(1) of the 1979 Constitution now s 37 and 38 of the
1999 Constitution dealing with freedom of conscience and freedom of expression
335
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respectively was that an adult of sound mind has a right to choose what medical
treatment offered to him he would accept or refuse. Ayoola JSC stated that:

The right to privacy implies a right to protect one’s thought conscience or
religious belief and practice from coercive and unjustified intrusion; and, one’s
body from unauthorized invasion. The right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion implies a right not to be prevented, without lawful justification, from
choosing the course of one’s life, fashioned on what one believes in, and a right
not to be coerced into acting contrary to one’s life, religious belief. … The sum
total of the rights of privacy and of freedom of thought, conscience or religion
which an individual has, put in a nutshell, is that an individual should be left
alone to choose a course for his life, unless a clear and compelling overriding
state interest justifies the contrary.339
In his concurring judgment, Uwaifo, JSC added:

[U]nder normal circumstances no medical doctor can forcibly proceed to apply
treatment to a patient of full age and sane faculty without the patient’s consent,
particularly if that treatment is of a radical nature such as surgery or blood
transfusion. So, the doctor must ensure that there is a valid consent and that he
does nothing that will amount to a trespass to the patient. Secondly, he must
exercise a duty of care to advise and inform the patient of the risks involved in
the contemplated treatment and the consequences of his refusal to give
consent.340
The court noted that a consideration of a religious objection involves the balancing of
several interests: the patient’s constitutional right; state interest in public health, safety
and welfare of society; and the interest of the medical profession in preserving its
collective integrity. The court held that:

To give undue weight to one of these other interests over the rights of the
competent adult patient may constitute a threat to liberty of the individual,
unless legally recognized circumstances justify that weight should be ascribed to
one over the others. … Where, however, the direct consequence of a decision

339
340

MDPDT v Okonkwo, supra note 335.
Ibid at 255.
96

not to submit to medical treatment is limited to the competent adult patient
alone, no injustice can be occasioned in giving individual right primacy.341
The court held that any rule of ethics that does not consider individual circumstances
may lead to unjust consequences.342 It cited with approval, the statement made by
Nzeako JCA that, “[e]verything put together, it does appear that the code of ethics
which requires a medical practitioner to ‘always take measures that will lead to
preservation of life’ failed to pin down on the conflict between the right of a patient to
decide on what medical measures to agree to and the doctor’s code of ethics.”343

The court acknowledged that the decision of a competent patient to refuse treatment
may be overridden on grounds of public interest or recognized interest of others, such
as dependent minor children. However, the decision to override the patient’s refusal is
for the court to make, not the physician.344 The physician who is faced with such refusal
may “callously force” the patient out of the hospital, give refuge to the patient but
without treating him, or take steps to ameliorate the consequences of the patient’s
decision.345 Thus, the court upheld the conduct of the physician in respecting the
patient’s decision to refuse treatment.

4.1.2.2 Esabunor v Faweya

In Esabunor v Faweya,346 the plaintiff, a Jehovah’s Witness, refused to consent to blood
transfusion on her son who was about a month old and found to be suffering from a
severe shortage of blood. The management of the hospital reported the matter to the
police. The police applied for, and obtained an order authorizing treatment from a
magistrate court. Pursuant to the order, the blood transfusion was carried out and the
341

Ibid at 244.
Ibid.
343
Ibid (emphasis in original).
344
Ibid at 245.
345
Ibid.
346
Esabunor v Faweya, [2008] 12 NWLR (pt 1102) 794.
342

97

child’s condition stabilized. The plaintiff sought to quash the order of the magistrate
court. She also claimed damages against the attending physician and the hospital for
unlawfully transfusing blood into her son without consent and for denial of parental
right. The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed by the High Court. She appealed to the Court
of Appeal.

In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal referred to the constitutional right to life
and held:

The Code of Ethics of the Medical Profession enjoins a [physician] not to allow
anything including religion to intervene between him and his patient and that he
must always take measures that lead to the preservation of life. This [C]ode of
[E]thics places a great burden on medical practitioners in such a way that they
cannot accede to the wish of a citizen who will allow a child to die on account of
[religious] belief.347
The court also held that although the plaintiff had absolute right to choose a course for
her life, her right does not extend to determining whether her son lives or dies on
account of her religious belief.348

Next to the Constitution and case law, medical and dental professionals are regulated by
the Code of Medical Ethics. The provisions of this Code vis-à-vis informed consent, and
how the actual practice of informed consent is carried out, are explored below.

4.1.3 The Code of Medical Ethics

The key issues that are covered by the Code include:

347
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(i)

general guidelines, including, general ethical principles of physicians, the
rights and responsibilities of physicians, and informed consent;

(ii)

professional conduct;

(iii)

malpractice;

(iv)

improper relationship with colleagues or patients;

(v)

aspects of private medical or dental practice;

(vi)

self-advertisement and related offences; and

(vii)

conviction for criminal offences.

Based on relevance, particular focus is given to the first issue covered by the Code.
4.1.3.1 The Code on Informed Consent
Section 19 of the Code provides that physicians349 involved in procedures requiring the
consent of the patient, the patient’s relative, or appropriate public authority, must
ensure that the appropriate consent is obtained before such procedures are carried
out.350 As well, that explanations to patients from whom consent is sought should be
simple, concise and unambiguous about expectations.351 Further,
[w]here the patient is under age, (below eighteen years (18) by Nigerian law), or
is unconscious, or is in a state of mind constituting a mental impairment, a nextof-kin should stand in. In the absence of a next-of-kin, the most senior doctor in
the institution can give appropriate directive to preserve life. In special
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situations, a court order may need to be procured to enable life-saving
procedures [to] be carried out.352
In cases which may involve surgical procedures that are difficult to reverse, such as
sterilization, or removal of organs, such as amputation of limb, counseling sessions must
be undertaken at a minimum of three (3) sittings to give the patient ample time to make
an informed decision before a consent form is signed. The interval between counseling
sessions must be, at least, four (4) weeks if the clinical situation permits. Discussion and
explanation to the patient must be in the language the patient understands353 and when
necessary, through a competent interpreter. In the course of counseling, the attendant
benefits and risks of treatment must be clearly laid before the patient; appropriate
professional advice on options must be given, and the preferred option is to be chosen
by the patient who will then authorize the physician by completing a consent form.
4.1.3.2 The Code on Ethical Principles of Medical Practice

On ethical principles that guide medical practice in Nigeria, the Code provides that the
primary goal of a physician is to promote the health of the patient, promote the general
health of the community and respect the dignity of patients.354 While providing
professional service to patients, physicians are given “absolute discretion and authority,
free from unnecessary non-medical interference, in determining when to give their
services, the nature of care to be given to a patient under their care and must accept
responsibility for their actions.”355 For “special treatment procedures with determinable
risks”, the physician is required to obtain the consent of the patient, a competent
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relative or another professional opinion before embarking on such procedures.356
However, for biomedical research involving human subjects, physicians are mandated to
obtain the informed consent of the subjects.

4.1.3.3 The Code on the Rights and Responsibilities of Physicians

Section 10 of the Code provides that only physicians who are qualified according to the
criteria set by the Council can practice as either medical or dental practitioners.357 One
of the rights of physicians, according to the Code, is the right of absolute discretion in
terms of patient treatment. According to the Code:

Subject only to accepted standards of care as determined by corporate
professional opinion, a doctor must exercise absolute discretion and authority in
determining the nature of care given by him including appropriate utilization of
men [and] materials, money and time in order to achieve the best possible
results for his patients. By the same token, he must accept the responsibility for
the results obtained under his management. To this end, he must refrain from
doing anything repugnant to his sense of honour or against his considered
judgment, even in the face of unreasonable demand from the patient or other
persons, whether individual or corporate.358
It further provides that where resources and facilities are inadequate or inappropriate,
the physician must exercise ingenuity and initiative to secure the best treatment for the
patient.359
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Apart from the Code, there is also a National Health Bill 2008 [the Bill],360 which
provides for, among other things, the rights, duties and responsibilities of physicians and
patients. This Bill was passed by the Nigerian legislature in 2011. However, the Bill failed
to receive presidential assent for it to come into force. With respect to informed
consent, the Bill does not differ from the provisions in the Code of Medical Ethics. The
relevance of the Bill to informed consent is that it sets out specific information a patient
is entitled to receive. The information includes: the patient’s diagnosis except where
there is substantial evidence that disclosure would be contrary to the best interest of
the patient;361 the range of treatment options that are generally available to the
patient;362 the benefits, risks and costs associated with each option;363 and, the patient’s
right to refuse health services and the implications of such refusal.364

The Bill does not conflict with the Code of Medical Ethics. However, whereas the Code is
silent, the Bill expressly recognizes the doctrine of therapeutic privilege, by which
physicians may withhold information to benefit patients, and informed refusal by which
physicians are to explain the implications to a patient who refuses treatment. By stating
the information a patient is entitled to receive, the Bill seems to require informed
360
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consent in all cases, although it does not state that treatment should not be
administered without such consent. Since the Bill is not yet in force, limited reference
will be made to it.
4.1.4

Informed Consent in Practice

Several studies have been carried out in order to evaluate the understanding and
practice of informed consent in Nigeria. Some of these studies focus on patient
experiences and evaluation of the consent process. Others focus on physicians’
understanding, practice, and opinion about informed consent.
A 2009 study by David Irabor and Peter Omonzegele on the opinion and attitudes about
the process of informed consent in Ibadan, Nigeria, found that the style of obtaining
consent does not consider whether patients understand the proposed surgery - the
organs involved, the repair contemplated, alternatives available and possible
complications.365 The authors attributed it to illiteracy and the difficulty of translating
certain surgical procedures in local languages. Further, the authors found that where
“misunderstandings” arise post-operatively, the nature of the consent form used
appears to protect physicians from liability.366 The approved consent form reads:
--------- of -------- … hereby, after detailed explanation of the advantages and
disadvantages to me by Dr ------ willingly consent to the procedure of ---- on …
myself/child/spouse/mother/father/others… I affirm that I clearly understand
the language of presentation. The option to think over the procedure for a
period before assenting was also presented to me.
I further affirm:
(A) that the extent of the procedure and mode of [anesthesia] are left to the
discretion of the physician.
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(B) That any additional surgery or procedure to that described above will only be
carried out if necessary and in my best interest and can be justified for
medical reasons.367
The authors found that 63% of the participating physicians were satisfied with the
consent form as it is. However, 58% thought it is too vague. Only 15.8% of the
participants believe that patients know what they are signing for; only 10.5% obtain
consent themselves; only 26.3% test patients’ comprehension after consent has been
taken by house-officers, and only 36.3% of the participants are certain that patients do
not sign the consent form to avoid annoying the physician.368 A significant majority of
the participants (68.4%) are of the opinion that the consent form is just a medico-legal
document.369
One study by Osime et al370 carried out at the University of Benin Teaching Hospital
(UBTH), Benin city, Nigeria, found that there was significant difference in the kind of
information that is given to patients of different educational levels, especially in respect
to the nature of operation, risks of operation and opportunity to ask questions.371 It was
also found that despite not being satisfied with the amount of information provided, or
understanding the information, patients still consented to the medical procedure in
order not to appear rude or have their operation cancelled.372 Other complaints
identified include the use of technical terms in the disclosure process, or the duty of
disclosure of information being left to junior members of the surgical team who are not
themselves fully knowledgeable about the risks of treatment.

367

Form MDCN/COMEIN/R19. See the Code s 19.
Irabor & Omonzegele, supra note 10 at 36. This implies that the remaining 63.7% of
the physicians are not sure if patients sign the consent form just to please them.
369
Ibid 34 at 38.
370
OC Osime, O Okorie, F Osadolor & S Mohammed, “Current Practices and MedicoLegal Aspects of Pre-Operative Consent” (2004) 81:7 East African Medical Journal 331.
371
Osime et al, supra note 9 at 334. See also LD Leffal, H Claude & J Organ, “Ethics in
Research and Surgical Practice” (1997) 174 American J Surgery 589;
372
Osime et al, ibid.
368

104

In another study by Temidayo Ogundiran and Clement Adebamowo373 on the opinions
of surgeons in Nigeria about informed consent, it was acknowledged by a majority of
the surgeons that enough information is not provided to patients before taking their
consent.374 Informed consent was largely perceived as a medico-legal ritual rather than
a moral obligation. It was generally acknowledged that informed consent was not a truly
participatory decision making process. Very significantly, a majority of the surgeons see
informed consent as alien to the African psyche,375 and equate its importance to signing
a consent form.376 Opinions were, however, closely divided on whether informed
consent can be sought for every procedure.
In terms of information usually disclosed, it is helpful to set out the frequency at which
particular information is disclosed. They include: (i) therapeutic options, including
surgical operation (38.2%); (ii) special procedures to prevent or reduce risks (36.3%); (iii)
detailed explanation of diagnosis (31.4%); (iv) available alternative surgical procedures
(29.4%); (v) specific operative details (23.5%); (vi) risks associated with chosen operation
(22.5%); (vii) potential benefits of the operation (19.6%); (vii) specific information about
anesthesia and immediate postoperative period (19.6%); (viii) frequency of occurrence
of major operative risks (18.6%); and (ix) the likely surgeon to perform the operation
(4.9%).377
Ogundiran and Adebamowo also found that surgeons seldom encounter patients who
refuse to consent to surgical procedures. In the limited instances where patients refuse
surgery, the surgeons agree that poor communication between the surgeon and the
patient is a cause. Where patients decline to consent to proposed surgical operation, a

373

Ogundiran & Adebamowo, supra note 9.
Ibid at 742.
375
Although a large majority agreed that insisting on informed consent does not amount
to being insensitive to the African culture.
376
Ogundiran & Adebamowo, supra note 9 at 742.
377
Ibid at 743.
374

105

significant majority of the surgeons378 indicate that they are most likely to threaten the
patient.379
4.2

Analysis of Informed Consent in Nigeria: Law and Practice
4.2.1 The Constitution

Although not expressly stated, the right to bodily integrity and liberty protected by
informed consent process are discernible within the constitutional provisions, as
interpreted by the court. The protection from unauthorized invasion which the court
held to refer to the right to privacy ensures that the bodily integrity of the patient is not
violated. Similarly, while protection from coercion or denial of the right to choose the
course of one’s life may refer to the constitutional right to freedom of thought and
religion, it also extends to the liberty interests of patients and their right to be selfdetermining. This means that, following the interpretation by the court, the right to
personal dignity is not limited to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, but includes
unlawful and non-consensual invasion of the body of an individual. Besides, it is
arguable that, except where justification exists, to impose treatment on a competent
patient without his or her consent, or despite his or her refusal, is to subject the patient
to inhuman or degrading treatment which is clearly proscribed by the Constitution.

It seems that the personal liberty guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution is the
liberty of movement. That is, the right against unjustified physical restraint or
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confinement. This is, arguably, the sense in which it is understood.380 Whether it can be
extended to liberty to determine what happens to a person’s body in the healthcare
context is not clear. However, the Supreme Court’s statement that an individual should
be left alone to determine the course of his or her life, and that it is the role of law to
ensure the fullness of liberty where there is no threat to the society,381 is a clear
statement in favour of personal liberty. The implication is that reliance can be placed on
sections 34, 35, 37 and 38 of the Constitution to demand the right to participate in
medical decision making. On this basis, it is submitted that the right to informed consent
is a constitutionally protected right.

On the other hand, it would also appear that a person who is below the age of 18 years
may be involuntarily confined, without injuring his or her liberty rights, provided the
purpose is for his or her education or welfare.382 Similarly, persons suffering from
infectious or contagious disease, or who are of unsound mind, or addicted to drugs or
alcohol or who are vagrants, may be detained for the purpose of their care or treatment
or the protection of the community.383 The Constitution is however silent on whether,
having deprived these persons of their freedom of movement, their consent has to be
obtained before care is given or treatment administered on them. These issues are
important because, if treatment may be imposed without their consent, particularly
where the capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and implication of any
decision made exists, the purpose of informed consent, as it pertains to these persons,
is, arguably, negatived.384
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Perhaps this explains why the Code automatically deems mental impairment and being
below the age of 18 years, as evidence of incompetence. Consequently, it would seem
that, in regards to these persons, the erosion of their fundamental rights of liberty and
personal dignity, which are the interests compromised by involuntary confinement and
treatment without consent, respectively, are validated by the Constitution.
4.2.2 Case Law
The Supreme Court in MDPDT v Okonkwo clearly (and strongly) endorsed and upheld
the rights of patients to determine the treatment they want to receive and to be given
information that is necessary for that purpose. It hinged this on the constitutional right
to privacy and freedom of thought and religion. By this decision, the court elevated
patient autonomy over the beneficence of physicians and made informed consent a
clear part of Nigerian law. It recognized that although ethical principles of medical
practice require physicians to preserve life, where such principles conflict with an adult
patient’s right of self-determination, they must be subject to the right of selfdetermination. This is except where the court overrides the decision made, in the
interest of public health or other recognized interests, for example, the interest of
dependent minors. However, the court’s suggestion that a physician may callously force
a patient who refuses consent out of the hospital leaves open the question whether if,
following such callousness, the patient reconsiders and accepts treatment, such consent
is voluntary.

among the provisions of the bill was confinement for purposes of treatment and the
requirement of consent before treatment. The bill failed to receive sufficient support
and, consequently, it was withdrawn. See Andrew Hudson Westbrook, “Mental Health
Legislation and Involuntary Commitment in Nigeria: A Call for Reform” (2011) 10
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 397; World Health Organization,
“WHO-AIMS Report on Mental Health System in Nigeria” a Report of the assessment of
the mental health system in Nigeria using the World Health Organisation - Assessment
Instrument for Mental Health Systems (WHO-AIMS) Ibadan Nigeria 2006.
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The decision of the Court of Appeal in Esabunor v Faweya which referred to the
physician’s ethical duty to preserve life, and the constitutional right to life as the basis
for dismissing the appeal of the plaintiff, suggests that, except where the patient is an
adult and of sound mind, and has made a contrary decision, the physician’s ethical duty
to protect the life and promote the health of the patient is paramount. Arguably, the
Court in Esabunor v Faweya would have reached the same outcome on the basis of its
inherent parens patriae jurisdiction over children without basing its decision on the
physician’s ethical duty to save life.
4.2.3 Code of Medical Ethics
The provisions of the Code appear to balance physician beneficence and patient
autonomy. The Code charges physicians with the obligation of protecting both the
health and life of the patient, and his or her dignity. It ensures that physicians exercise
the discretion conferred on them scrupulously by making them responsible for the
outcome of the exercise of discretion. In respect of patient dignity, the Code makes
provisions for the consent of patients to be obtained.
On a literal construction of the Code’s provisions, two possible interpretations arise:
first, it appears that consent is not required for every medical procedure. The Code
seems to qualify its requirement of consent with words which imply that it is not always
required. For example, the Code enjoins physicians to obtain the consent of patients in
“procedures requiring the consent of the patient, his relation or appropriate
authority.”385 Such procedures would include where the treatment is “special” and has
“determinable risks.”386 These terms are not defined by the Code. In the absence of
judicial guidance, they are subject to various interpretations. For example, they may
refer to new treatments, or to a new way of applying an existing form of treatment, or
to treatments which have a research component. However, even for special treatments
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with determinable risks, the Code suggests that getting another professional opinion
may suffice to authorize the procedure.387 That consent of the patient is not always
required is further buttressed by the Code’s definition of professional negligence to
include a “failure to obtain the consent of the patient (informed or otherwise) before
proceeding on any surgical procedure or course of treatment, when such a consent was
necessary.”388
Second, the use of words like, “consent” and “informed consent”, suggests that the
Code provides for what may be described as a gradation of consent, with the spectrum
running between procedures which require no consent at all, through procedures
requiring mere consent, to procedures requiring informed consent. As indicated in
Chapter Two, consent and informed consent do not necessarily mean the same thing.
With respect to procedures which require mere consent, the Code requires explanations
about expectations to be concise and unambiguous. Where informed consent is
required, several counseling sessions, must be scheduled at decent intervals, at which
the benefits, risks and treatment alternatives must be presented to the patient.
Informed consent is required for difficult and irreversible procedures.389 In other words,
the Code sets a higher standard where the treatment involves procedures that are
difficult to reverse such as sterilization or amputation, and a lesser standard for special
treatments with determinable risks.390 This appears to be intentional. For example, in
section 28, the Code provides that it is professional negligence for a physician to fail to
obtain the “consent of the patient (informed or otherwise)” before administering
treatment.391 However, what may be distilled from modern jurisprudence on informed
consent in Western countries is that consent is required for every medical treatment
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except where this is impossible, as in emergency situations, or, pursuant to certain
legislative instruments (e.g. public health legislation), consent is unnecessary.392 And
consent must be informed.393
Where consent (including informed consent) is sought, the Code intends that the
consent process be initiated in the language and manner in which the patient will
understand. This implies that the physician is required to speak the language of the
patient or have the information translated into his or her language. As far as is
practicable, the physician must also simplify the information in such a way that the
patient, whatever his or her level of literacy, may understand. This requirement
acknowledges the challenges posed by the multiplicity of languages and the low literacy
level in Nigeria which, while extending the cost of obtaining informed consent in terms
of time and effort, does not justify ignoring it altogether.
With respect to the requirements for informed consent, allowing a decent interval
between one counseling session and the next, affords a patient ample time, where the
clinical situation permits, to reflect on the procedure and to come to a reasoned and
unhurried decision. Further, the requirement of professional advice on the options
ensures that the physician does not simply recite the required information to the
patient and leaves him or her to make his or her decision. The professional advice may
invite further questioning or discussion between the physician and the patient where
the option recommended by the physician is not one which the patient favours. Thus, it
facilitates a collaborative decision making process. Following these disclosures and the
physician’s professional advice on the options available, or in the case of mere consent,
the concise explanation about expectations, the preferred option is to be chosen by the
patient who authorizes the procedure by signing the consent form.394
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4.2.4 Actual Practice
The practice of informed consent is arbitrary. This arbitrariness stems, partly, from the
provisions of the Code, and partly from the physicians themselves. Although the Code
regulates the conduct of physicians, its provisions, arguably, only set the minimum
standard of conduct that is expected. As argued above, the right of patients to
determine the treatment they receive and to have information necessary to that effect
is embedded within the constitutional rights of personal dignity, liberty, privacy and
freedom of thought and religion. As a constitutionally protected right, it deserves
respect even if the Code did not provide for it. Although obtaining informed consent in
Nigeria may be challenging as noted in Chapter Five, the challenges do not, altogether,
excuse the arbitrariness of the practice of informed consent. They only make the
consent process more exacting.
Yet the Code contributes to the unsatisfactory practice of informed consent in Nigeria
even though physicians are also complicit in it. The nature of disclosure that is made,
whether consent is sought at all, and the emphasis that is placed on the consent form
which, in itself, does not adequately reflect the consent process, may align with the
interpretation of the Code and, to an extent, be blamed on the Code. The format for the
consent form provided by the Code is vague, a fact acknowledged by physicians in the
study by Irabor and Omonzegele, yet a majority of the physicians are satisfied with it.395
The form does not reflect the participatory consent process. It permits a physician to
carry out any further surgery other than the one consented to if the physician thinks it is
necessary, in the best interest of the patient. Yet, the Code intends it to be the only valid
form that may be used to obtain consent. Arguably, this protects a physician from
liability in battery for exceeding the scope of consent, or for performing a procedure
other than the one to which consent has been given, provided the physician can justify
the procedure as being medically necessary, and in the best interests of the patient.
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Perhaps, this explains why the consent form, which is supposed to embody the consent
process, is seen as a medico-legal requirement that protects physicians from liability.396
Further, as argued above, in compliance with the Code which, arguably, does not
demand consent in all cases, consent is not always sought before treatment.397
Sometimes, the nature of disclosure is such as satisfies the requirement of mere
consent.398 Ogundiran and Adebamowo find that physicians are almost evenly split on
whether informed consent should be sought in all cases.399
Lastly, given the judicial backing afforded by MDPDT v Okonkwo to the effect that
physicians may callously force out from the hospital, a patient who refuses treatment, it
does not seem surprising that in the few cases when patients exercise their right of selfdetermination to refuse treatment, surgeons are more likely to threaten them.400
Consequently, it appears that the shortcomings or dissatisfaction with the way informed
consent is practiced may be traced particularly to defects in the Code. Some specific
shortcomings of the Code are highlighted below.
However, the Code is not entirely to blame. The Code does not require physicians to be
selective in their duty to disclose based on the literacy level of patients. The Code also
does not provide that physicians may threaten patients who refuse treatment. As stated
before, physicians are subject to the overriding provisions of the Constitution and the
court. The Constitution provides, and the court has interpreted, at least, the right to
privacy and freedom of thought and religion as embodying the concept of informed
consent. The Supreme Court, per Uwaifo JSC expressly stated that the physician must
ensure that there is a valid consent and that he or she must exercise a duty of care to
advise and inform the patient of the risks involved in the contemplated treatment and
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the consequences of his or her refusal to give consent.401 Consequently, even if the
provisions of the Code are not optimum, the Supreme Court decision in MDPDT v
Okonkwo provides sufficient direction on what physicians are required to do.
4.3

Specific Shortcomings of the Code of Medical Ethics in Nigeria
4.3.1 Assumption of Patient’s Decisional Authority

A major shortcoming of the Code on informed consent is its assumption that, by stating
that the preferred option is to be chosen by the patient, it has effectively placed
decisional authority in his or her hands.402 As highlighted above, the Code provides that
the patient should make the decision. Yet, one of the ethical principles of medical
practice, which is also a right accorded to physicians, is their absolute discretion to
determine the nature of treatment to give to a patient who is in their care. This raises
two possible interpretations: on the one hand, it may be argued that to “determine the
nature of treatment to give” refers to the right of a physician to decide what treatment
he or she is willing to render to patients and when. Physicians are also autonomous
persons who, as the Code provides, are at liberty to choose whom they will offer their
professional services to, except in an emergency.403 As such, it may be argued that
401
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physicians have absolute discretion to determine what treatment options they are
willing to provide, and having laid out these options and their risks, the patient decides.
On this view, there is no conflict in the Code.
On the other hand, to “determine the nature of care to be given to a patient under their
care”404 may mean that it is within the absolute discretion of physicians to determine
the treatment a patient in their care receives. This view embodies a contradiction in the
Code, or indicates conflicting desires. It means that at one and the same time, the Code
attempts to give decisional authority to patients, in protection of the right of selfdetermination, and to maintain the traditional authority of physicians to decide the
treatment a patient receives. It also means that the Code acknowledges both the
desirability of patient autonomy and the professional obligation of the physician to
always act according to his or her considered judgment of what is in the interest of the
patient. In other words, on this latter view, the Code bestrides two models of patientphysician relationship identified as “patient sovereignty” and “medical paternalism.”
Medical paternalism, also referred to as the Hippocratic tradition, is based on a view of
the physician as the dominant, authoritarian figure whose expertise and training places
him or her in a position to be able to make decisions in the best medical interests of the
patient. On the other hand, patient sovereignty aims to take this authority from the
physician and to place it in the patient so that the patient, not the physician, would
control the decision about what treatment to receive. While a blending of the two may
be achieved,405 simultaneously locating decisional authority in the physician and in the
patient indicates a conflict: who decides? There are justifications for either the patient
or the physician making the decisions. These justifications are explored next.

been discriminated against may seek redress from the High Court of the State where the
discrimination occurred. See the Constitution s 46(1).
404
The Code s 9(h).
405
It is argued that the Code, to an extent, contemplates such blending.
115

4.3.1.1 Decision-Making by Physicians: Justifying Paternalism in Nigerian
Healthcare
If being treated paternalistically means a simulation of the relationship between a child
and her parents in which parents decide what is best for the child rather than let the
child decide what is best for him or her, then that appellation is not the exclusive
preserve of physicians. Rather, it extends to anybody who purports to act in the best
interest of another. As Patricia Peppin observes, participation of patients in their
treatment decision provides them with an opportunity to exercise choice according to
their own values and beliefs rather than through a “paternalistic imposition of another’s
treatment decisions.”406 In Malette v Shulman, Robins JA for the Ontario Court of Appeal
expressed the self-determining principle of informed consent thus:
The doctrine of informed consent has developed in the law as the primary means
of protecting a patient’s right to control his or her medical treatment. … the
doctrine of informed consent is plainly intended to ensure the freedom of
individuals to make choices concerning their medical care. For this freedom to be
meaningful, people must have the right to make choices that accord with their
own values, regardless of how unwise or foolish those choices may appear to
others.407
Self-determination is like a shield which protects an individual from outside control, and
manifests the wish to be an instrument of one’s own and “not of other men’s acts of
will.”408 The interpretation of “other men” seems to generally refer to physicians. If
paternalism is strictly construed to mean “overriding” a patient’s decision in order to
benefit him or her,409 then a physician who does this has clearly undermined the
patient’s decision. An example of a situation giving rise to this would be where a patient

406

Peppin, supra note 258.
Malette v Shulman, supra note 30.
408
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1969) at 118;
409
See Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 5 at 274 (paternalism was defined as the
intentional overriding of a person’s known preferences or actions by another person,
justified by reasons referring solely to benefitting or avoiding harm to the person whose
will is overridden).
407

116

expressed a preference for a particular treatment X, and the physician thinks X carries
more risk than treatment Y, and goes ahead and carries out treatment Y which has a
lesser risk. According to Beauchamp and Childress, “Paternalism always involves some
form of interference with or refusal to conform to another person’s preferences
regarding their own good. Paternalistic acts typically involve force or coercion, on the
one hand, or deception, lying, manipulation of information, or nondisclosure of
information on the other.”410
Essentially, a physician will be acting paternalistically where he or she fails to carry out
his or her duty of disclosure. This contemplates where the physician withholds
information, such as the patient’s diagnosis, out of concern not to cause him or her
undue anxiety. It may also include where the physician actively lies or deceives the
patient, perhaps by trivializing his or her medical condition, or manipulates the
information in a way that ensures that the patient’s decision aligns with the physician’s
preference. It is also paternalistic for a physician to make healthcare decisions for a
competent patient rather than let the patient make it (as distinct from overriding an
already made choice).411
In the foregoing examples, the intention of the physician is to further the patient’s
interest, or protect his or her welfare. Because the patient is competent to determine
what is in his or her interest, such paternalism is offensive. In Kantian liberalism, the
moral fundamentality of individual autonomy seems to prohibit any paternalistic actions
when the individual involved is capable of self-governance.412 On this view, it would
always be morally wrong for the physician to withhold information from a competent
patient on the grounds that such information is not in the patient’s interest to receive as
it may create undue anxiety. Withholding such information is akin to treating the
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patient as a means to an end, even if the end is his or her restored health.413 John Stuart
Mill captured the unpopularity of paternalistic action in his classical utilitarian
statement. According to him:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise,
or even right.414
This is certainly true where the patient is competent. What about cases where the
patient is found to be incapable of deciding? Where the patient appointed some other
person to decide on his or her behalf, a decision made by the patient’s appointee is an
exercise of self-determination. Where this is not the case, it is arguable that decision will
have to be made on the patient’s behalf by a substitute decision maker, and the
substitute decision maker will be acting in what he or she perceives to be in the best
interest of the patient. This is still paternalism. But, because the patient is incapable of
deciding for himself or herself, such paternalism is justified.415 Mappes and DeGrazia
caution that in considering the justifiability of paternalistic actions, the difference
between paternalism as a principle, and extreme paternalism, should be borne in
mind.416 This difference lies in the motive for the paternalistic intervention. According to
them, if the intent is to benefit the individual, it is extreme paternalism. If, on the other
hand the intent is to keep the individual from harm, it is paternalism as a principle, and
is justified.417 An example of the latter will be intervention in an emergency to save the
life of the patient, or to keep him or her from getting worse.
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Mappes and DeGrazia’s distinction does not fully account for decision making in
situations, other than emergencies, where a patient is incompetent. In such situations,
keeping the patient from harm may not arise. Rather, the decision made may be one
that is assumed to be beneficial to the patient. Besides, it is for the benefit of the
patient that he or she should be kept from harm. Thus, Mappes and DeGrazia’s
distinction is, arguably, without a difference. If any distinction at all is to be made, such
distinction should be between justified and unjustified paternalism: justified, where the
patient is incompetent and has not authorized another person; unjustified when the
patient is capable of deciding for himself or herself or has appointed somebody else.
Even Mill qualified his rejection of paternalism in the case of minors and incompetent
persons like mentally impaired persons. Mill states:
[This] doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their
faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age
which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in
a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their
own actions as well as external injury.418
However, Mappes and DeGrazia argue that though it may seem like an endorsement of
paternalism in the case of minors and mentally impaired persons, Mill’s qualification
only removes the limitation of coercion in terms of autonomy as liberty of action, and
narrows the choices available in terms of autonomy as freedom of choice. However,
they argue, it does not limit autonomy in the sense central to both Mill and Kant’s moral
position. This is because, according to them, those with diminished autonomy like
minors and the mentally impaired, lack what is essential for an appropriate level of
effective rational deliberation.419 The validity of this interpretation is not certain. A
literal construction of Mill’s statement suggests that the idea of individual liberty applies
to persons who are competent. For persons who, by reason of age or mental state,
require care from others, they must be protected from their own actions, which benefits
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them, as well as from external injury, which keeps them from harm. Even by Mappes
and DeGrazia’s distinction, the foregoing is paternalism.
If this argument is correct, it would mean that where a patient possesses diminished
autonomy,420 it may be justified to treat him or her paternalistically. In other words, the
lesser the level of autonomy that a patient is capable of exercise, the greater the
paternalism that is required. To express it mathematically, the level of paternalism that
is justified is inversely proportional to the level of autonomy that can be exercised.
Paternalism may be justified where the pain and distress from illness and disease are so
severe as to make a patient’s competence impaired.421. As argued in Chapter Three,
accidents, illnesses, diseases, and emotional pressures may diminish patients’ rational
capacities and consequently their autonomy.422 Where this is the case, it may be
justifiable to treat the patient paternalistically.
It is argued that pursuing informed consent may actually work against the interests of
the patient by robbing him or her of the therapeutic powers of faith that a medical
intervention will be successful. For example, Jay Katz notes that disclosure and consent
may be deleterious to a patient in those situations where, as a result of the ubiquitous
uncertainties of medicine about risks and benefits, the unexamined faith of both the
physician and the patient in the curative power of medical interventions, contributes
significantly to therapeutic success.423 According to him, even partial awareness of such
uncertainties which informed consent would bring to the fore, could prove detrimental
to recovery.424 However, as argued in Chapter Three, the fears expressed about the
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consequence of disclosure for the purpose of informed consent, often do not
materialize, and studies have shown that patients benefit from being informed.425
Why does paternalism have to be justified at all if it is for the benefit of the patient?
Again, the argument traces back to the American repudiation of any form of authority
and class difference. On this view, the growing awareness of class differences in society,
and the fact that those who perform paternalistic acts, for example, physicians, are
usually members of the upper-middle class, while those who are treated
paternalistically are usually, though not necessarily, members of the poorer, less
privileged class, may be enough reason to repudiate paternalism.426 Further, the
differences in the values and preferences between members of each of the classes lead
to serious doubt about the capacity of physicians to act in the best interests of the
patient. Therefore, while it may not be morally wrong for the best interest of a patient
to be pursued, there is a possibility that leaving the decision about what that best
interest is, to persons other than the patient or his or her appointee, may lead to abuse.
According to Mappes and DeGrazia,
[I]t is not the moral legitimacy of the principle of autonomy that is really at issue
when paternalistic acts are increasingly rejected. Rather, what is at issue are the
abuses resulting from so-called paternalistic acts that do not in fact serve to
benefit (or keep from harm) the individuals constrained but do serve the ends of
the members of the profession wielding paternalistic authority.427
The foregoing argument purports that physicians who make treatment decisions for
competent patients may not really serve the ends of the patients. This may occur in a
number of ways. An example is where the physician is conflicted, such as where the
physician recommends treatment for a medical condition which the patient does not
have, just for the purpose of the financial reward. It is best to allow patients to
determine their own best interests in order to avoid the danger of tyranny. For, unless
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the interests and values of both the physician and the patient coincide, the patient’s
best interest, where he or she is competent, is better served if paternalism is rejected
rather than accepted.
4.3.1.2 Decision-Making by Patients: Autonomy in Nigerian Health Care
Under a free government at least, the free citizen’s first and greatest right, which
underlies all others - the right to himself - is the subject of universal
acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however
skillful or eminent, to violate without permission the bodily integrity of his
patient…and [operate] on him without his consent or knowledge.428
Justice Cardozo aptly captures the importance of autonomy in his often quoted dictum
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body.”429
The foregoing demonstrates that decision making is to be made by the patient in the
exercise of his or her right to be self-determining. It is argued that other ethical
principles, such as beneficence, justice, and non-malfeasance, presuppose and can be
reduced to respect for autonomy.430 According to Raanan Gillon, beneficence and nonmaleficence toward autonomous moral agents presuppose respect for the autonomy of
these agents even when they exercise such autonomy to refuse medical interventions
which are life-saving. For justice, Gillon argues that justly responding to people’s needs
will require respect for those people’s autonomous decisions even when such decisions
would result in death or grievous bodily harm. Justice in this case would question
expending scarce resources on a person who voluntarily decided he or she does not
want it. Gillon concludes that respect for autonomy builds in a prima facie moral
requirement to respect both individual and cultural moral variability.
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The primary contribution of autonomy is that it provides a basis for a right to refuse
treatment.431 In other words, autonomy in health care is a negative right which the
holder can only exercise in refusing treatment; it cannot be used to compel a particular
treatment.432 Its practical significance to a physician is that it shifts responsibility for
decision making to the patient, affords protection from liability from malpractice suits,
and enables the physician to fulfill his or her ethical duty of respecting the dignity of
patients.433 As seen from the provisions of the Code, physicians have absolute discretion
to determine what treatment to give on the condition that they bear the responsibility
for the outcome of the treatment. Thus where the decision making authority is shifted
to patients, it arguably relieves physicians of responsibility for the outcome of
treatment. By the decision in MDPDT v Okonkwo,434 the Supreme Court indicated the
direction judicial decisions on informed consent are likely to take. The Supreme Court
ruled in favour of patient autonomy, rather than paternalism. It endorsed the right of
patients to decide the course of their treatment rather than leave it to physicians’
ethical obligation to preserve life.

However, on the specific facts of the case, the Supreme Court did not take into account
how the refusal of blood treatment by the patient was primarily caused by the
conditioning effect of her religious membership.435 Perhaps if the patient had received a
different kind of socialization or belonged to a different religious group, her decision
would have been different. On this view, it may be argued that her decision is a product
of her socialization as was arguably the case in JM v The Board of Management of St
Vincent’s Hospital. Knowing this, would the physician have been justified in transfusing
blood despite its rejection? This is even more complex where the patient has reflected
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upon and adopted the religious norms as her own, and acted based on a personal
conviction.436 Perhaps, in this case, she is fully autonomous. Yet, it is still vexing to
decide, as Diana Meyers suggests,437 that where the religious norms are uncritically
adopted, she is not autonomous. Provided the patient understood and appreciated the
consequences of her decision, and there was no evidence that she was otherwise
unduly influenced to the extent that she could no longer think and decide for herself,
her decision was validly respected by the physician and the Supreme Court’s preference
of autonomy over paternalism is sound.

However, the concept of autonomy cannot fully account for the ethical responsibilities
of physicians. This is because the sense of responsibility exhibited by physicians,
arguably, arises from their ethical obligation to preserve life and promote health, rather
than from a set of rules designed to protect patient autonomy. Although physicians’
ethical obligation includes respect for patients, yet, it is in beneficence that a more
resonant expression of medicine’s fundamental ethos is found.438 Patient autonomy
cannot meaningfully exist in the absence of professional input to guide the exercise of
such autonomy. On the other hand, professional decision without patient autonomy
may eventuate in medical tyranny. Accordingly, both autonomy and paternalism ought
necessarily to interplay with each other. The interplay contemplated is not dialectic
where these principles are in conflict. Rather, it is one which creates a homeostatic
balance where each principle balances the other in the pursuit of a common goal.439

The Code of Medical Ethics, in requiring physicians to provide professional advice on
treatment options, seems to envisage such interplay between patient sovereignty and
medical expertise. Accordingly, it is arguable that the decision making process requires
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mutual participation of both the physician and the patient, with the physician ensuring
that the choice of the patient is enlightened through proper disclosure of information,
and professional advice on the options available to him or her.440 However, the patient
is free to accept or reject the physician’s recommendation.

Thus, while the process leading to the preferred option is collaborative, the ultimate
decision should reflect patient autonomy. In other words, the process encompasses
collaboration, autonomy, and accountability. Accountability determines who bears
responsibility for the treatment outcome. Although the Code places the responsibility on
the physician, this would be the case where the physician relies on his or her absolute
discretion to decide the treatment to give. In the mutual decision process suggested,
responsibility for the decision or outcome of treatment should be joint. Arguably, having
a patient take responsibility for his or her decision encourages his or her participation in
the decision-making process. At the same time, it does not excuse the physician from his
or her ethical and professional duty of care.

For a patient to exercise the right of autonomy, such patient must be competent. In this,
the Code is defective: it measures competence according to status. A consequence of
this defect is that it unnecessarily widens the range of persons who may be treated
paternalistically. This defect is discussed below.
4.3.2 Prescription of Status Incapacity
It was shown in Chapter Three that a threshold matter for informed consent is the
determination of competency or capacity. This determines whether or not the decision
of a patient will be sought at all, or where given, will be respected. In other words,
competence determines which of the identified values underlying informed consent will
prevail, that is, respect for autonomy or beneficence. As such, competence performs a
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gatekeeping function.441 A finding of competence means that the patient is allowed to
decide his or her treatment. On the other hand, a finding of incompetence may lead to a
patient having treatment imposed on him or her based on the decision of a next-of-kin,
who, ostensibly is acting in his or her best interest.
According to the Code, a competent patient is one who is not below the age of eighteen
or who is not mentally impaired or unconscious.442 This implies a status approach to
competency: the status of being a child or a minor and the status of being diagnosed as
mentally impaired. Each of these is discussed in turn.
4.3.2.1 The Minor in Nigerian Health Care
The Code provides that where a patient is below eighteen, he or she is not capable of
giving consent; the consent must proceed from a next of kin. In this sense, incapacity is
conflated with being a minor. There is no requirement to assess the minor’s capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature of decision to be made. The Code adopted the
age of majority in Nigeria as the age of competence. The conflation of the age of
majority with the age of competence may stem from the law of contract under which an
infant, that is, a person under the age of majority, is incapable of entering into valid
contracts or incurring legal obligations therefrom. However, even this contractual
principle admits of several exceptions where an infant can be bound to his or her
contract, such as in some cases of contracts for necessaries. Perhaps, the uncertainty
about whether certain treatments qualify as necessaries which may bind a child,
contributes to the desire to obtain the consent of an adult who might be bound.443
As argued in Chapter Three, the test of capacity for a minor is highly functional and
subjective across jurisdictions. This means that the test varies from one child to another
and from one decision to another. For example, a 12-year old may be possessed of
441
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sufficient maturity to consent to receive contraceptive advice. Another 12-year old may
not have the same maturity. Similarly, a 14-year old may be able to consent to
treatment with relatively minor consequences, but may be found incompetent to
consent to more complex ones such as a sex reassignment.444 A functional assessment
does not rely on a blanket presumption of incapacity. Rather, it assesses whether the
particular child is capable of consenting to the particular procedure, having regard to
the age, maturity and understanding of the child and the nature and complexity of the
procedure.
Conflating age with incapacity implies that notwithstanding how enlightened about his
or her illness a patient is, as long as he or she is below the legal threshold, he or she is
automatically barred from making his or her own decision and has to be treated
paternalistically, in his or her best interest, as determined by someone else. The
significance of this for informed consent is large. Available statistics indicate that the
Nigerian population is very young; over 40% of Nigerians are under the age of 14,445 and
about 51% are under the age of 18 years.446This implies that over half of the Nigerian
population

is,

automatically,

medically

incompetent

and

may

be

treated

paternalistically. But this is only one arm of the excuse for paternalism. Another
automatic recourse to paternalism is in the case of the mentally impaired.
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4.3.2.2 The Mentally Impaired
Numerous studies on mental impairment show that it is highly prevalent in Nigeria.447
Severely mentally impaired persons do not pose much assessment difficulties. However,
the Code of Medical Ethics does not make a distinction between severe mental
impairment which renders a patient incapable of being held responsible for any decision
made because he or she lacks the cognitive capacity, and mild mental impairment in
which the person is able to function normally to an extent and to make some decisions
affecting him or her. The former consists of cases where the impairment is so severe as
to make a patient unable to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of
the decision to be made. The latter would include where, though the patient may have
trouble with memory, language, thinking or judgment, it does not interfere with his or
her daily life or activities, so that he or she is still capable of cognitive functioning, albeit
at a relatively reduced level. It has been found that although mental disorders are
common in Nigeria, they are usually of a mild nature.448 A large proportion of those with
such disorders manage to function without considerable limitations.449
Further, studies have shown that physicians are generally only able to detect severe
mental disorders and not their mild manifestations.450 Consequently, if every mentally
impaired patient, whatever the degree of impairment, is incompetent, arguably even
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where his or her impairment is not detected, the patient’s decision is invalid. This is
because, as mentioned earlier, a valid consent must flow from a person who is
competent. Because competence under the Code is based on belonging to the class of
minors or the class of mentally impaired, it follows that once a patient is a member of
either class, irrespective of whether the physician is aware of the patient’s status, or is
mistaken about it, the patient cannot give a valid consent.
The impact on informed consent of competence based on belonging to the class of
mentally impaired is, as with the case of a minor, a testimony to the prevalence of
paternalism in Nigerian health care. Available statistics show that at any point in time,
about 10% of the adult Nigerian population suffers from a mental illness and around
20% of all patients seen by primary health care providers, have one or more mental
health disorders.451 If, based on the Code, this group of persons is incompetent, whether
severely mentally impaired or mildly impaired it further reduces the number of persons
whose autonomy can be respected. For the seriously impaired, it seems that their
autonomy does not suffer as it does not exist given their clear lack of capacity for selfdetermination. For the mildly impaired, overriding their preference or imposing
treatment on them without a functional assessment of their ability to understand and
make decisions for themselves would violate their right of self-determination.
A functional provision of competency in the Code would read:
“A person shall be deemed incompetent if by reason of age or mental
impairment he or she is unable to understand and appreciate the information
that is necessary to make an informed decision regarding his or her treatment.”
The above construction properly captures the functionality of competence. It avoids the
rigid status approach, and respects the patient’s self-determination. The proposed
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construction does not negate the presumption of competence in adults.452 Rather, it
obviates the necessity of a competence assessment where the individual is clearly of age
and there is no indication of incompetence. For persons below majority or cognitively
impaired, it provides an opportunity for them to demonstrate that they are not unduly
affected by their age or mental condition.
Where a patient is incompetent, decision-making power shifts to his or her next-of-kin,
where one is available. In this respect, the Code does not specify how the next of kin
may be identified, in terms of priority, and what should guide the next-of-kin in making
a decision for the patient. This shortcoming is discussed below.
4.3.3 Lack of Definition of Next of Kin
As already stated, a determination of incapacity according to the Code means that
authorization for treatment will be given by a next-of-kin. The Code is silent on who
qualifies as next-of-kin and whether the appellation can be interpreted to include
persons in close relationship with the patient, but who are not related to him or her.
This is particularly important given that the nature of activity contemplated is one
touching on the dignitary interest of the patient. Since Nigeria, essentially, operates a
private health care system, it also involves administration of or forbearance from
treatment which the person so authorizing bears responsibility for the costs of
treatment, the welfare of the patient while in hospital, and liability in the event that a
suit ensues. Should a next of kin be limited to persons connected to the patient by blood
even in cases where the emotive element of kinship is undeveloped?
Canadian legislation, Ontario, for example, is very instructive on decision making where
a patient is found incapable of deciding his or her treatment. The Ontario Health Care
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Consent Act provides, in ranking order, persons who can authorize treatment in the
event that the patient is found incompetent. These persons include:453
(i)

The incapable person’s guardian, if the guardian has authority to give or
refuse consent to the treatment.

(ii)

The incapable person’s attorney for personal care, if the power of attorney
confers authority to give or refuse consent to the treatment.

(iii)

The incapable person’s representative appointed pursuant to the Act, if the
representative has authority to give or refuse consent to the treatment.

(iv)

The incapable person’s spouse or partner.

(v)

A child or parent of the incapable person, or a children’s aid society or other
person who is lawfully entitled to give or refuse consent to the treatment in
the place of the parent. This paragraph does not include a parent who has
only a right of access. If a children’s aid society or other person is lawfully
entitled to give or refuse consent to the treatment in the place of the parent,
this paragraph does not include the parent.

(vi)

A parent of the incapable person who has only a right of access.

(vii)

A brother or sister of the incapable person.

(viii)

Any other relative of the incapable person.

Any of the foregoing persons may authorize treatment only if that person is:454
(a)

competent with respect to the treatment;

(b)

is at least 16 years old, unless he or she is the incapable person’s parent;

(c)

is not prohibited by court order or separation agreement from having access
to the incapable person or giving or refusing consent on his or her behalf;

453
454

(d)

is available; and

(e)

is willing to assume the responsibility of giving or refusing consent.

Health Care Consent Act, 1996 s 20(1).
Health Care Consent Act, 1996 s 20(2).
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Where none of the above indicated persons meets the requirement,455 or where there is
a conflict between any of them,456 the Public Guardian and Trustee shall make the
decision. In making the decision whether to authorize treatment or not, the person so
authorizing shall first, act in accordance with any advance directive or expressed wishes
of the incompetent person made while he or she had capacity and after attaining the
age of 16 years. In the absence of any such expressed wishes or where the same cannot
possibly be carried out, the person authorizing or refusing treatment shall only act in the
best interest of the incompetent person.457
The Ontario Health Care Consent Act further provides for how the incapable person’s
best interests may be determined.458 This includes consideration of the values and
beliefs that the person knows the incapable person held when capable, and believes he
or she would still act on if capable, and any expressed wish of the incapable person.
Specifically, the person authorizing treatment is to consider:
(a) Whether the treatment is likely to (i) improve the incapable person’s condition
or well-being; (ii) prevent the incapable person’s condition or well-being from
deteriorating, or (iii) reduce the extent to which, or the rate at which, the
incapable person’s condition or well-being is likely to deteriorate.
(b) Whether the incapable person’s condition or well-being is likely to improve,
remain the same or deteriorate without the treatment.
(c) Whether the benefit the incapable person is expected to obtain from the
treatment outweighs the risk of harm to him or her.
(d) Whether a less restrictive or less intrusive treatment would be as beneficial as
the treatment that is proposed.
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Similarly, the National Health Act, 2003 of South Africa459 provides, in order of priority,
for persons who may authorize treatment where a patient is incompetent. These
include a person mandated by the patient in writing, a person authorized by law or
court order, a spouse or partner, a parent, grandparent, adult child, brother or sister.460
There is no similar provision in Nigerian law stipulating: how authorizations for
treatment may be made in the event that a patient is incompetent; the rankings in order
of priority of the patient’s next-of-kin; and how, if at all, the patient’s best interests may
be determined. It is not even clear whether the next-of-kin, in making the decision,
should be concerned about the patient’s best interest. The Code only requires the nextof-kin to “stand in.”461 In other words, the next-of-kin takes the place of the patient and
is not expressly constrained or limited by considerations such as the best interest of the
patient.
It is argued that for a next-of-kin to be able to authorize treatment which is in the
interest of the patient, he or she must know what those interests are. This implies that
he or she must have had personal contact with the patient within a time frame sufficient
to enable him or her to decipher what is likely to be in the patient’s best interest.
It is suggested that a construction of next-of-kin should be broad enough to encompass
persons who have had close contact with the patient and have shared intimate
relationships with him or her. The increasing rate of urbanization in Nigeria and the
struggle to earn a living has placed significant strain on close familial ties.462 It has led to
individuals cultivating relationships which are, in some cases, stronger than familial ties,
perhaps as a result of shared struggles and experiences. These persons would be more
likely to better decide treatment that will cohere with the patient’s interests, rather
than a relative who has neither the affection nor the knowledge of the patient’s
interest.
459
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A competent patient, or the decision maker, requires certain information in order to be
able to reach a knowledgeable decision. While other jurisdictions have a standard for
measuring the materiality of information to be disclosed, the Code of Medical Ethics is
silent. This leaves the materiality and adequacy of information uncertain. This
uncertainty is reflected in actual practice. The shortcoming of the Code in respect to the
nature, scope and materiality of disclosure is discussed over the next two sub sections
below under absence of scope of disclosure and lack of contextually based treatment
options.
4.3.4 Absence of Scope of Disclosure
The importance of informed consent, as highlighted in Chapter Two, is to give
expression to the right of self-determination. This right is almost meaningless if the
patient does not receive the information necessary to be effectively self-determining.
Consequently, physicians are given the duty to provide patients with information
necessary to enable them to make informed decisions. As discussed in Chapter Three,
the materiality of the information provided by physicians is measured by two standards:
the professional standard and the patient standard.463 The Code of Medical Ethics does
not have a clearly identifiable standard for measuring the adequacy and materiality of
information to be disclosed by physicians.
The Code provides that the physician is to disclose “the attendant benefits and risks”464
of the treatment to the patient. But it does not qualify the duty to disclose or indicate
by what standard a physician’s compliance with this requirement may be measured.
Two possible interpretations arising from the provision are: (i) the Code contemplates a
full disclosure of every risk attendant upon treatment, however remote or immaterial;
and (ii) by default, the Code allows the materiality of the information disclosed to be
determined by physicians.
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Requiring physicians to provide patients with information of every risk that may occur
following the treatment is, arguably, impracticable. This is not only because physicians
may not have this information, it also confuses the purpose of informed consent. To
demand a full disclosure of risks is to prescribe, essentially, a crash course on medical
risks. In effect, it encourages a monotonous recitation of every possible and probable
risk, including the routine risk of infection from surgery.465 It does not, however,
advance patient autonomy. Rather, inundating patients with unnecessary information
may hinder the actual exercise of their autonomy. Thus, this interpretation ought to be
rejected. As noted by Justice Linden, “[Physicians’ duty to disclose] does not mean that
[physicians] must now give complicated seminars on medicine to all of their patients. It
does mean, though, that more time may have to be spent explaining things to their
patients than in the past.” 466
Rejecting the interpretation that the Code intends full disclosure of risks to patients
leaves the default position by which the materiality of information to be provided is
determined by the physician. This, in essence, contemplates a professional standard by
which the materiality of information to be disclosed is based on the discretion of the
physician. The shortcomings of this standard are discussed in Chapter Three.
As seen from the studies on the opinions and practices of informed consent in Nigeria,
physicians perform poorly when it comes to providing necessary information to
patients. The studies also suggest that the general practice of informed consent is, at
best, arbitrary. It is argued that an important factor in the arbitrariness of disclosure is
the lack of definition of the standard of disclosure which, consequently, leaves the
scope and content of disclosure to physicians. The situation is different in other
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countries like Canada, where materiality of the information determines its disclosure
and it is the patient, though a reasonable patient, who determines what is material.467
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the Code of Medical Ethics fails to impose a
clear duty on physicians to inform the consent of patients. Rather, allowing physicians to
rely on their discretion in disclosing risks encourages paternalism on their part, in the
sense that the physician may withhold information from the patient which they do not
think the patient should have. It also maintains the traditional perception of physicians
as authoritarian figures who control the treatment process.
Since the goal of informed consent is for patients to participate in decision making
about their healthcare, it is suggested that the physician’s duty to disclose be measured
by what it takes for the patient’s decision to be informed. In other words, it is suggested
that the standard of disclosure in Nigerian healthcare be an informed standard.468
4.3.5

Contextually Based Treatment Options

Following from the above, the scope and extent of information which will be deemed
adequate for informed consent should be that which would serve to make the patient’s
consent informed. Though this sounds cyclical, it underscores the fact that the purpose
of requiring disclosure of information will not be met if the patient does not receive the
information that is relevant to him or her, or if he or she does not understand the
information that is given to him or her. As already argued, the scope of disclosure
should not be what a reasonable physician would ordinarily disclose, or what a
reasonable patient would want to be told. Rather, informed consent implies that the
sufficiency of information be what is required to ensure that patients (or authorized
surrogates) comprehend the implication of any decision made.
The information to be disclosed is not confined to risks but must extend to other
information, such as alternatives to treatment and the risks associated with those
467
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alternatives.469 Accordingly, the Code of Medical Ethics requires treatment options to be
presented to the patient.470 Also, section 23(1)(b) of Nigeria’s National Health Bill
provides:
“(1) Every health care provider shall give a user relevant information pertaining to
his state of health and necessary treatment relating thereto including:
(b) the range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available to
the user;”
The risks of treatment471 do not take on different meanings for Nigerian patients
compared to patients in Canada and elsewhere. However, the issue of treatment
options is one which has a particular significance to a Nigerian patient. This is because
Nigerians have several indigenous means of treating various illnesses which are not
acknowledged in western bioethics. These indigenous means have been described, in
comparison to western medicine, using terms such as supernatural against natural,
unscientific against scientific, primitive against modern, and uncivilized against
civilized.472 According to Iyioha, these descriptions are not heuristic devices to facilitate
understanding of the different medical cultures of non-western peoples. Rather, she
says they are part of “a linear agenda”, entrenched in “imperialism” and “geared
towards ‘establishing’ the supremacy of western ideologies over the worldviews of the
[non-western peoples].”473
By definition, indigenous medicine
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comprises the totality of therapeutic knowledge, methods and systems,
including the natural, psychosomatic, psychosocial and mystical, employed in
maintaining health or preventing, diagnosing and treating illness, which are
based on mechanisms and theories that may or may not be explicable through
western biomedical philosophy; the methods and systems typically employ
plant, animal and other mineral resources in combination or independently in
the therapeutic process.474
The World Health Organization defines indigenous medical practice as “diverse health
practices, approaches, knowledge and beliefs, incorporating plant, animal, and/or
mineral based medicines, spiritual therapies, manual techniques and exercises applied
singularly or in combination to maintain well-being, as well as to treat, diagnose or
prevent illness.”475
Both definitions capture the essential features or elements of indigenous medicine.
However, the former definition particularly highlights the features which distinguish
indigenous medicine from western biomedicine. The features or elements include the
natural, supernatural, psychosomatic and psychosocial, and social elements.476 These
elements identify the origin of diseases as they are perceived within the cultural setting.
Relying on Baronov’s analysis, the natural elements relate to observable and
measurable forces within the physical world such as pollution, infection and contagion,
as the causes of illnesses.477 It also relates to the use of natural materials like herbs,
roots and plants for treatment. The supernatural elements relate to factors which
transcend the natural as the causes of illnesses.478 Baronov argues that transcendental
forces like religious deities or ancestral spirits are believed to possess powers which
474
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enable them to interfere with the physical world and cause illnesses.479 Such illnesses
cannot be analyzed or treated through physical means, as in the case of natural
elements. Rather, they require knowledge of the interaction between the supernatural
and the natural.480
The psychosomatic and psychosocial elements operate to link certain illnesses to
emotional or social factors, and highlight the interconnectedness of the body and the
mind.481 Each of the elements- natural, supernatural, psychosomatic and psychosocialinteracts on an ongoing basis to underscore the fourth element, and the core organizing
principle of indigenous medicine, which is holism.482 This holism complicates the
attempt to separate the natural element from the other elements, as done in
biomedicine.483 This holism is not adequately reflected in the Code of Medical Ethics and
in the National Health Bill.
To present a patient with only conventional treatment options which may not have any
significant meaning to him or her, arguably, may not inform his or her decision whether
to accept treatment. When patients are informed about treatment options, apart from
conventional ones, they should, where there is evidence that they are effective, also be
informed about other indigenous alternatives, their benefits and risks.484 This is more so
when the efficacy of such alternatives is so well established that a physician would be
negligent in failing to disclose them.
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It is understandable that physicians who are not convinced about the benefits of
indigenous medicine may be reluctant to provide them to patients as options. This is
especially where research data about their benefits are unavailable or inconclusive.485
Where reliable evidence shows that indigenous alternatives have more benefits
compared to the conventional ones, such alternatives should be disclosed. An example
is where there is scientific evidence that an indigenous alternative has fewer or milder
side effects than conventional treatment. Where physicians are unable to offer such
indigenous treatment, they may offer to arrange a referral.486

The question remains whether the physician is obligated to disclose indigenous
alternatives. According to Joan Gilmour et al,
[T]he obligation to discuss alternative treatment choices in addition to those
proposed by the treating physician is not unlimited. Although the boundaries of
the obligation have not been well developed in case law, the alternative should
offer at least the prospect of some therapeutic benefit; that is, it must be
reasonable to consider it to be an alternative.487
The foregoing view may be read into both the Code488 and the National Health Bill.489
Though silent about it, the requirement that treatment options or alternatives be
disclosed to the patient, may be taken to mean a duty to disclose such alternatives that
offer some prospect of therapeutic benefits which are generally recognized, and which a
physician would be negligent in not disclosing. Given that even within conventional
medicine, physicians may disagree about what treatments are appropriate, a physician
who does not support an indigenous alternative even where it is scientifically proven to
be effective should, nonetheless, if it is part of his or her duty and standard of care,
disclose it to the patient and the reason he or she thinks the alternative is
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inappropriate.490 This would enable a patient to make a reasoned decision assisted by
the physician’s assessment and recommendation.

However, for a physician to provide these indigenous alternatives, it has to be
commensurate with his or her duty of care.491 Arguably, where scientifically tested
indigenous alternatives offer a better outcome, or less severe side effects, or similar
outcome at a reduced cost, physicians owe patients the duty to present such
alternatives.

Whether this duty extends to unproven indigenous treatments is

uncertain. Anecdotal evidence in Nigeria suggests that some physicians have been
known to suggest that a patient’s illness may have supernatural causes that require
more than orthodox medicine can provide.492 However, in countries like Canada and the
US, providing indigenous alternatives or “fringe” alternatives is, currently, not the
standard practice and may not meet a physician’s duty of care.493
In Santos v Traff,494 it was held that there is no duty upon the physician to advise of
“fringe” or dangerous alternatives.495 In particular the court stated that ”common sense
suggests that failure to [advise] of alternatives might be applied most successfully
against a doctor who uses the fringe alternative or one not generally accepted by the
medical profession as being within the standard of care, and fails to inform of the
medically accepted mainstream alternative.”496
The above dictum implies that disclosing only “fringe” options does not discharge his or
her duty to disclose alternatives because the physician is not obligated to disclose those
“fringe” alternatives. It implies that a physician has not met the standard of care in
490

Picard & Robertson, supra note 102 at 151.
Moore v Baker, 989 F 2d 1129 (1993)
492
See Jane John-Nwankwo, “The Effect of Culture on Health Care” July 26, 2009 Online:
(www.theeffectofcultureonhealthcare.blogspot.ca
493
See generally Gilmour et al, supra note 484.
494
Santos v Traff (1999), ABQB 630.
495
Ibid at para 49.
496
Ibid. See also Seney v Cooks (1998), ABCA 316.
491

141

disclosing only the fringe alternatives. It is not clear whether the standard of care would
still not be met where the physician discloses the “fringe” alternatives and the
mainstream options. What seems clear is that the physician is not under obligation to
provide such alternative unless it is part of the standard of care.
Similarly, in Moore v Baker,497 a patient sued a physician for failing to disclose an
alternative therapy to her. In determining whether the physician incurred any liability
under the Georgia statute which requires disclosure of alternative treatments, the court
held that an alternative must be one that is accepted in the medical community.
A patient who has always relied on indigenous medicine may not be satisfied with
information about only conventional alternatives. This is especially where the medical
outcome of using either indigenous medicine or conventional medicine is similar, but
indigenous medicine has fewer side effects or has a lower cost. Whether integrating
conventional and indigenous medicine is possible, and the mechanics of such
integration, requires further research. But the prospect is one that is desirable and
would, arguably, provide a Nigerian patient with comprehensive care and a range of
options. However, where a patient asks questions about indigenous alternatives the
physician should answer the question to the best of his or her ability.498
Following disclosure of the necessary information, and understanding of same by a
competent patient, the decision whether or not to submit to treatment, including the
nature of treatment, must be made by the patient.499 As seen in Chapter Three, such
decisions must be voluntary, without fraud, duress, misrepresentation, undue influence
or oppression. Whether this is also the case in Nigeria is not clear, as the Code of
Medical Ethics does not explicitly say so. This identified shortcoming is discussed next.
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4.3.6 Silence about Voluntariness

Added to the foregoing shortcomings of the Code of Medical Ethics, is the uncertainty of
whether the consent of the patient must be voluntary. There is no express provision in
the Code for a voluntary decision. The Code only says that the patient is to choose the
preferred option. The absence of a specific requirement of voluntariness is problematic.
It implies that however the patient came to his or her decision, whether or not his or
her will was overwhelmed or undermined by external factors, it is valid. This is different
from the position in other jurisdictions, like Canada, USA, UK, and Australia where
consent obtained by coercion or undue influence is invalid.500

It may not be straightforward to impute voluntariness to informed consent where the
Code is silent on it. This is especially so, given the prevalent communal process of
decision making in a typical Nigerian family. Perhaps the omission is deliberate to reflect
such a process which, seen in the light of cases such as the English case of Re T (Adult:
Refusal of Medical Treatment),501 may be held to be undue influence. In Re T, a 21 year
old woman who was 34 weeks pregnant refused to consent to a blood transfusion
following a private conversation she had with her mother who was a Jehovah’s Witness.
The patient’s father successfully applied to the court for an order authorizing the blood
transfusion. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the patient’s refusal was due to
undue influence from her mother, and was thus, vitiated.

It is uncertain whether, on a similar set of facts, the Nigerian Courts will decide in the
same way. While it is desirable to explicitly require consent to be voluntary, it may be
inaccurate to classify the absence of such explicit requirement as a shortcoming of the
Code, when it may, in fact, be an acknowledgement of the existence of factors that
influence patients’ decisions. Some of such factors derive from the social context of the
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individual from which it may be difficult to escape. This is discussed as challenges to
informed consent in Nigeria which are explored in Chapter Five next.

4.4

Conclusion

The preceding analysis of the Nigerian law provisions on informed consent has shown
that right to informed consent is, indeed, part of constitutionally protected rights and of
the common law in the country. It has also shown that the Code of Medical Ethics covers
the threshold matters of competence, surrogate decision making, disclosure and patient
decision.

At first blush, these elements resemble those on the subject in any developed Western
country. On closer scrutiny, it was found that the Code has several shortcomings, such
as lack of clarity about who makes the decision; prescription of competence based on
status; lack of definition of next of kin; lack of a standard for measuring the duty to
disclose. It was also found that adherence to the western model of informed consent
may not satisfy a Nigerian patient, especially in light of the meaning of “options to
treatment” and “voluntariness.” It was suggested that the shortcomings can be cured.
For instance, a functional assessment of competence was suggested in place of
competence by status, and, for disclosure, it was suggested that both materiality and
adequacy of information be measured by the patient’s needs, and options should ideally
include indigenous treatment.

Chapter Five next explains the shortcomings identified in this chapter. Essentially, it will
seek to place in context the inadequacies in the provisions and practice of informed
consent. To do this, the chapter looks at the setting or context of Nigeria through a
relational lens, in terms of demographical, sociological and cultural constraints that limit
the prevalence of a western-style practice of informed consent and the autonomy of
patients in Nigeria.
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Chapter Five

Informed Consent Practice in Nigeria

5.0

Introduction

The preceding chapters have established the importance and necessity of informed
consent in protecting patient autonomy. Chapter Four showed that the practice of
informed consent in Nigerian health care has not been satisfactory. This was traced to
shortcomings in the Code of Medical Ethics such as lack of proper delineation of
decisional authority, measuring competence by age or mental status, lack of definition
of next-of-kin, lack of guidance on the scope and materiality of disclosure, and no
express requirement of voluntariness. Because these shortcomings derive from within
the medical profession itself, in particular, the law regulating it, they are referred to as
legal or internal impediments to informed consent.

As indicated in Chapter One, and as the preceding chapters show, the notion of
individuals and autonomy which guide discussion in this thesis is a relational one. The
primary usefulness of this notion is that it brings to fore, autonomy impeding or
enhancing factors within Nigeria, how they impede or enhance autonomy and how
those that impede autonomy may be overcome. Particularly, a relational view generates
a rhetorical tool in promoting the right of women in Nigeria to control their medical and
reproductive care in a country that ascribes enormous powers to physicians and to male
partners. General discussion in bioethics often involves a dichotomy between autonomy
of patients and the paternalism of physicians.502 However, in a blatantly patriarchal
society like Nigeria, the divide is not necessarily between patient autonomy and
physician paternalism. Rather, it extends to the interests of a woman’s husband, her
502
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religious group, and the State in her reproductive life. A relational view shows that
patients in Nigeria, especially women, cannot simply assert autonomy. Rather, they
need to learn how to make decisions in a way that reflects their own values and
preferences. It identifies oppression, especially oppressive socialization as an
impediment to Nigerian women’s ability to develop the skill they need to make their
own decisions.

Empowering women in Nigeria may enhance their autonomy. However, it is also a great
threat to their social bonds and long established relationships. This does not imply that
self-determination is inherently opposed to social relationships. Rather, where a person
questions and rejects certain norms that bind him or her to other people, he or she may
want to change the relationship in a manner that disrupts it.503 Such disruption may
also come from other persons who are not comfortable with her increasing assertions of
autonomy. Marilyn Friedman observes that some parents disown children who rebel too
strongly against deeply held parental values, and that peer groups may ostracize their
members for disregarding important norms of their subculture.504

The exercise of autonomy does not necessarily disrupt social relationships. To Friedman,
questioning one’s commitments or group norms may lead to appreciating them in a new
light, and may enrich such relationships. On this view, autonomy may actually
strengthen relational ties rather than disrupt them. However, although the exercise of
autonomy may not necessarily disrupt relationships, it increases the chances of
disruption. A society that values autonomy encourages critical scrutiny of, and reflection
on every aspect of social ties including religion, sex, gender, family, government, to a
larger extent than a society which does not place much emphasis on autonomy.505 An
autonomy-embracing society may have a higher number of voluntary relationships that
are formed in adulthood around shared values, and a higher incidence of disruption in
503
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relationships into which people are born, and in which they received their first
socialization.506 Such relationships as family, church, local communities may be
disrupted in favour of voluntarily chosen ones. This is a possible consequence of
enhancing autonomous capacities of individuals, particularly those in an oppressed
group, as is the situation of women in Nigeria.

Bearing the foregoing in mind, the rest of this chapter focuses on the relational factors,
that is, factors other than the provisions of the Code, which may explain or justify the
unsatisfactory state of the concept of informed consent in Nigeria. The factors are
presented as challenges to the observance of informed consent in Nigeria that is derived
from the country’s socio-cultural background. Nine challenges are identified. These
range from general challenges, to cultural challenges affecting, primarily, the exercise of
autonomy, and to challenges emanating from the difference in background between
Nigeria and other jurisdictions where informed consent is practiced. Although the
discussion centers on Nigeria and the challenges are, to a great extent, derived from the
socio-cultural background of Nigeria, some of the challenges are not peculiar to Nigeria.
Examples of the challenges that are not specific to Nigeria include trust, illiteracy and
the relationality of autonomy.

It is argued that, despite the reality of cultural relativism, autonomy appears to be a
universal concept. However, insisting on autonomy in the relationship between
physician and patient, a relationship which is based on trust, is not entirely coherent.
Thus, the first of three general challenges to informed consent is trust. This challenge
affects the value protected by informed consent and transcends the socio-economic and
cultural realities that define the Nigerian context of the discussion.

506

Ibid at 44.
147

5.1

Factors Influencing the Practice of Informed Consent in Nigerian Health Care

5.1.1 Trust as a Challenge to Informed Consent

An important element in the relationship between a physician and a patient is trust, and
in that context, trust is both intrinsic and instrumental.507 It is critical to a patient’s
willingness to seek care, reveal sensitive information, submit to treatment, and follow a
physician’s recommendations.508 Effective treatment of a patient depends on the ability
of the physician to elicit trust from him or her.509 Whether the physician succeeds in
doing this depends on the patient’s perception of physicians in general, and on the
archetypal features of being a physician.510

While it is argued that abuse of trust led to agitations for autonomy in healthcare
generally through informed consent,511 empirical evidence in the UK and the US,
demonstrates that although trust in the medical profession may have diminished
somewhat, patients’ trust in their physicians remains remarkably high.512 As used here,
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trust refers to the willingness of a party (trustor) to be vulnerable to the actions of
another party (trustee) on the expectation that the trustee will perform a particular
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the trustor’s ability to monitor or control
the trustee.513 Stated concisely, trust is an ‘‘accepted vulnerability to another’s possible
but not expected ill will (or lack of good will).’’514

Trust in the physician encourages dependence and the expectation that the patient’s
best interest will be served.515 A feature of illness is that it fosters dependence. On the
other hand, “autonomy sets its sights on another agenda altogether, one marked by
freedom and independence that was forged in the fires of advocacy and conflict,
dynamics foreign to medicine.”516 Informed consent, which is meant to protect this
freedom and independence and to redress the power imbalance in the physician patient
relationship, ignores the severity of the inequality between patients and physicians.
Because of this inequality, patients cannot avoid “delegating authority, entrusting
themselves to others, and then fretfully hoping that their best interests will be
protected.”517 Consequently, while it may be the case that informed consent protects a
patient’s right of autonomy, a full expression of this freedom is constrained by trust in
the physician.

As indicated, the challenge posed to the underlying value of informed consent by trust is
not localized to Nigeria. However, its effect seems to be more pronounced in Nigeria.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Nigerian patients place very high trust in, and
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reverence for, physicians almost to the point of worship.518 This raises the dependency
of patients on physicians and an unquestioning attitude towards decision making by
physicians. In turn, it limits the purpose and effect of informed consent.

5.1.2 Relationality of Autonomy

A second general challenge to informed consent is the relational characteristic of
autonomy. This suggests that there is no such thing as an inherently autonomous person
who can be distinguished from a non-autonomous person. Rather, a relational view of
individuals reveals certain factors which influence and constitute the individual, and
which may impede autonomous decision-making.

As a concept, autonomy is formed around social relationships.519 Consequently,
activities such as reflecting, choosing and deciding that make up self-determination are
social in nature. The materials that enable reflection and decision-making are, arguably,
products of a past conditioning. Such conditioning may be a consequence of
socialization, as in patriarchy or religion. Reflection and decision-making may also be
affected by availability of materials such as where there is inadequate or manipulated
disclosure of information on the part of physicians in Nigeria. The foregoing may
subjugate or overwhelm the decision making capacity of a patient.

A person who chooses to subordinate himself or herself to the controlling influences of
physicians or religious and other beliefs may nonetheless be autonomous.520 Yet, it is
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questionable whether a person can deliberately choose the nature of his or her
socialization, or escape its effect. It is expected that where a person is consistently
taught a certain way of life or thought process, over time, the person tends to act or
think according to such teachings. This raises questions about how autonomous such
actions or thoughts of the person are. This is particularly so where the effect of such
conditioning is to foster oppression or subjugation of a particular group, such as women.
It may be challenging to assist persons, as patients, who are subject to oppressive
influences, to maintain relations that enhance their self-identity, where the
internalization of the conditioning effect of their socialization is near total.

It is possible that a patient may not fully realize his or her beliefs or be conscious of his
or her values. For this patient to be able to make an autonomous decision may require
an extensive exploration of his or her history and motivations.521 It is also possible that
the patient’s self-perception may be confused with other’s perception of and
expectation from him or her. In this case, the patient may make a decision that others
expect him or her to make rather than a decision that he or she, given his or her values
and preferences, want to make.

As an element of informed consent, voluntariness suggests that a person who is fully
autonomous can be distinguished from a person who is not, so that the question is the
basis upon which the distinction is to be made. It does not take into account the various
relational factors, as indicated above, which affect the ability of a patient to act
autonomously. Other such factors may be due to the failure of physicians to provide and
ensure the patient understands the information that is necessary for an informed
decision. The impediments to autonomy may also be structural or environmental and
may not necessarily be traced to inadequate disclosure.
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Studies have shown that persons with limited education may have difficulty
understanding information necessary for an informed decision.522 This is more so where
the information is explained in an unfamiliar language. Both the Code and the National
Health Bill suggest that the consent process must be carried out in the language the
patient understands. It is arguable that unless the physician understands and is able to
communicate in the patient’s indigenous language, communication is more likely to be
in English, or an adulterated version of it known as pidgin English. But even this “lower”
form of English may still be difficult to understand for some patients, especially those
living in rural areas who for some reasons, are in a city. There are over 500 languages in
Nigeria.523 Requiring a physician to communicate or get someone who understands a
patient’s language, especially where the language does not fall within the major
Nigerian languages, namely, Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba, may be difficult.

Similarly, an individual who has been gender-socialized to accept decision making by
persons regarded as having authority over her may find it difficult or impossible to
understand and appreciate the nature and implication of making a particular decision
where she is called upon to do so. Such socialization may foster self-doubt in the
individual to the point where she doubts her decision-making capacity, either with
respect to the particular situation, or generally. Consequently, such self-doubt may
affect her ability to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of her
decision.

The challenge, therefore, is to assess how physicians should proceed in the face of these
relational influences. Generally, where patients lack competence, or where the degree
of autonomy that may be exercised is reduced, the response is to treat the patient
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online:

paternalistically to ensure the best possible treatment for the patient.524 But
paternalism may distort what is actually a patient’s real interest, and is especially
problematic where lack of competence is caused by the influence of relational factors
such as patriarchy and religion. According to McLeod and Sherwin,
[o]ppression [which is a feature of patriarchy] involves unjust distributions of
power, and health-care settings are sites of very uneven power differentials. If
health-care professionals, especially physicians, further consolidate their already
disproportionate power in relation to patients, especially those from oppressed
groups, they exacerbate a problematic power differential and further reduce the
already limited autonomy of their patients.525
This is apart from the fact that, having a different background, relationships and
orientation, physicians may be unable to know what is ultimately in the patient’s best
interest. The solution may lie in empowering patients by removing the source of the
oppression, and thereby, helping to restore their autonomy. This may well be beyond
the capacity of physicians, especially since it may involve a large scale social change.
However, when attending to patients from a paternalistic setting, physicians may help
by looking beyond the prevalent stereotypical expectation of passivity from female
patients which impede their autonomous agency, and encouraging active participation
of the patients in decisions about their health care.

The import of the foregoing is that autonomy is a way of relating and may be better
understood where the ability of each patient to be autonomous is seen within a
network of relationships and cultural influences.526
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A third general challenge to informed consent is demographical. This challenge is
particularly felt in the cost of obtaining consent, in terms of time and effort. Illiteracy
and poverty, as challenges to informed consent in Nigeria, are discussed next.

5.1.3 Illiteracy and Poverty as Challenges to Informed Consent in Nigeria

Obtaining informed consent in Nigerian healthcare is affected by the degree of literacy
and economic capacity of the patient. The effect of poverty and illiteracy on patient
understanding, medical decision-making and compliance with treatment has been well
researched and documented.527 Persons who lack social and economic power are likely
to be occupied with meeting their material needs rather than be engaged in abstract
ideals of rights and autonomy. Studies have shown that poor and illiterate persons tend
to accept authority without question.528 A functional informed consent practice for
Nigerian healthcare needs to take into account certain important aspects of the lives of
the Nigerian people. These include political and socio-economic factors, illiteracy,
language barriers, and cultural differences among patient populations.

Nigeria is a lower-middle-income country with severe economic disparities among its
population.529 It is estimated that 70% of Nigerians live below the poverty line.530 It is
also estimated that general literacy level in Nigeria is 68%.531 This does not
527
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automatically mean that getting informed consent from uneducated or poor persons is
impossible. Rather, it means that the process of doing so may be more tenuous and
demanding on the physician, and may not make much difference. This is because first,
poverty and illiteracy foster class difference and may lead to a feeling of reduced selfworth in patients of the lower class. In turn, it may compel them to accept and comply
with a physician’s treatment decision. Second, because poor and illiterate patients lack
the means to institute and sustain a legal action for breach of their rights, there is no
real reason to fear legal liability for failing to follow the consent process in Nigeria.532

Consequently, and as practical solution, physicians are more likely to seek consent when
the patient is educated or enlightened,533 and are more likely to provide information to
a lesser or greater extent as the patient’s literacy level requires.534 It has also been
found that economically dependent women with less education are more likely than
others to seek permission from their husbands before seeking or accepting medical
treatment or participating in clinical research.535 The significance of illiteracy and
poverty on informed consent is noteworthy: if they can be reduced, a good deal of other
challenges to informed consent may be overcome. Ezeome and Marshall capture the
nexus between an improved literacy level and enhanced informed consent practice.
They point out that:

The patient’s level of education… seems to be an overriding factor in all the
influences on informed consent in [Nigeria]. It not only neutralizes the various
cultural and social factors, it bridges the gap between the doctor and the patient,
encourages discussion on medical matters and also puts the physician on guard.
If one considers that in 2007 60 million Nigerians have been estimated to be
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illiterate, illiteracy may be a far more inhibiting factor on informed consent
practices than any other factor.536
Thus, an effective and functional informed consent practice requires enlightened
patients who know what they want, or while not certain about what they want, are able
to process the information necessary for determining what they want. This requires
concerted effort from the physician, through a hermeneutic approach, in order to
enable the patient to overcome the barriers caused by illiteracy and poverty.

While not strictly peculiar to Nigeria, the next four challenges to informed consent are
cultural. Two of the challenges are based on belief and affect cognitive engagement
with the discourse leading to informed consent. They include beliefs about the causes of
illness and religious belief in invincibility. The other two challenges refer to familial
influence and stereotypical roles, and are derived from the conduct or expectations of
persons other than the patient. All four challenges affect the exercise of autonomy or
may make getting first person consent problematic. These challenges are discussed in
turn below.

5.1.4 Perception of Illness and Its Causes

The belief that illness, especially insanity, is caused by metaphysical powers invoked by
one’s enemies, and has nothing to do with medicine is predominant in Nigeria.537 This
belief affects the willingness of patients to access health care because it is assumed that
western medicine has nothing to offer in dealing with it.538 This belief constitutes a
536
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hindrance to a truly informed decision. For example, a man who recently got back from
a visit to his country home only to develop a severe headache, or swollen ankle, or
stroke days later, may be persuaded to believe that his illness is metaphysical. Rather
than seeking what caused the illness, he may be concerned with who caused the illness.
How this affects the ability of the patient to be fully autonomous is further discussed
below.

The perception of illness highlighted above does not originate from the patient alone.
John-Nwankwo asserts that there are several instances where physicians themselves
suggest to a patient’s family to take the patient home because his or her illness is
spiritual. This might occur where the patient does not respond to treatment, or where,
the patient looks physically ill and is in worsening pain, but diagnostic results show that
he or she is healthy.

A study was carried out in Igbo-Ora, a town in south-western Nigeria, to explore
accidents and unintentional injuries as a public health concern in Nigeria and to
question the suitability of transferring to poorer countries strategies formulated in
Western industrialized countries to combat them.539 The study found that except for
diseases, such as malaria which is believed to have a simple natural cause, there is a
common belief that death is rarely natural,540 and that diseases are caused by
supernatural forces, including sorcery, witchcraft and ‘spirit instruction.’541 An earlier
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study among Nigerian university students to evaluate their perception of death542
showed that a majority thought that death, except in very old persons, and sometimes
even then, was caused by “wicked people” or the gods. The students rarely thought that
death would result from ill health, unavoidable accidents or other natural causes.543

How then does this impact on the informed consent process? The impact is perceived at
two levels. On the first level, the question is whether such persons are competent to
decide on their medical treatment. The second level is concerned with whether persons
acting in accordance with such beliefs are autonomous. For the first level, two
perspectives are offered. First, following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
Starson v Swayze, a patient need not accept that he or she has an illness for which he or
she has been diagnosed or that the cause of it is as described by the physician. What is
required is for the patient to acknowledge that he or she has the manifestations or
symptoms of the illness. Based on this, provided the patient understands the treatment
proposed for those symptoms and its implications, he or she is competent to accept or
refuse treatment, notwithstanding his or her unorthodox belief.544 For example, where a
patient understands the information disclosed by the physician for the symptoms which
he or she has, even if he or she thinks there is another cause, he or she is competent to
give or refuse consent to treatment, except where the illness causes him or her not to
appreciate the condition.

It would seem, thus, that the duty of the physician is to ensure, in the abstract, that the
patient understands his or her medical condition and the treatment proposed for that
condition. It would also seem that the duty does not include convincing the patient
about the cause of his or her condition and the necessity for the kind of treatment that
is proposed. Where a patient understands, for example, that Paracetamol is an effective
542
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drug for severe headache, but is not persuaded that the pounding in his or her head is a
mere headache, he or she is nonetheless competent. And if he or she refuses to take
Paracetamol because he or she fears that, being supernaturally caused, treating his or
her “headache” through physical means might be dangerous, his or her decision would
be respected.

Second, if we accept that the importance of informed consent or the values underlying
informed consent are autonomy and the right of the patient to determine his or her
treatment in line with his or her values, desires, experiences and belief, we would
question a consent process that does not take into account the beliefs of the patient.
We would ask: if informed consent aims to put the patient at the center of decision
making about medical treatment, why is the emphasis on causes and treatments that do
not cohere with his or her beliefs? In other words, why is disclosure centered around
the perception of illnesses as caused by diseases or micro-organisms or technical failure,
information that does not contribute to the patient’s perception of his or her health
condition and which makes the consent process for him or her a mere formality?

Focusing on an abstract understanding by the patient of his or her medical condition
and the treatment for it without engaging with the patient to understand his or her
perception about the cause of his or her illness, arguably, anonymizes the patient. The
physician presents only the natural or medical part of the illness, which is just one side
of a holistic approach to medicine.545 This may cause the patient to “feel disempowered
in the face of a foreign jargon, a strange story which, while it makes sense for the
doctor, has little to do with the ground of his own life.”546 However, if we maintain our
definition of competence as the ability to understand and appreciate the nature and
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consequences of the decision that is to be made, then, despite the patient’s belief, he or
she is competent. Whether the patient is acting autonomously is discussed below.

At the second level, a meta-physical belief about causes of illness may be a product of
the patient’s socio-cultural environment which influences the decision that he or she
makes. This is because, as argued under “Relationality of Autonomy”, it is difficult to
perceive of any thought, action or belief which is not socially caused. It may not be
adequate to abandon a patient who refuses treatment out of such beliefs, nor would it
be proper to impose treatment on him or her on the grounds that he or she is not acting
autonomously. Rather, respect for the autonomy of a patient with such beliefs may
require a physician to “respond sensitively to the meanings illness has for [the patient];
to deploy [his or her] power and influence to restore and strengthen autonomy
competencies; and to support [the patient’s] struggles to create new personal meanings
out of the experience of disease, disorder or disability.”547

Consequently, meeting the challenge posed by meta-physical belief about the causes of
illness necessarily involves a hermeneutic approach which strives to build or enhance
autonomous capacity through dialogue and intimate engagement with the patient.548
This hermeneutic approach represents an effective panacea to the several challenges to
the practice of informed consent which involves understanding or cognitive effort such
as religion and illiteracy. It may also help where the impediments to full exercise of
autonomy is caused by socialization. For this particular challenge, a hermeneutic
approach calls on the physician to listen to the patient without being patronizing or
aloof, to tactfully draw out the patient’s perspective about his or her illness, and, to
engage with that perspective in a meaningful dialogue. This will enable both the
physician and the patient to gain a higher appreciation of that perspective.
547
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5.1.5 Religion and Belief in Invincibility

In addition to belief that pathological conditions are not necessarily physical, Nigerians
also generally accede to the idea that forces outside the individual control physical
occurrences. As with meta-physical belief about causes of illness, the challenge that
arises for informed consent is: whether a decision affected by this belief is nonetheless
informed; and, whether the patient is acting autonomously.

The mindset about forces outside the individual reflects the religious belief systems in
Nigeria. The two dominant religions are Christianity and Islam. Together, they account
for about 90% of religious worship.549 However, neither Islam nor Christianity is free
from mixture with indigenous beliefs in deities, spirits and ancestor worship550 which
account for the remaining 10% of religious worship.551

Belief in a supreme being who is supposed to have power to control both the dead and
the living, and to influence human affairs, affects the way health information is received.
For example, in the study referred to earlier on south-western Nigeria,552 it was found
that south-westerners have a basic belief in predestination, and this affects their
philosophy and daily life.553 According to this belief, a person’s fate is sealed at birth by
549
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Oludumare, the creator of life. This means that a person’s destiny is already chosen for
him or her, and he or she cannot deviate from it.

To find out what fate has in store, a person may consult Orunmila, the deity believed to
be present when a person’s fate was decided. This deity is consulted through a
babalawo, who functions as the middle man or a go-between. Once a person does all
that he or she is required by the babalawo to do, he or she believes that nothing can
happen to him or her. As such, unless it has been divined to be so, he or she refuses to
accept that he or she has the health condition the physician has diagnosed, or that he or
she is at risk from a certain complication. Even where a misfortune is predicted, the
south-western Nigerians believe that it can be averted by the sacrifice of, for example, a
chicken.554 Dixey found that more people are turning to indigenous beliefs, and by
extension, to religion for help in the face of collapsing faith in modern hospitals,
economic decline and political uncertainty.555

The significance of this dependence on supernatural beings is that responsibility for
failure, success, or good health is shifted from the individual to an abstract entity. This
may be a coping mechanism to confront the challenges of declining economy, illiteracy
and poor health.556 However, projecting power onto external forces reduces the
individual’s capacity to act logically and assertively. According to Tones et al, “a person
who believes that life’s choices are governed by the vagaries of fate or determined by a
conspiracy of powerful others and faceless organizations will be less likely to mobilize
the personal resources needed to face a potentially threatening situation.”557 Informed
consent aims to make the patient take charge of his or her own health and,
consequently, his or her life, rather than leave it to the physician or to God.
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It would seem that the imposition of this notion of individual responsibility in a culture
where responsibility and fate is assigned to God, gods, or other entities, offends liberal
values like respect for cultural sensitivity.558 It is argued that the emphasis placed on
empowering individuals to take control of their lives and to direct it themselves, rather
than see themselves as controlled by external factors, is at odds with another view that
one cannot, nor is it desirable to take charge of one’s destiny.559 On this latter view, if
the gods will that a person would be sick or suffer any ill, it would come to pass. If, on
the other hand, nothing of such nature has been destined, then it will not happen. In
other words, whether risks connected to treatment occur or not is an act of God.

The effect on informed consent is that a Nigerian patient who is told that he or she has,
for example, cancer may deny it: “God forbid! My body is the temple of the Holy Spirit
and no cancer can live in me. I bind it and I cast it into hell!” Similarly, when risks of
treatment are disclosed, he or she is likely to believe that “God will not let that happen
to me. I am his child and he said healing is the children’s bread.” The challenge is
whether consent obtained is informed. Where the patient refuses treatment because he
or she has sacrificed a chicken, and believes that he or she is not destined to die from
the illness, such a patient is competent if he or she understands and appreciates the
implication of his or her decision, but is he or she acting autonomously?

The above question echoes an earlier one about whether persons who are influenced by
a belief system to which they have been socialized are nonetheless acting autonomously
and, if not, whether paternalism is justified in such cases. As well, the proper response
may not be paternalism. Rather, it may be more appropriate, in enhancing and
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respecting the patient’s autonomy to engage him or her in a dialogue concerning his or
her beliefs in order to gain better insight into the patient’s world view, and, if possible,
to cajole, persuade or entreat him or her to make a decision that is anchored on his or
her personal values, rather than on an abstract concept.560 Engaging a patient who
refuses treatment because he or she has sacrificed a chicken, or because he or she
believes in the healing power of faith in a frank and meaningful dialogue may cause the
patient to reflect further on his or her refusal, and to make a decision that truly accords
with his or her values. Perhaps, this will reduce the number of persons who refuse
necessary treatment.

The next two cultural challenges are largely derived from the communal life in Nigeria.
These challenges, discussed under familial influence in decision making, and sociology of
respect and role play also affect the capacity of the patient to act autonomously. In
other words, the discussion highlights the cultural constraints on the exercise of
autonomy.
5.1.6 Familial Influence on Decision Making
The preceding factors show that Nigerian culture has a system of beliefs which are used
to explain the etiology of illness. These beliefs affect proper evaluation and appreciation
of a treatment option. In addition, there are cultural elements, other than the belief
system, which also challenge the practice of informed consent. One of these is the
influence of family on the medical decision that is made. Another is the stereotypical
roles assigned to particular individuals or classes. These, as with the two preceding
challenges, affect the extent to which a patient’s decision is voluntary, and the extent to
which the decision reflects his or her values. A patient’s consent is required to be given
voluntarily, and in the absence of any factor which overwhelms or undermines his or her
will.
560
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In Nigeria, as in many African countries, extended families are still the norm and in fact,
the backbone of the social system.561 Nigerians live in a culture that centers on the
importance of family and the church. There are extended kinship bonds with
grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, sisters, brothers, in-laws, and individuals who are
not biologically related but who play an important role in the family system.562
Individuals turn to members of the extended family for financial aid and guidance, and
the family is expected to provide for the welfare of every member. Usually, a senior
family member is consulted on important health-related decisions. Although the role of
the extended family is diminishing in the urban areas of Nigeria, the tradition of mutual
care and responsibility is still strong.
Unlike the above communal life in Nigeria where everyone is interconnected to others
in various ways, the Western view of individuals is more individualistic. It assumes that
each person is unique and highly knowledgeable about matters concerning him or her.
As such, it is argued that each person, alone, should be able to voluntarily decide what
happens to his or her body.563 The consequences of this atomistic assumption of
individuality are two-fold: first, it sees patients not as passive individuals content to let
their medical decisions to be made by the physician, but as active participants in the
treatment process who determine the course of treatment based on their values and
preferences.564 Second, it potentially suspects any influence on the patient’s decision
making, or adjudges such influence as overwhelming or undermining his or her will. This
suspicion of undue influence is not limited to the conduct of physicians, but has
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increasingly widened to include the nature of pressure that family members exert on a
competent patient’s decision.565
Arguably, the influence of family members on the decision of a competent patient is
suspected out of fear that they may have separate and conflicting motives for preferring
one form of treatment to another, and that their preference may have nothing to do
with advancing the patient’s interest or promoting his or her wellbeing.566 Because of
this fear, where a patient gives in to the persuasion of family members, the decision
made may be assumed to be coerced or unduly influenced and, hence, not truly
reflective of the patient’s autonomy.567
An atomistic and isolated perception of patients denies the social context from which
patients derive their identity.568 It also denies the influence of intimate relations, social
obligations and group values which a person has internalized as part of the socialization
process, and which contributes to shape his or her perception of himself or herself.569
Instead, the perception focuses on the individual as distinct, independent, and
separated from others by clearly discernible boundaries which can only be crossed with
the autonomous and uncoerced permission of the individual.570 The presence of such
boundaries limits the treatments physicians can impose on patients without their
consent, and requires that the consent given should flow freely from the patient as a
moral agent.

565

See Jonathan M Breslin, “Autonomy and the Role of the Family in Making Decisions
at the end of Life” (2005) 16 J Clin Ethics 11.
566
Ibid.
567
See for example, Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment), supra note 50.
568
Susan Sherwin, ”A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Health Care” in Feminist
Health Care Research Network, Susan Sherwin, coordinator, The Politics of Women’s
Health: Exploring Agency and Autonomy (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press,
1998) 19 at 34.
569
See Francoise Baylis, “The Self in Situ: A Relational Account of Personal Identity” in
Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer J Llewellyn, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational
Theory and Health Law (Canada: UBC Press, 2012) 109.
570
Donchin, supra note 520.
166

Explanations offered for the near exclusive focus on patient autonomy include: (i) the
general nature of illnesses and injury, described as “physically challenging and
emotionally exhausting” for many patients, especially where the diagnosis and
prognosis are unexpected or grim;571 (ii) patients are often in a vulnerable position in
relation to the physician and are, therefore, prone to manipulation and coercion;572 (iii)
while physicians, family and other persons may have vested interests in the health of
the patient, it is the patient who, ultimately, must live with the consequences of any
decision. Hence, it is proper that his or her preference be controlling.573
This does not suggest that the involvement of family members in the decision making
process has always been frowned upon. Family members have been involved in
providing care for the patient through the illness, conveying his or her wishes to the
physician or explaining the physician’s instructions to him or her, and caring for him or
her while he or she recuperates.574 Where family involvement leads to challenging the
physician’s professional judgment, or where it interferes with the patient’s decision
making, it may lead to a finding that the involvement overrode the patient’s autonomy
and is undue influence.575 Accordingly, where patients defer to the opinion of their
family members or take into significant consideration their wishes, desires and values
and so make a decision that is contrary to the physician’s judgment, such patients may
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be assumed to be unduly influenced, and their decisions may be assumed not to reflect
their desires as autonomous individuals.576
Autonomy is best protected when the patient retains control of his or her treatment
decision. As earlier discussed under “Trust”, the reality of illness, and the nature of
dependence and vulnerability which it excites determine the extent to which patients
are willing to retain decision-making power.577 Studies show that patients vary in the
level to which they desire to participate in their healthcare decision: while some want to
fully participate in the decision-making process, others are comfortable with letting
their family members decide, and others take into account, the opinions of family
members in reaching a decision.578
The decision made may impact on familial relationships financially, emotionally and
psychologically. In turn, this may affect the decision that the patient makes. For
example, whether a patient chooses to withdraw life-saving treatment may be
influenced by the costs to his or her family – the emotional cost of providing long term
care for him or her, perhaps at the expense of other commitments; the financial cost of
treatment, especially where finances are limited; and psychological dread that another
sibling may have to leave school to save resources for his or her treatment.579 These are
constitutive factors that may weigh on a patient’s decision. Do these factors constitute
undue influence?
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If we adopt the predominant Western individualism, then we may affirm that the above
factors are external influences on the patient’s decision making. However, such external
influences may not always amount to undue influence, especially in a communal society
like Nigeria. The reflection and thought process leading to a particular decision may take
into account several factors and persuasions around which the final decision is based.
Unless these factors can be said to have overwhelmed or undermined the will of the
patient, the patient’s decision is, arguably, autonomous.
It may not be as easy to classify situations where the decision is made for the patient by
other persons. Would communal living and relational account provide justification for
such a decision making structure? This is further discussed below. The discussion is split
into two: the first and immediate part explores how, acknowledging the relatedness of
individuals in Nigeria, it is not unusual for familial influences to exist, or for familial
interest and opinion to be taken into account. The second part discusses the validity of
assigning decisional authority to another person, where the patient is competent, for
reason only that the patient is a female. This second part highlights issues of gender
inequality and patriarchy in Nigeria.
5.1.6.1 Familial Influence: A Relational Account
Acknowledging that Nigeria is largely communitarian presupposes that an individual is
made up of all the relationships he or she has fostered through life and this includes his
or her family.580 Within this set up, a patient’s actions influence and are influenced by
the relationships. This does not necessarily subsume his or her will, for he or she is still
free to incorporate or reject the influences of a group into what he or she perceives to
be his or her own values fostered through the relationships he or she has with other
people.581
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Therefore, a patient who has been nurtured and socialized into being considerate to
other members of the family, and cares for them especially in material terms, may
accept a course of treatment, or no treatment, in order to cause the least suffering to
his or her family. On the other hand, this value might not be very pronounced in a
person who was socialized to think first or only of himself or herself, or who repudiates
the feeling of guilt at the cost to his or her family of his or her treatment decisions. The
thoughtful consideration, or repudiation of the effect of his or her decision on his or her
family, serves to highlight his or her values and enables him or her to make decisions
which accord with those values.
A relational identity recognizes that:

Illness is not an isolated or time-limited event, but a highly stressful situation
that evolves from the family’s history and contributes dynamically towards its
future. Patients in tight-knitted families, particularly in certain ethnic … groups,
do not see themselves as independent units. Rather they often discuss their
conditions with or are cared for by family members long before seeking
professional help. Unlike institutional medicine, familial care relationships are
not generally based on temporary contracts but on empathy and beneficence
family members have towards one another.582
In a setting like the above, to insist that the patient, mentally or physically, distances
himself or herself from this relational identity is to insist that he or she cuts himself or
herself off from his or her family and to work against their care for him or her.583 This is
especially so, given that rather than autonomous decision making, a patient may be
more interested in preserving his or her identity and relationship with others who
understand and share his or her history, experiences and story. This view is primarily set
on the assumption that family members truly care about the patient’s interest and
wellbeing.
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Contrary to this enmeshment within a relational context as part of undergoing
treatment is the situation where the patient’s agency is replaced by that of his or her
family members. The import of this substitution for informed consent in Nigeria is
considered next.

5.1.6.2 Familial Influence: Substituted Decision

In a second sense, family may actually hinder autonomous decision making by the
patient. This contemplates instances where rather than the patient making the decision
while considering the family situation, or validly delegating decisional power to a family
member, the decision is made by another member of the family, for example, a
husband, father or brother, by reason of his gender. Nigeria is a patriarchal society
where cultural and religious norms perpetuate ingrained inequalities between the
sexes.584 Women, compared to men, are accorded subordinate status by custom, in the
family, the economy and the polity.585

The culture of patriarchy is passed on from one generation to the next and endures by
virtue of socialization, internalization and acceptance.586 By socialization, a female is
born into a status of inequality because of her gender.587 She is taught from an early
stage that she is different from a male, not only in terms of physical anatomy, but in
584
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expectations, behaviour and roles. Over time and with continued socialization, these
gender differences, behaviour and roles are internalized. Following internalization, the
gender roles, inequality and male dominance are severally accepted as normal and
natural states of affairs.588 The females, in turn, pass the same message to their own
female children. As a consequence, the suppression of women’s rights and autonomous
capacity are accepted or excused as part of Nigerian culture.589

One cultural norm which enjoys statutory backing is the right given to a man to beat his
wife in order to correct her, provided that he does not cause permanent physical injury
to her.590

As a patriarchal society, decision making, including in relation to healthcare, is often the
preserve of the man who is the authority figure of the family, especially where the
economic strength of the family depends on him. An aspect of women’s healthcare
decision making which is particularly constrained by patriarchy is reproductive health
and rights. As used here, “reproductive right” includes reproductive autonomy and
refers to the right and entitlement, in law and in fact, of women to control every aspect
of their reproductive lives, such as whether or not to have children, the number and
spacing of children, whether or not to use contraceptives, including the kind of
contraceptive to use, and whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term. To exercise their
reproductive rights, women need reproductive autonomy. However, there is a general
reluctance to acknowledge the reproductive autonomy of women in Nigeria.591 It is
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suggested that one cultural factor that is responsible for this is the payment of bride
price which objectifies women and makes them chattels owned by men.592

The implication of this patriarchal setting is that all her life, a woman remains under the
custodianship of her father, husband, or eldest son, as she progresses from childhood
through marriage and widowhood and finally to old age. She is socialized not to refuse
to have sexual relations with her husband.593 She is also under societal pressure to get
pregnant, and to have children, preferably male children. This is true in Southern and
Northern Nigeria. In Northern Nigeria, after marriage, a woman is expected to be largely
invisible to outsiders and under the authority of her husband’s family. She has little say
in domestic decisions and even less freedom of movement. Her prestige and security in
her husband’s home depends on her ability to bear children, and particularly, the
number of sons she bears.594

Similarly, a woman, especially a married woman, may not unilaterally decide not to
carry a pregnancy to term without risking the break-up of her marriage. This is partly
due to the fact that abortion is still illegal in Nigeria, with a maximum of a 14 year jail
term for its provider, and 7 years for the woman, unless carrying the pregnancy to term
would jeopardize her life595 or her physical and mental health.596 It is also due to the
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cultural belief that a married woman lacks the autonomy to terminate a pregnancy; the
religious belief that children come from God and one has no right to terminate life;597
and the fear that a relaxed position on abortion would encourage female promiscuity.598

However, the illegality of abortion and the societal stigma that it engenders has not
affected the high incidence of abortion in Nigeria. Rather, it has increased the rate of
unsafe abortions and, consequently, the rate of maternal mortality.599

Available

statistics suggest that:

Unsafe abortion is a major cause of maternal mortality and morbidity in Nigeria,
accounting for 30–40% of maternal deaths. The abortion rate in Nigeria is 25 per
1000 women aged 15–44 years and there are about 610,000 pregnancy
terminations annually. About 60% of these are in young women, mainly carried
out by unskilled practitioners. However, the fact that 60% of terminations in
Nigeria are still being done by unskilled providers, using unsafe methods like
dilatation and curettage, a range of often harmful and ineffective drugs and
insertion of solid or sharp objects into the cervix to perform abortions, suggests
and Consequences” (2006) https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/08/08/Nigeria-UPIA.pdf.
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a high post abortion complication rate. These high levels of morbidity and
mortality could be prevented by improving access to contraceptive services,
sexuality education, safe abortion procedures and treatment for abortion
complications.600
The above indicates that women die because they want to make decisions concerning
their own bodies which both the government and society will not let them do safely.
Denying women access to safe abortion, except where the life of the woman is in
jeopardy, forces women to have babies, even when they are financially, emotionally,
psychologically and even physically incapable or unready to take care of the child. This
constitutes a violation of their reproductive autonomy and right.601

Accordingly, the woman is trapped from every angle: while she cannot refuse sexual
relations with her husband, she cannot also access contraceptive treatment without his
consent. As well, she cannot decide not to carry the pregnancy to term, and the birth of
a female child is received with less enthusiasm than that of a male child.602 More than
these, she may not be able to discuss her sex-related predicaments so as not to incur
societal ridicule.603 Although particularly visible in the area of reproductive health, the
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impediment to women’s autonomy transcends their reproductive health and extends to
their general health care decision making.

In a 2011 survey by Demographic Health Survey on women’s participation in different
aspects of household decisions, it was found that women in the African countries
surveyed generally lack the power to make decisions about their own healthcare. In
particular, it was found that for over 70% of women in Nigeria, Burkina Faso and
Malawi, their husbands alone make their healthcare decisions.604 One reason for this is
economic. According to Kola’ Oyediran and Ayodele Odusola:

The focus of household decision-making is determined by who controls and
allocates economic resources within the family. A change in income generating
capacity of partners precipitates a change in household decision-making
prerogatives. Thus, at the core of household decision-making determinants is
poverty. An important determinant of poverty, on the other hand, is low women
participation in decision-making at home and in the community.605
In other words, the capacity of a female to participate in decision making is dependent,
among other variables, on her financial strength.606 However, it is contended that in
Northern Nigeria, irrespective of a wife’s educational attainment or occupational
position, decisions are generally made by the husband.607
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The decision-making authority of the husband in Northern Nigeria stems from his
obligations in the Qur’an.608 These obligations include to love and cater for the needs of
his wife, including her healthcare needs.609 In turn, the obligation of the wife includes
devout obedience, conscientious guarding of her chastity, contributing to the success of
the marriage, taking care of the comfort and wellbeing of her husband, and avoiding
conducts that may offend him.610 Because the husband has to maintain his authority
over his wife, he does not consult her before making decisions.611 Conversely, in keeping
with her obligation of devout obedience, and in order not to offend her husband, the
wife complies with the decision he makes.

As indicated above, decision making in the context of healthcare presents two possible
arguments. On the one hand, it may be argued that the decisional authority of the
patient and, consequently, her autonomy in this respect is significantly diminished if she
is not allowed to make decisions herself. For, decision making must proceed from a
competent patient or her appointee as a free and autonomous agent. Therefore, to
impose another person’s treatment decision on her does not respect her autonomy and
does not satisfy the requirement of voluntariness in informed consent.

On the other hand, if we adopt the view of the husband and wife as a unit, unified by
matrimony, and so, not separate autonomous persons, then we might accept the
husband’s decision as flowing from the unit and not from the husband as a separate
608
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individual. In this sense, it would not matter who the actual decision maker is, or the
processes leading to the decision. Provided the decision follows an understanding of the
nature of treatment and its risk, it is validly made and the autonomy of the unit is not
harmed. Looked at from another angle, it could be said in this context that since the
rights and obligations of the husband and wife are accepted by either party, so that the
obligations of the husband give the wife a right in their performance, and the
obligations of the wife give the husband a right in their performance, it would seem that
the wife has a right to expect the husband to provide her needs, including healthcare
needs. Doing this may include deciding what healthcare needs should be provided or
received, and when. Correspondingly, the husband has a right in the devout obedience
of his wife and this, by extension, includes obedience to his decisions. On this view, the
autonomy of the wife-patient is arguably undisturbed, being that she is getting what, in
a manner of speech, she bargained for.

It may also be argued that the rights and obligations of husbands and wives as provided
by the Qur’an, serve identical functions with a waiver. In this case, the wife waives
decisional authority in favour of her husband and undertakes to comply with his
decisions. In regard to waiver, the waivor retains the right to reclaim the right to decide,
but this does not seem possible in the circumstances here where unflagging obedience
has been promised and can even be compelled by physical measures.612

The import of the foregoing is that obtaining first-person consent may be problematic.
There is suggestion that it is perfectly acceptable and culture-respecting to obtain
consent from the husband of a competent woman.613 Perhaps this suggestion is based
on a fear that to insist on first person consent may disrupt the marital relationship, and
perhaps, create more problems for the patient. But, respecting such cultures may be
validating gender inequality and the subordinated status of women. Consequently, it
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may be ideal to disrupt certain relationships if they are oppressive. Seeking first person
consent is particularly important in patriarchal Nigeria for the very purpose that it
should disrupt such unequal relationships.614 How to go about getting first person
consent is another challenge. This follows the internalization and acceptance of their
subordinated status which makes some women seek permission from their husbands
before consenting to treatment, in situations where physicians attempt to deal directly
with them.615 It is not certain that physicians alone can effectively meet this challenge.
However, they can certainly contribute by tactfully bringing the patient into the
treatment discussion and asking for their suggestions, contribution and preference. In
the long run, greater improvement may come through economically and educationally
empowering women.

Another challenge to informed consent in Nigeria which affects the exercise of
autonomous capacity is the culture of role play. This stems from an emphasis given to
hierarchy which maintains inequality in the Nigerian culture. Markers of this inequality
include age, social and economic standing. This challenge affects mostly women and
children. This challenge is discussed immediately below.

5.1.7 Sociology of Respect and Role Play as a Challenge to Informed Consent in
Nigeria
So far, this chapter has argued that informed consent may be constrained where (i) the
patient is cognitively misaligned with the physician either as a result of unorthodox
belief either as to the cause of his or her illness or metaphysical belief in his or her
imperviousness to the risks of the illness or its treatment, and (ii) the patient has the
614
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capacity, but is unable to exercise his or her right of autonomy. It has demonstrated that
this may arise in a number of ways, such as where, owing to patriarchy, a woman is not
allowed to make her decision. Another constraint on the exercise of autonomy derives
from the Nigerian emphasis on hierarchy and stratification with definite roles assigned
to each stratum.

Nigeria is a hierarchical society where age, position and wealth demand respect.616 This
means that the lack of equality between individuals is acknowledged and accepted
without question. It also means that there is a general recognition of the roles each
person is expected to play based on the person’s status or position. For example, there
is a general recognition of inequality between government and governed, between
employers and employees, between teachers and students, between parents and
children and, between physicians and patients.

Along with this recognition is the expectation that each class of persons would fulfill the
roles designated to their class. The government is expected to provide basic needs:
social, economic, healthcare, educational, infrastructural and related resources.
Employers are expected to provide jobs, good staff packages and safe working
environments. Parents must provide for their children, including determining the nature
of healthcare treatment they would receive.617 For physicians, it is expected that they
are knowledgeable about the human anatomy, about detecting what health problem a
patient has, and that they can be trusted to act beneficently to relieve the patient of
that health problem. Thus, inequalities are accepted and those in subordinate positions
trust the superordinate classes to carry out their roles. For those in the subordinate
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group, such as the governed, students, employees and patients, it is expected that they
should be told what to do.618

Given the foregoing, it is not surprising that informed consent which, in effect,
challenges the superordinate position and role of physicians, has not received full
compliance. Although there have been, at least, two reported cases that seem to
endorse a patient’s right to refuse treatment on religious grounds, these cases could be
seen to not have fundamentally challenged the expectation that physicians know what
is best for the patient and that their duty is to benefit the patient. One way of analyzing
the cases, is to see them as endorsing respect of another unequal relationship, one
which is regarded as higher than that between the physician and the patient. That is, the
unequal relationship between the Creator, God, and his creatures. The decision calls for
respect for God’s command to his creatures not to eat blood and blood products. This
decision does not affect the role assigned to any class. Rather, it affirms that a higher
class requires a certain conduct, the lower class must, of necessity, defer to the wishes
of the higher class.

The foregoing may be exemplified thus: Given the inequality in relationships between
government and governed, doctor and patient, teacher and student, parents and
children, pastor and congregation, where there is conflict between a stipulation by
government that everybody must stay at home on a particular day, and an instruction
by a teacher that classes would hold on the same day, because the relationship between
government and the teacher is also one of inequality, with the class of teachers being
the subordinate, the student is more likely to comply with the requirement of
government. This does not translate to denying the role of teachers to hold classes, but
it affirms their subordination to the superior authority of government.
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In sum, the culture of role play has not been unsettled by the courts in MDPDT v
Okonkwo and Esabunor v Faweya. By implication, this says that in Nigeria, the prevailing
notion and expectation is that a patient is content to play the role of a patient and to
allow the physician to play her role of carrying out her care. Clearly, this means a patient
may not necessarily expect to be asked to consent to a course of treatment decided
upon by the physician as appropriate for his or her care, and the physician would expect
the patient’s agreement with his or her decision, and compliance with his or her
instructions.

But, a patient is a morally accountable agent who is responsible for his or her actions.
When a patient acts on the basis of a role assigned to him or her, the intuition that they
are not autonomous may be triggered. It is possible that though possessing the power
to reflect, regulate and control his or her behavior, in the light of his or her values and
beliefs, the patient may choose not to exercise it. In this case, his or her submission to a
physician’s instruction is, arguably, an exercise of autonomy.

However, in situations where the patient does not critically and reflectively choose the
role he or she is assigned, either because he or she is unaware that he or she has a
choice whether or not to carry out his or her assigned role, his or her autonomy is,
arguably, impeded. A patient who, in asserting his or her autonomy, refuses to passively
accept the role that is expected of him or her may create friction or disrupt the
relationships that are built around those obligations and expectations. However, as
mentioned earlier, the disruptive effect of autonomy is only a possibility, not a
necessary outcome of the exercise of autonomy. Accordingly, it should not detract from
the desirability of full exercise of autonomy.

The next two challenges to informed consent derive from contextual differences
between Nigeria and other jurisdictions with a more robust consent law and practice.
Beginning first with cultural relativism, it shows that, as currently construed, informed
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consent arose from and is tailored to fit western countries. As a result, attempting to
practice informed consent in Nigeria without first domesticating it creates avoidable
challenges. The second contextual difference focuses on how the absence of judicial
compulsion removes the incentive to faithfully adhere to informed consent
requirements.

5.1.8 Cultural Relativity as a Challenge to Informed Consent in Nigeria

Distilled from all of the foregoing is that while there are globally cognizable challenges
to informed consent, there are those that are more likely than others to exist in a
particular society. Although the concept and appeal of autonomy is recognized in all
cultures, its expression may vary according to the particular culture that is being
observed. This makes it incongruous to interpret autonomy uniformly across various
cultures.

Nigeria is a unique legal system in which certain western-developed concepts may serve
to frame practices. Unless such concepts are made to fit the background, experiences
and values of its people, they are likely to be irrelevant to the issues they seek to frame.
Challenges to informed consent caused by variations in culture are noted by several
authors.619 Each element of informed consent has implications for different cultures.
For example, full disclosure may conflict with cultural beliefs about hope and wellness;
strictly autonomous decisions may conflict with family centered decision making and
the social meaning of competence; uncoerced decisions may conflict with cultural
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norms of obedience to the wishes of one’s spouse or family elders.620 A culturally
sensitive approach to healthcare may achieve better outcomes.621

As currently framed in the literature, informed consent as a concept, suggests that the
inequality between physicians and patients is so worrisome that it needs to be
exchanged for one which balances such inequality. This view of informed consent
accords and coheres with some societies in which it is practiced - like Canada, US, UK,
and Australia. In these societies, there is a common desire to erase the inequality
between physicians and patients and to push for patient sovereignty and selfdetermination. This desire is not readily found in Nigeria. The seminal research by Geert
Hofstede sums up this relativist reality thus: culture is relative and not universal.622
5.1.8.1 Exploring Cultural Differences through Hofstedian Analysis
Culture refers to a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional
features of society or a social group, including art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living
together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.623 It is usually acquired and transmitted
over generations by symbols, stories and rituals. Culture may be said to be learned,
shared, cumulative, symbolic, integrated and above all, dynamic. Arguably, a person’s
620
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culture influences his or her perception or interpretation of reality; and, perception is
seen as experience filtered through one’s cultural background. The same event may be
interpreted differently by people from different cultural backgrounds.
Geert Hofstede developed five dimensions by which to measure the cultural relativity of
various countries and to compare them with one another.624 Four of the five dimensions
or perspectives are: (i) the extent to which power inequality is accepted; (ii) the degree
to which the country values certainty; (iii) the prevailing notion of the self; and (iv) the
nature of the drive in society. These perspectives are conceptualized respectively as
Power

Distance,

Uncertainty

Avoidance,

Individualism/Collectivism,

and

Masculinity/Femininity.625
From Hofstede’s analysis, a society characterized by a comparably high power distance
accepts, to a larger extent, class inequality in hierarchical relationships. Persons in this
society generally accept their place on the class strata. To a large extent, such a society
does not debate the idea that some should lead others or that certain privileges belong
to powerful and influential persons and there is a less active pursuit of participatory
encounters. Rather, people tend to accept that those in authority should decide and
direct what should be done. There is also no general expectation of input from persons
who belong in the lower stratum of the unequal relationship. Rather, these persons are
limited to carrying out the instructions given. In such societies, decision making
authority is centralized. Hofstede finds, with a score of 80, that Nigeria is a very
hierarchical society. It is more hierarchical than South Africa which has a score of 49. In
societies with a lower level of power distance, for example UK (35), Australia (36), US
(40) and Canada (39), inequality in power distribution is rejected and justification is
demanded for hierarchies.
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With respect to uncertainty avoidance, Hofstede finds that Nigeria has a higher
preference for avoiding uncertainty than the other countries in this analysis, while the
UK, Canada and the US are relatively more uncertainty accepting. An uncertainty
avoiding society generally has a low risk tolerance, is less entrepreneurial, has a low
tolerance of deviant people and ideas, avoids conflict and emphasizes consensus, has a
high respect for laws and rules even where those rules do not work, accepts the acts,
decisions or opinions of experts and authorities as correct.
The extent to which a society is individualized or collectivized depends on the extent to
which its members are in loosely knit relationships where individuals are only
responsible for themselves and their immediate family, as in an individualized society,
or tightly knit structures where, in return for loyalty, individuals can expect care and
support from relatives or other members as in a collectivistic society. It also depends on
the extent to which individual or collective achievement is emphasized, the degree of
independence exercised in decision making, and the level of recognition accorded to
emotional ties to organizations or groups. Its significant determinant is in how selfimage is reflected -whether as “I” or “we”. On this individualism dimension, Hofstede
finds that Nigeria scores significantly lower than other countries and, consequently, is a
collectivized society.626
And to the masculinity/femininity dynamic, societies are classified according to their
definitions of gender roles. For example, a masculine society is one in which the
dominant role is assigned to the male gender, where decisiveness in males is
encouraged, where work is given priority, and success and money are emphasized. This
is counterposed to a feminine society where cooperation and consensus is encouraged
and emphasis is placed on caring for the weak. Hofstede finds that all the countries,
including Nigeria, are masculine in nature. Canada is described as moderately masculine
because, in some ways, it emphasizes care, emotions and relationships.
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5.1.8.2 Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions: Lessons for Informed Consent
and Autonomy in Nigeria
Constructing Nigeria through the lens offered by Hofstede shows that Nigeria is a
hierarchical, collectivist and masculine society which, to a significant extent, avoids
confrontation and uncertainty. To a larger or smaller extent, the US, UK, Canada,
Australia and South Africa are all less tolerant of hierarchy and unequal relationships
than Nigeria. They are also more individualistic and, except for South Africa, each of
them is uncertainty accepting. Although Hofstede’s work looks at how values in the
workplace are influenced by culture, his findings are relevant in explaining the peculiar
challenges faced in the effort by Nigeria to practice informed consent in the same
manner and according to the same values as the other countries. As shown, the
prevailing culture in these countries differs significantly from the culture in Nigeria.
Given the relativism of culture, an attempt to graft into a cultural setting a practice
grown in a different cultural setting assumes cultural universalism.
Even so, it is acknowledged that a concept like autonomy is universal. For example, the
movement in Northern Nigeria for greater rights for women, the nuanced interest in
maternal health and the reproductive rights of women, the push for girl-child education
in Nigeria, the fight against violence against women, the mobilization against traditional
widowhood practices, may all be explained on the basis of autonomy, that is, the right
to determine what happens to one’s body.
However, since Nigeria’s socio-economic development is not at a level comparable to
those of the western countries, its emphasis on autonomy is also at a foundational level.
This means that the agitation is for the recognition of basic rights to education, to be
free of harmful and demeaning widowhood practices, to access maternal healthcare,
and to exercise reproductive rights. It has not yet advanced to agitation about the
modalities of the exercise of the right. In other words, the fight is still about whether the
right exists, should exist, and how it is to be brought into existence, instead of how that
right should be exercised, whether communally or individually. Framed differently,
although the long-run issue is autonomy and the right to bodily integrity, the immediate
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challenge for Nigeria is one of access, and overcoming barriers to access, such as
illiteracy, poverty, patriarchy. This challenge affects the basic question whether, in the
first place, there is a patient whose consent is to be obtained, and second, what the
nature of consent may be if it is obtained in any one case.
5.1.9 Absence of Judicial and Ethical Motivation as a Challenge for Informed
Consent
So far, we have seen that the limitations to the practice of informed consent in Nigeria
include trust, religion, a culture of role play, familial influence, demography, and
context. Another contextual challenge to informed consent is the general lack of
motivation on the part of physicians to comply with informed consent requirements. In
Chapter Two, it was argued that informed consent is ethically justified and legally
mandated. A failure to obtain informed consent from a patient prior to administering
treatment leaves the physician liable to a cause of action in either battery or negligence.
A failure to disclose or inadequate disclosure has been a basis for several suits, as in
Canada.627 The position is different in Nigeria. Asides from MDPDT v Okonkwo and
Esabunor v Faweya which were based on a constitutional right of freedom of religion,
there is no known judicial decision on the right of a patient to give informed consent,
and on the duty of physicians to disclose pertinent information to their patients to
inform their consent to treatment.
In MDPDT v Okonkwo, the Supreme Court indicated the direction courts in Nigeria
would likely take in the event that cases that implicate matters of informed consent
become more common in Nigeria. As already discussed, the court leaned in favour of
autonomy and the right of the adult patient to refuse treatment except where public
interest determines otherwise, or where there are children whose interests need to be
considered. While this case is helpful, its directional usefulness is limited. It does not, for
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example, address issues of disclosure and understanding which are necessary for
informed consent.
As already highlighted, studies show that the consent of the patient is not sought in
some cases before medical treatment. Where it was sought, disclosure was found to be
arbitrary. Studies also found that sometimes, patients are not satisfied with the extent
of disclosure made. Yet, no case has been made in Nigeria against the physicians
involved, either in battery for failing to obtain consent, or in negligence, for failing to
disclose the risks of treatment and other material information. One commentator
attributes the dearth of cases alleging lack of informed consent to a general
sociocultural reluctance to settle medical disputes through litigation.628 According to
him, there is a general inclination to settle disputes using elders, religious leaders and
family members. It is also attributed to a general inclination to accept medical outcomes
as the will of God.629
Beyond the foregoing socio-cultural factors, the paucity of informed consent litigation in
Nigeria, and the reluctance to seek legal redress following medical mishap, may be
influenced, primarily, by absence of awareness arising from illiteracy and ignorance of
the existence of the right to be informed.630It is also influenced by economic
considerations in regard to the cost of litigation and uncertainty of the outcome of the
process. Protracted trials and corruption of the Nigerian bar and bench also discourage
litigation.631 There is optimism that with an increase in literacy, a decline in poverty, and
the introduction of a health insurance scheme, more medical malpractice cases will be
litigated.632 Certainly, this thesis does not contend that a prevalence of litigation in any
society indicates advancement. However, the absence of a judicial authority that
upholds the likelihood of liability for non-compliance with the requirements of informed
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consent, arguably, reduces the incentive for physicians to comply with consent
procedures.
5.2

Conclusion

Nigeria’s practice of informed consent reflects clearly the country’s socio-cultural and
economic realities. These realities absorb a desirable principle of appropriate relations
in healthcare delivery, and have paced conforming practice to their dictates.
Consequently, operationalizing informed consent can only become reality with change
and improvement in the underlying and conditioning socio-cultural and economic
influences.
Among the factors examined as adversely affecting the practice of informed consent in
Nigerian healthcare, illiteracy and poverty ranks high. These particular impediments
affect whether consent will be sought; what information is disclosed; whether the
patient acts autonomously; and whether the patient is able to evaluate the information
he or she is given. Primarily, a socially and economically empowered patient may be
able to escape the relational influences of patriarchy, gender inequality and role play, on
his or her exercise of autonomy. Such patients are more likely to question certain
relationships, analyze social expectations and reflect on their choices, and fashion their
responses to socializing influences rather than passively accept them. This does not
mean that illiterates and poor persons are always unable to exercise full autonomy or
that their better positioned counterparts are always able to escape the influences of
patriarchy, gender inequality and role play. Rather, it is a matter of the degree or
frequency at which full autonomy may be exercised.
As argued in this chapter, both poverty and illiteracy affect the ability of a patient to
compel respect of his or her right to self-determination. On the other hand, a literate
and economically empowered patient makes a physician to be conscious of liability for
failing to obtain proper informed consent. Consequently, if illiteracy and poverty can be
eradicated through economic and educational empowerment, and through a
hermeneutic engagement with the patient, the effects of patriarchy, religious and other
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beliefs will be reduced, and a more nuanced consent practice may develop. Possibly,
with education, patients may be aware of their right of autonomy and ensure that it is
respected; and with economic power, patients are given the means to protect that right,
whether by being able to make a claim in court, or, by paying for the treatment they
want.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion
Bioethical literature identifies duress, coercion, undue influence and misrepresentation
as vitiating consent, since they constrain an individual’s autonomous capacity. The
influence of oppression on a patient’s choice is often overlooked.
Often, oppression may manifest through coercion or undue influence, however, it may
be subtle enough to go unnoticed. This thesis views oppression as certain influences
which impede full exercise of autonomy by an individual. The thesis finds that such
oppression may arise from socialization. Ready examples are patriarchy and religion.
Oppression may arise from the arbitrary disclosure practice by physicians by which the
nature of information that is disclosed is based on the literacy level of the patient.
Oppression may also arise as a result of legislative enactment, such as criminalizing
abortion, which limits the options available to an individual in exercising her
reproductive autonomy.
The influence of patriarchy is particularly visible in relationships between a husband and
wife in Nigeria, especially as it relates to decision making about the wife’s reproductive
health. It is either that the husband decides the nature of treatment the wife receives,
or the pressure to conform to the societal norm which places premium on motherhood
and the male gender, forces her to make certain choices.
To a large extent, a Nigerian woman is primarily valued for her reproductive capacity.
Her ability to fulfill her biological child bearing role secures, not only for herself, but also
her dependents, social security. Particularly, her ability to produce a child of a preferred
gender, usually a male child, secures for her a place in her matrimonial home and in the
society. This puts her in a position where she may accept any medical option that will
enable her, first, to conceive, and, second, to have a male child. The search for a male
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child may also cause her to have more children than she wants, and sometimes at the
expense of her health.
Through striving by every means available to get pregnant or have a male child, each
woman contributes to normalizing societal expectation that a real woman is one who
has given birth to a child at all, and particularly a male child. Yet the consequences of
not complying with this socially assigned role may be the risk of losing her coveted
position as a married woman, or being outranked by a younger and more compliant cowife.
The possibility of such disruption or demotion is understandably worrisome in a society
where women generally derive their identity from that of the men in their lives. This
puts women in Nigeria in a double bind where they are disadvantaged whichever way
they turn. It is argued that oppressed people fail to act fully autonomously because “the
options that are meaningfully available to them do not include a choice that is
compatible with their deepest values and needs or because the rewards and
punishments for choosing an action that reinforces oppression outweighs the personal
benefits of choosing one that would help undermine the oppression.”633
Also limiting her options is the illegality of abortion in Nigeria except to save the life and
health of the woman. By this illegality, the State forces women to have children even
where they are not ready. Attempts to surmount this legal hurdle result in accessing
unsafe abortion services and contribute to the alarming rate of maternal mortality in
Nigeria. Further, because relationships in Nigeria are communal and hierarchical in
structure, emphasis is placed on assigned roles and individuals are expected to carry out
the roles expected of them. All the foregoing affects the extent to which an individual’s
medical decision is voluntary and reflective of his or her values and interests.
Consequently, in analyzing the relational impediments to full exercise of autonomy by
patients in Nigeria, it was increasingly clear that, contrary to Western bioethics
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literature in which the debate appears to be about whether patient autonomy prevails
or whether paternalism is justified, with a common ground being the patient’s best
interest, the situation in Nigeria is more complex.
Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court of Nigeria in MDPDT v Okonkwo strongly
endorsed patient autonomy over the beneficence of the medical profession, and
notwithstanding that informed consent and patients’ right of self-determination enjoy
constitutional protection, informed consent debate in Nigeria is not entirely about
either patient autonomy or physician paternalism. Rather, it involves several other
interests such as the interest of a husband, the church, the community, and the state, in
the medical decisions of a patient. It also involves a social value of obedience, which
may warrant complying with medical decisions made by other persons, or with the role
expected of a patient, or faithful adherence to a religious doctrine.
In analyzing the shortcomings of the Code of Medical Ethics in Nigeria, it was
categorically suggested that: competence be assessed functionally; the patient may be
cajoled, entreated or persuaded by family members provided he or she is not
overwhelmed by the persuasion to the extent that the decision made does not reflect
his or her preferences and interests; and, adequacy and materiality of disclosure should
be measured by the patient’s needs. It was also suggested that both the physician and
the patient have a role to play in the medical decision making, the fact of which makes
the process leading to the decision collaborative, but the final decision is ultimately for
the patient to make.
Ideally, these suggestions should make informed consent more nuanced in Nigerian
health care. But, the challenge of obtaining a truly voluntary consent, and how to
recognize such consent, is particularly problematic given the various relational factors
that might impede a voluntary exercise of autonomy. A patient might be declared
functionally competent to decide his or her medical treatment. He or she may receive
adequate information to enable him or her make an informed decision. Yet, if the
patient is not allowed to make the decision that she wants, either because, for a female
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patient, her husband’s consent, not her own, is required, or because the patient feels
compelled, owing to his or her socialization, to make a particular choice, or because the
physician withheld or manipulated necessary information, then the essence of informed
consent will be defeated.
Thus, this thesis finds that autonomy of a patient in Nigeria cannot be fostered or
enhanced merely by assessing competence functionally, or by providing extensive
information or by scheduling several counseling sessions in order to allow the patient to
make a reasoned and unhurried decision. The social circumstances from which the
patient must make his or her decision must be conducive to such decision making. Such
decisions must also reflect the patient’s own values. It is a truism that for every value
that is formed or any action that is taken, there are antecedent causes that shape those
values and those actions. As such, it is impossible to escape one’s social environment.
But, as Linda Barclay observes, the difference between an autonomous person and a
nonautonomous person is that “the autonomous person is not a passive receptacle of
[the societal influences] but reflectively engages with them to participate in shaping a
life for herself.”634
Consequently, to promote autonomy transcends focusing on the patient and arming
him or her with extensive information to be able to cope with decision making. It
requires overhauling the socio-cultural background of Nigeria from which decisions are
made.
The foregoing analysis is made possible through the relational theoretical frame work
that is adopted. As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, a relational theory enables
analysis of how oppressive socialization and oppressive social relationships impede
autonomous agency at three levels: (i) at the time of formation of an individual’s
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desires; (ii) at the time of developing the ability to be autonomous; and (iii) at the time
of exercising autonomy or making autonomous choices.
Using this framework, it was found, at the first level that the socializing effect of
paternalism, religion, and stereotypical role play, contribute in shaping an individual’s
values, beliefs, and desires. At the second level, it was found that developing the
capacities for self-reflection and self-direction requires empowerment of the individual
and eliminating the impediments to his or her autonomous capacity. It was found that
the exercise of autonomy may be overtly impeded at the third level by legislation, such
as the Criminal Code which makes it illegal to access abortion services unless the life and
health of the woman are in danger. It also found that autonomy can be impeded by
norms and social expectations which effectively reduce the range of significant options
that are available to patients.
As earlier mentioned, it may not always be possible to enhance the autonomy of a
patient through extensive information disclosure or through insisting on an uncoerced
choice from a variety of options. According to Susan Sherwin, an individual may not
improve his or her degree of autonomy simply by improving his or her understanding of
the nature of decision that he or she is to make, he or she also has to be properly
situated in favourable circumstances.635 Accordingly, enhancing autonomy may require
more than educating the individual on the risks and alternatives to treatment, or
requiring a more thorough informed consent standard. Based on a relational view, a
clarion call may be made on the State, the medical profession, and other individuals to
ensure that the patient has full autonomy, and that there is no coercion on his or her
exercise of autonomy.
On the part of the State, it may require the development and adoption of policies which
would, for example, overturn the legislative impediment to women deciding on whether
or not to carry a pregnancy to term. It may also involve the adoption of policies that will
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deliver sustained economic and educational power to the citizens – actual and potential
patients.
For the medical profession, it may require actively engaging with the patient in more
meaningful ways that will ensure that the patient’s personal values are reflected in the
medical decision that he or she makes. It also requires deliberately seeking consent
from a female patient, rather than her husband, where the patient is capable of
understanding and appreciating the implication of her decision. Overall, it requires deep
commitment to the ideal of autonomy irrespective of the social or economic class of the
patient.
At the community level, enhancing patient autonomy by removing the impediments to
it may necessitate a change of mindset, both in the general expectations from the
patient, and in the attitude of members of the community towards his or her increasing
assertions of autonomy.
Patients also have a role to play in enhancing their autonomous capacity. For example,
they may consciously and deliberately repudiate the oppressive socialization, thoughts
and beliefs that they have internalized.636 However, without the support and
cooperation of the State, physicians, and other members of the community, such
repudiation may potentially exacerbate the oppression and severe long established
social ties.
Overall, it may be concluded that informed consent will work in Nigerian healthcare if
there is a firm commitment to patient autonomy, particularly by the key players in the
society. This demands the adoption of a different mindset and a more genuine tolerance
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of autonomy. Changing mindsets is potentially difficult, more so when what is involved
is a long established practice. Yet it is necessary for this change to be brought about in
order for patients – actual and potential – to be able to exercise full autonomy in
decisions concerning their health, and so, to enjoy the fullness of their bodily integrity
and self-determination.
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